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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The earliest computers were used in a mode that made no distinction 
between programmer and operator. Having prepared a program, the user 
signed up for a session with the machine, during which he took conç)lete 
control, loading and running his program himself, and using the console 
lights and switches to start and stop the machine and to diagnose and 
patch the inevitable program errors. In case of machine failures (which 
were far more frequent in vacuum-tube days than new), the programmer was 
on the scene to decide how best to pick up the pieces and continue proc­
essing. At the end of his session, the user took all of his results— 
tapes and listings—away with him, leaving the machine for all practical 
purposes in the same state as that in which he had found it. 
The first machines were soon replaced fay bigger, faster, and more 
reliable successors. It became apparent that while the machine lay idle, 
as the programmer/operator pondered his next patch, millions of potentially 
useful machine operations were being lost; the bigger, faster, and more 
expensive the machine, the greater was the opportunity cost of on-line 
WW f ^ S«. W V W f V ^ W*** ^  W ^ ^ W y ^ f 
as well as users who were not programmers at all; for such applications 
and users, the lights and switches of the machine's console were of little 
interest. During roughly the same period, the sophistication of program­
ming techniques had progressed to a level at which the loading and running 
of users' programs could be taken over entirely by an operating system 
executed by the machine itself; a system timer could guard against 
infinite loops, and instead of merely halting on error conditions, the 
machine could be made to transfer to a system routine that would print 
diagnostic messages. And so "batch processing" became commonplace: users 
handed in their jobs across a counter, and received the printed results 
in an hour oj. two (or, sometimes, not for a day or two). Within the 
computer room, operators batched many users' jobs together and fed them in 
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a continuous stream to the machine, which went from one job to the next 
without a pause. Machine idleness was thereby minimized. 
For many applications, batch processing was indeed adequate. So-
called "production" programs, sufficiently reliable and routine as to 
produce the desired results without a programmer in attendance, were 
served well enough. But for other applications, such as program develop­
ment and debugging, which typically require frequent, intensive inter­
action between the running program and the programmer, something had been 
lost. The several-hour delay between the submission of a job and the 
availability of the results was long enough to cool the programmer's 
enthusiasm and involvement, and frequently forced him to keep several jcdss 
in the air at once, to avoid being idle himself between submission of a 
job and the return of its results. Since trivial coding errors meant the 
loss of hours or days, programmers tediously "desk-checked" their programs 
before submitting them, actually dvç)licating—in advance—the work of the 
computer. Conservatism was rewarded, and experimentation discouraged, as 
people were forced into disadvantageous patterns of thinking and working 
by the very machines that were supposed to be serving them. 
Timesharing was originally proposed as a means whereby the immediate, 
intensive on-line access of the early days could be recaptured—albeit at a 
I 111 . m ^ ^ W 1 mm A «3 ^ A ^ ^ #3 IfK A A ^ ^ ^ ^ m m M 1 A uiu^xi V JLC uAicuA xxoui 
lights and switches—through conversational access. The user of a time­
sharing system is provided with a terminal, including a keyboard through 
which he communicates with the system, loading and rtinning his programs, 
and a printer on which the results are displayed as they are generated, 
along with diagnostic and explanatory messages from the system programs. 
Not only does tliis "instant turri-arounu" greatly reduce the elapsed time 
required for program development, but it encourages more innovative, experi­
mental, and intuitive uses of the machine [35, pp. 5,6]. Until recently, 
timesharing—i.e., the provision of computing service simultaneously to 
several independent users, by rapid switching of the machine's attention 
from one user to another—has been the only practical means of providing 
conversational access at an acceptable cost. At its most basic level, the 
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effect of timesharing is to give each user the illusion that he has the 
machine all to himself, while ensuring that most of the time, there is 
sufficient work available to keep the machine usefully occupied. Expensive 
machine idleness is thus averted not by altering people's preferred 
working styles—as in batch-processing—but by adapting the machine's 
behavior to suit its users' needs. 
This thesis is concerned with a particular timesharing system, 
namely, SYMBOL-2R. This machine, designed and built by a group led by 
Rex Rice and William R. Smith at the Palo Alto research and development 
laboratory of the Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation in the mid-
to-late 1960's, was first described publicly in 1971 [6, 8, 23, 32]. 
Motivating SYMBOL'S design was the conviction that most of the increasing 
sophistication and versatility of computing systems, including timesharing 
systems, had been achieved by the agglomeration of layer after layer of 
software, bridging the growing gap between the relatively primitive hard­
ware and tne high-level facilities offered to users, but in the process 
consuming far more of the machine's resources than was warranted, and 
contributing far more complexity than was necessary. To prove that many 
"software" functions could profitably be transferred to hardware, SYMBOL-2R 
was built as a pure hardware implementation, not only of a high-level 
programming lamguage, but of a multi-terminal timesharing system; operable 
in the complete absence of system software. Chapter 2 of this thesis 
describes both the externally visible attributes of SYMBOL, including its 
programming language, and various aspects o± its internal inç)lementation. 
The repertoire of services furnished by SYMBOL to its users, 
remarkable as it is for a software-free system, is primitive timesharing 
of the type described above, giving each user the illusion of exclusive 
access to the machine. By the time of SYMBOL's debut, several elabo­
rations had appeared in contemporaneous timesharing systems. First came 
on-line storage, which allowed users to entrust information to the 
machine for retrieval during some future terminal session. Then came 
facilities for controlled sharing of such information, providing a means 
whereby users can build upon one another's work by sharing programs and 
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other information. Examples of timesharing systems providing such 
facilities are described in [13, 20, 22, and 36]. The facility through 
which users store, retrieve, and share information, generally referred to 
as the file system, grew in importance until R. W. Watson could write, in 
1970, that "the file system is one of the most visible parts of the system 
to the user and one of the most inçjortant resources available to him" 
[35, p. 11]. 
Ironically, the newfound inçjortance of timesharing as a means of 
communication between its users came to prominence at a time when time­
sharing's original rationale—the provision of cheap conversational comput­
ing—was being threatened, if not yet actually undermined, by plummeting 
prices for hardware components, which drastically reduced the opportunity 
cost of machine idleness. To put it another way—when machine cycles are 
cheap enough, it becomes more economical to let them go to waste than to 
go to great lengths to utilize them. 
As originally conceived, and as delivered to Iowa State University for 
testing and evaluation, SYMB0L-2R lacked any sort of file system. Not only 
was there no means of using the machine for communication between users; 
the system lacked even private storage facilities. The end of every 
terminal session returned the machine, for all practical purposes, to the 
same initial state. It would be tempting, in view of these serious short­
comings , to dismiss SYMBOL as a mere tour de force, overtaken by events 
and devoid of any real significance. It is a matter of record, however, 
that SYMBOL-2R was intended only as a precursor of a full-fledged time­
sharing system to be called SYMBOL II [23, p. 581]; its designers were well 
aware of the need for a file system, but deliberately postponed its 
implementation until the mechanisms for basic timesharing were well in hand 
and the file-system algorithms had received further study [23, p. 578]. 
Not only have many of SYMBOL'S individual innovations proved remarkably 
successful, but the philosophy underlying its integrated design, and its 
re-examination of traditional assumptions regarding "general-purpose" 
architecture and hardware/software boundaries, demand the most thorough 
and extensive evaluation of SYMBOL and its iitçjlications. 
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Accordingly, one of the gocds of this thesis project has been to 
develop a file system for SYMB0L-2R, primarily as a vehicle for determining 
whether the system's basic structure, originally designed to enforce total 
isolation between users, was indeed capable of supporting a file system 
consistent with SYMBOL'S high-level programming language, furnishing long-
term storage and controlled sharing of programs and other information at 
a level expected of a modem timesharing system. Whether and to what 
extent the SYMBOL file system described in this thesis resembles one that 
might have emerged from the original SYMBOL project can never be known, 
due to the project's termination even before the completion of SYMBOL-2R, 
and long before SYMBOL II had been fully specified.^ 
Be that as it may, the file system described below amply demonstrates 
that SYMBOL'S basic architecture, far from restricting the machine to the 
most primitive level of timesharing, supports facilities for the protection 
and sharing of information that bear comparison with some of the most 
advanced systems in existence. In a 1972 paper surveying protection 
mechanisms, Graham and Denning identify 
. . . SGven levels [attributed by the authors to M. Schroeder] at 
which protection mechanisms can be conceived as being required, 
each level being more difficult than its predecessor to implement: 
1. No sharing at all (complete isolation). 
2. Sharing copies or programs or data files. 
3. Sharing originals of programs or data files. 
4. Sharing programming systems or subsystems. 
5. Permitting the cooperation of mutually suspicious 
subsystems .... 
6. Providing "memoryless" subsystems .... 
7. Providing "certified" subsystems .... [15, p. 417] 
personal communication from W. R. Smith to the author in 1971, 
containing recommendations for the SYMBOL project at ISU, suggests' that 
at the demise of the SYMBOL project at Fairchild, the file system being 
contemplated was somewhat more conventional, in its orientation towards 
spooling and conventional programmed I/O, than the file system eventually 
developed at ISU. 
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In its original configuration, SYMBOL corresponds to level 1; with the 
addition of the file system, whose functional characteristics are described 
in chapter 3, it rises to level 5. 
In a more recent survey of "the mechanics of protecting computer-stored 
information from unauthorized use" [29, p. 1278], Saltzer and Schroeder 
present a somewhat different categorization of protection schemes according 
to their functional properties; 
a) Unprotected systems .... 
b) All-or-nothing systems . . . that provide isolation of users, 
sometimes moderated by total sharing of some pieces of information .... 
c) Controlled sharing ... to control explicitly who may access 
each data item stored in the system . . . [allowing for] several 
common patterns of use, such as reading, writing, or executing .... 
d) User-programmed sharing controls . . . [providing for] user-
defined protected objects and subsystems .... Only a few of the 
most advanced systems designs have tried to permit user-specified 
protected subsystems. 
e) Putting strings on information .... Computer systems that 
inç>lement such strings . . . are rare and the mechanisms are 
incomplete. [29, p. 1281] 
In terms of this categorization, SYMBOL initially belongs in groi^) (b); as 
we show in chapter 3, the file system justifies its inclusion in category 
(d). 
Chapter 4 of the thesis is devoted to a description of how the file 
system is to be implemented, in sufficient detail to demonstrate its 
feasibility, and to serve as a guide to the implementation process (as of 
this writing, no firm plans have been made to actually construct the file 
system described herein). Some readers may well prefer to skim lightly 
over this chapter. 
Our purpose has not been limited, however, to the mere vindication of 
SYMBOL by showing that a file system of same sophistication could be 
mounted on the original machine. We have attempted also to identify, in 
chapter 5, those features and aspects of the SYMBOL architecture that were 
either particularly congenial or especially hostile to the implementation 
of the file system, as part of the on-going evaluation of SYMBOL and as a 
contribution to the art of conçuter system design. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SYMB0L-2R COMPUTING SYSTEM 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to present, for the benefit 
of readers previously unacquainted with SYMBOL, the machine context for 
the file system described in the following chapters. For readers already 
familiar with SYMBOL, this chapter establishes the terminology and con­
ceptual framework—the particular way of looking at the system—that we 
have adopted for this thesis. 
The chapter has two parts. The first describes the user's view of 
SYMBOL, giving such highlights of the system's command and programming 
languages as are related to the external attributes of the file system. 
The second part deals with those aspects of the SYMBOL implementation 
that influence the file-system implementation. 
Exterior Aspects 
Although SYMB0L-2R was developed as a research vehicle (whence the 
"R" in its name), it was nevertheless aimed at a particular segment of 
•che computing market, nasicly, those applications, typically prograrrr^d in 
FORTRAN or COBOL, in which the reduction in programming effort accruing 
from the use of high-level application-oriented programming languages 
outweighs any performance benefits obtainable through machine-oriented 
programming.^ SYMBOL was therefore designed to implement a general-
purpose application-oriented programming language—not one of the existing 
languages, but a new one, whose design was an integral part of the system 
design process (the reasons foi- the decision to develop a new programming 
language are described in [6]K 
^As hardware costs continue to diminish, and programming costs to 
increase, more and more applications will doubtless cross over into this 
category. 
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It was decided, early in the project, that the user's primary mode of 
interaction with the SYMBOL system would be conversational, through a 
terminal equipped with control and data-entry keyboards, status indicators, 
a printer, and possibly other I/O devices. This terminal provides the 
user's sole contact with the system—through it he loads and edits his 
program, controls its execution, supplies it with input data, and receives 
its output. Because a single user, interacting conversationally, can 
typically absorb only a small fraction of a conçut:.ng system's available 
computing power, SYMBOL was designed to serve as many as 31 terminals 
simultaneously. 
Finally, the reader ought to bear in mind, as he reads th^^ descriptions 
of SYMBOL, that the system was never intended as a marketable product, but 
only as a vehicle for testing and demonstrating many of the important 
concepts and mechanisms of a subsequent production model that was never 
completed. Many of its shortcomings were deliberate shortcuts appropriate 
for an experimental machine; had the project survived the electronics 
industry recession of 1970, SYMBOL-2R would probably have been consigned 
to history long since, and such attention as it has received would have 
been directed towards its successor. 
The SYMBOL Programming Langijage 
Probably the single most important factor in determining SYMBOL's 
appeal to its users is the language in which they express programs for it 
to execute. The language is also the primary determinant of many facets 
of the system's implementation. Accordingly, we devote a few pages to 
those aspects of the SYMBOL Programming Language (SPL) that have a bearing 
on the file system. Further descriptive material on SPL is contained in 
[6, 24, and 26]. 
SPL is in many respects a conventional general-purpose high-level 
language—"well within the main stream of contemporary language develop­
ment" [6, p. 563]. As befits its intended applications, it ewes much to 
FORTRAN and ALGOL 60. More than either of these languages, however, SPL 
is application-oriented, rather than machine-oriented—the SPL programmer 
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tends to think of his program as describing an algorithm, rather than 
controlling a conputer. In resolving the inevitable conflicts between 
the interests of the application programmer and those of the implementor/ 
the designers of SPL consistently favored the former. Some specific 
examples demonstrating this bias are given below. 
1. The burden of storage allocation and management is shifted from the 
programmer to the system. Not only does the language lack all size-
declaration statements, but it allows the amount of data contained 
in a variable's value—i.e., its storage requirements—to vary 
dynamically during program execution. 
2. Unnecessary type distinctions, such as INTEGER, PEAL, BOOLEAN, and 
CHARACTER are absent. Indeed, SPL provides only two distinct types 
of values, namely, scalars and structures. These types, moreover, 
are attributed only to values, cind not (as in conventional languages) 
to variables. 
A scalar value is simply a string of zero or more characters 
(an empty string is called a null value). Some of SPL's operators 
are defined over all scalar values, whereas others are defined only 
over proper subsets of the scalars. For example, the Boolean 
operators—AND, OR, and NOT—are defined only for strings containing 
nothing but I's and O's,- and the arithmetic operators are defined 
only over strings that satisfy the definition of a decimal number 
[24, p. 61] . Application of an operator to an operand outside its 
domain produces an execution error—as in the familiar divide-by-
zero error in conventional systems. 
A structure value is a vector, each of whose conponents is 
either a scalar cr a vector. Individual ccssponents of structure-
valued variables are selected, for evaluation or replacement, by 
conventional subscripted references. The regular arrays of FORTRAN 
and ALGOL can be handled as special cases of SPL's structure values, 
but SPL imposes no restrictions as to regularity or homogeneity. 
Indeed, structure values can be viewed as ordered trees, whose leaf 
nodes are scalar values; in this context, a subscript list is a 
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description of the path from the tree's root to a particular node. 
SPL provides a linear notation for describing structure values, as 
shown in Figure 1: each vector is enclosed in angle brackets ("<" 
and ">"), and neighboring scalar conçonents are separated by vertical 
bars ("1"). We enploy this notation in chapters 3 and 4 in describing 
structure-valued parameters of certain file operations. 
1 2  3  
4  5  6  
a matrix — conventional notation 
«1|2|3X4|5|6» 
the same matrix -- SPL linear notation 
Fig. 1. Structure values. 
3. Arithmetic operators are defined on decimal operands, rather than the 
conventional binary "equivalents"; numeric precision is program-
controllable in 1-digit increments from 1 digit to 99. Character-
c -*-4 T3/-v->T cs a va i c? +• r*rro 3 i +->-53 •vr r 
length. The language is thus unusually free of machine-architecture 
artifacts—it is not possible, in fact, to deduce SYMBOL'S word length 
from the results of SPL programs. 
Another important attribute of SPL—its conciseness—involves no compromise 
between the users' interests and those of the implementors. The users 
benefit from an easily remembered and understood, yet unusually powerful, 
set of operators and other constructs, while the mechanisms that interpret 
programs are spared excessive proliferation of program elements. 
In spite of its novel aspects, SPL is largely familiar to programmers 
accustomed to FORTRAN or ALGOL 60. It accommodates variables, to which 
values are bound by initial-value, input, and assignment statements. 
Values are generated by algebraic expressions involving constants, variable 
references, component references (i.e., subscripted variable references). 
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and procedure-calls, joined by operators chosen from SPL's set of 21 
numeric, character-string, relational, and Boolean operators. Conditional 
and GO-TO statements are provided for overriding the normal statement-to-
statement sequencing of execution. 
Like ALGOL 60, SPL is hierarchically block-structured. Unlike ALGOL 
60, however, a variable in an SPL block is local to that block, unless it 
is explicitly declared GLOBAL—which makes it known in the enclosing block. 
In addition to ordinary blocks, which are executed in-line, SPL provides 
procedure-blocks and CMî-blocks. Procedure blocks are invoked by explicit 
procedure-calls; a procedure may have any number of formal parameters 
(including zero), and the parameter linkage mechanism is of the type 
commonly referred to as "call by name": an actual parameter, which is 
an arbitrary expression, is in effect substituted for every occurrence 
of the corresponding formal parameter within the procedure. An ON-block 
is associated with one or more identifiers, and is invoked by certain 
events involving those identifiers. An ON-block linked to a variable is 
invoked immediately following any assignment operation affecting its 
value. 
The system provides a facility, analogous to ALGOL 60's standard 
functions or the "built-in" and library subprograms supplied by FORTRAN, 
known as the System Public Library. This is a collection of procedures, 
available to all users, that forms a run-time environment for all SPL 
programs. Library procedures are called by SPL programs in exactly the 
same fashion as ordinary procedures, the only difference being that 
library procedures are not declared in the program. 
Finally, SPL, like the other "main stream" programming languages, 
is limited to describing strictly sequential algorithiûs. Every executing 
SPL program has a single well-defined locus of control, and is totally 
isolated from all other computations. 
Conversational access 
Next in inçKjrtance, after the programming language, are the facilities 
by which the SYMBOL user gets his program into the machine and sees to its 
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execution. Each user works at a separate terminal, which is his only 
connection with the machine. The terminal is equipped not only with the 
usual input and output devices—keyboard and character printer, with 
card reader, line printer, and tape drives optional—but also a set of 
default I/O device selector switches, a command keyboard, a text-editing 
keyboard, and a panel of processing-mode indicators. The terminal's 
repertoire of processing modes is shown in Figure 2, together with the 
control-key commands and other events that give rise to processing-mode 
transitions. 
A user starts a terminal session by pressing his terminal's INITIATE 
key, which puts the terminal into the IDLE mode. The LOAD key then causes 
a transition to the LOAD mods, and proirçts the system to establish a 
workspace for the terminal. The workspace is a character-string, initially 
enpty, into which the user loads the text of his program using one of his 
terminal's input devices. He can then use the editing keyboard to insert, 
delete, and display text until he is satisfied with it, at which point he 
presses the end-of-record key to terminate loading. Pressing the RUN key 
then directs the system to assemble the program and all necessary public-
library procedures into what we call a computation, which is defined (from 
the user's point of view) as a program, together with all library pro­
cedures called by it, and the values of all of their variables. (Theproc­
ess of assembly, known as translation, actually involves the generation of 
an internal representation of the computation, which is then executed. 
This is not apparent to the user, however, to whom it appears that the 
system executes his source program directly). 
The system provides for at most one computation per terminal. The 
same RUN-key command that creates a computation destroys its predecessor, 
if any. Computations are also destroyed by the CLEAR key, which clears 
the workspace as well, and the TERMINATE key, which brings the terminal 
session to an end. 
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( INPUT > ^OUTPUT ) 
MODE TRANSITIONS 
1. INITIATE key 
2. LOAD key 
3. end-of-record character read 
4. RUN key 
5. translation successfully completed 
6. INPUT statement executed 
7. OUTPUT statement executed 
8. end-of-record character output, or 
CANCEL OUTPUT key pressed 
9. execution successfully completed 
10. RESTART key 
11. PAUSE key 
12. CONTINUE key 
13. processing error encountered 
14. PAUSE statement encountered 
15. CLEAR key 
16. TERMINATE key or communications 
failure 
ACTIVE PROCESSING MODES 
LOAD: source text is accepted from terminal's input device. Interactive 
editing provided includes insertion, deletion, and display of selec­
ted text (designated by characters or lines), and substring searching 
in both forward and backward directions. 
TRANSLATE: source text is syntactically analyzed and computation is gener­
ated. 
EXECUTE: computation (generated from source text in TRANSLATE) is executed. 
INPUT; one record (character string) is accepted from the terminal's input 
device and assigned to a variable. Editing is provided as in LOAD 
mode. 
OUTPUT; one or more records are transmitted to the terminal's output device. 
Fig. 2. Processing modes and transitions. 
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Software extensions 
The functionality of the system described above is provided by SYMBOL'S 
hcirdware alone, with no software involvement other than for system 
initialization. The system's user services can be augmented, however, by 
system software, as described in [25]. The current software system pro­
vides each terminal with a separate Terminal Monitor (TM)—a permanent 
computation that takes turns with the user-computation for control of the 
terminal. The TM is automatically invoked in case of processing errors 
in its companion user-con^utation, and can also be invoked at arbitrary 
times by pressing a certain control key. Among the services provided by 
Terminal Monitors are the following: 
1. extensive program-error diagnostics and interactive debugging aids 
2. SPL extensions, e.g., iteration statements, v^ich are not 
implemented by the hardware 
3. intervention to handle certain execution faults that are not 
properly handled as execution errors (e.g., the "field-expansion 
page fault" error described in chapter 4) 
4. a facility by which a user-confutation can create and invoke a 
subsidiary computation [5] 
5. substitutes for command and editing keys and processing-mode 
indicators, enabling the system to be accessed via commercially 
available teletype-compatible terminals. 
The TM will also furnish the user's primary access to the file system. 
The preceding paragraphs have presented a few highlights of the 
services provided by SYMBOL to its users, and have indicated the means by 
vdiich users request these services. Two aspects of the system's 
"exterior" are particularly important for protection—both for protection 
of the system from its users, and for protection of the users from one 
another. First, SYMBOL delivers what we may call "pure" timesharing, 
creating for each user the illusion of a private system dedicated to 
his use alone. Secondly, the system is designed to offer services that 
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are meaningful and useful at the application-program level, and makes 
no attempt to allow users to "control" the system. The most inqportant 
manifestation of this approach is that SYMBOL entirely withholds from 
its users the ability—routinely granted in conventional systems—to 
manufacture addresses and use them to gain access to the machine's 
storage facilities. As we shall demonstrate, this too has crucial 
consequences for protection. 
Inçlementation 
In this section we present a necessarily abbreviated description of 
the interior of SYMB0L-2R, with a strong orientation towards those aspects 
of the system that bear most directly upon the implementation of the 
file system. We undertake the description at two different levels of 
complexity, beginning with a less detailed view. 
The simpler view of the system, as depicted in Figure 3, splits 
it into two parts, namely, the Interpreter and the Memory System. The 
Interpreter is multiplexed among the user terminals to provide each one 
with a dedicated Virtual Processor that responds to the user's commands 
and executes his computations. Although the notion of a virtual processor 
is primarily a convenience in referring to the set of services received 
by a given terminal, in SYMBOL (unlike most systems in which the concept 
is used) a virtual processor has a certain degree of tangibility, in 
the form of dedicated memory space (its "context block," which is defined 
below) and a dedicated terminal. The SYMB0L-2R system allows for 32 
virtual processors (only three of which are equipped with physical 
terminals as this is written). 
The Memory System 
The Memory System serves the Interpreter, providing it with the 
storage facilities it needs to service all the virtual processors. As 
Figure 3 indicates, the Memory System is composed of two elements—the 
Memory Controller and Virtual Storage. The latter consists of a single 
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Fig. 3. Simplified view of SYMBOL-2R implementation. 
linear array of 2^^ (16 million) 64-bit storage locations (words), capable 
of storing 126 million 8-bit characters- Most of the virtual-memory 
implementations in existing multiprogramming systems provide a separate 
linear address space for each computation; some (e.g., Multics [21] and 
the Burroughs B5000 and its descendants [20]) provide several. In these 
systems, the context-dependent interpretation of an address—the dependence 
of the meaning of an address upon the identity of the computation that 
emits it—plays an important role in protecting computations from one 
another. In SYMBOL, to the contrary, a single linear address space serves 
the entire system and is shared by all computations; isolation between 
computations is provided not by the system's memory structure, but by the 
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discipline wired into the Interpreter. In the SYMBOL context, then, a 
virtual-storage address is an absolute address, in that its meaning— 
i.e., the physical storage location to which it refers—is independent 
of the computation in terms of which it is interpreted. As we shall 
show in chapter 4, this aspect of SYMBOL'S memory system proves to be 
highly advantageous for the sharing of information. 
Although the Interpreter communicates with Virtual Storage in terms 
of absolute (virtual) addresses, all of its storage accesses are trans­
acted through the Memory Controller, which inç>lements logical storage 
by inçosing two levels of structuring on the original linear address 
space [27, 38]. At the large-scale level (shown in Figure 4), the 
address space is partitioned into 256-word pages. Each page belongs 
either to one of several storage domains—one of which is provided for 
each virtual processor—or to the system's free-page pool. Each storage 
domain consists of three page lists, i.e., linked lists of pages; each 
list is dedicated to a specific use, as follows; 
page 
list usage 
1 uccr's workspace 
2 name tables, variables' values, stack, etc. 
3 instruction string 
(Some of these terms have yet to be defined.) In general, each page list 
contains both free space and space that is in use by the Interpreter 
(this is a manifestation of the second level of structure, which is 
explained below). It is when the Interpreter demands allocation of 
additional storage within a page list containing no free space that a 
page is taken by the Memory Controller from the free-page pool and 
added to the specified page list. The system allows for the imposition 
on each virtual processor of an upper bound on the number of pages in its 
storage domain. When this mechanism is being used, a computation 
attençting to allocate a page in excess of its virtual processor's limit 
incurs a processing error (this mechanism turns out to be useful for 
limiting individual users' consumption of file space). 
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Fig. 4. SYMB0L-2R logical-storage structure (large-scale level). 
Pages are reclaimed—i.e., returned to the free-page pool—an entire 
page list at a time.^ The RUN command triggers reclamation of page-lists 
2 and 3, clearing the terminal's pre-existing computation, if any, before 
generating a new confutation. The CLEAR and TERMINATE commands call forth 
reclamation of all three page lists of the terminal's storage domain. 
The smaller-scale level of storage structure is perhaps best explained 
in light of a somewhat novel aspect of the relationship between the 
Interpreter and the Memory Controller. This is, specifically, that the 
Incidentally, each page is cleared as it is reclaimed, providing 
redundant protection against unintended disclosure of residual data. 
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Interpreter itself never generates addresses; every address it emits is 
one that it has previously received from the Memory Controller, and 
stored meanwhile in memory or in one of its own internal registers. 
This allows the Memory Controller to structure the space in each page 
list into storage strings—one-dimensional strings of 64-bit words, 
allocated and extended on demand, and well matched to the data objects 
constructed and stored by the Interpreter. For every address submitted 
by the Interpreter in a storage access request, the Memory Controller 
returns to the Interpreter another address, specifying the storage-string 
predecessor or successor—depending on the nature of the operation—of 
the word accessed. The Memory Controller is thus in a position to 
define the logical relationships between storage locations, and particu­
larly the order of storage locations in a storage string. The details 
of the inç>lementation of these strings are explained in [27, 32, and 38]; 
for our purposes, it is sufficient to note that a portion of each page— 
32 "page-overhead" words out of the 256—is given over to various links, 
counters, and list structures by which the Memory Controller maintains 
the logical structure of the memory as it appears to the Interpreter. 
This leaves 224 words of each page for storing information actually 
submitted by the Interpreter. 
A typical instance of a storage string's employment begins when the 
Interpreter, having a multi-word datum to store, requests allocation of 
a new storage string. As parameters of the operation, it supplies the 
virtual-processor number and page-list number identifying the storage 
domain and page list in which the new storage string is to be located.^ 
The Memory Controller returns the address of the first word of a new 
storage string (after rearranging its private list structures as 
necessary, and perhaps adding a new page to the page list—all of which 
is invisible to the Interpreter). The Interpreter now requests a 
^The allocation of a new string thus breaks the infinite regression 
that may at first appear inherent in the Interpreter's inability to 
generate Virtual Storage addresses. 
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second operation, to store the first 64 bits of its datum at the address 
just received, i.e., in the first word of the string- At the conclusion 
of this operation, the Memory Controller returns the address of the next 
word of the string, which the Interpreter uses to store another 64 bits. 
This cycle is repeated—the Interpreter transmitting a 64-bit datum with 
an address (as well as its page-list number) , and receiving in return the 
next address of the string—as many times as necessary. The Memory Con­
troller sees to it that there always is a "next address," allocating space 
and appending it to the storage string in accordance with the Interpreter's 
demands. The Interpreter is thus provided with an arbitrary number of 
independent "mini-memories," each of which grows to whatever size is 
needed. 
The storage-string structure also appears in the data-retrieval 
("fetch") operations, by which the Interpreter obtains not only the datum 
occupying a specified storage location, but also the address of its storage-
string predecessor or successor. This facilitates bidirectional scanning 
of storage strings (both forward and backward scanning fetch operations 
are provided) for retrieval of multi-word objects. 
When the Interpreter has no further need for a storage string, it 
instructs the Memory Controller to de-allocate it. The Memory Controller 
returns the space occupied by the string to its page-list's free-space peel 
(not to be confused with the system's free-page pool) for eventual use in 
constructing new storage strings. 
An unusual property of the storage-string structure needs to be 
pointed out here, namely, that the addresses of contiguous words in a 
storage string are not necessarily numerically contiguous. In fact, 
consecutive words may reside in widely separated pages. The effect of 
this property is to reduce the extent to which SYMBOL'S memory is randcstily 
accessible, compared to conventional memories: in the absence of auxiliary 
information as to the location of the j-th word of a storage string, the 
location of whose i-th word is known, the j-th word can be located only by 
starting at the i-th word and scanning, which requires j-i fetch operations. 
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On the other hand, a pointer to the j-th word of a string provides 
immediate access to it; what is forbidden is for the Interpreter to 
calculate an address, as is commonly done in conventional linearly 
addressed memories. The overall costs and benefits accruing from the 
storage-string structure's flexibility emd restrictions are extremely 
difficult to disentangle from many of the system's other novel aspects, 
and no definitive evaluation is attempted here—in a system as tightly 
knit as SYMBOL, an evaluation of such a fundamental and pervasive aspect 
apart from its context would be meaningless. We cannot refrain from 
noting, however, that much of the address calculation that goes on in 
conventional systems amounts to nothing more than counting, in which 
case the SYMBOL mechanism incurs no penalty. The major use of conventional 
address calculation appears to be in locating components of arrays, an 
activity in which SYMBOL overcomes much of its initial disadvantage by 
using pointers (see chapter 4). 
We have left until last the mention of context blocks, which are 
small but inportant allocations of storage space permanently associated 
with each virtual processor. Each virtual processor's context block 
consists of 24 fixed storage locations, whose format is defined by the 
hardware; the net effect of the context block is to bind the virtual 
processor to a particular confutation. Some of the context-block words 
function as images of various Interpreter registers, containing 
computation-state information as of the Interpreter's most recent 
suspension of service to the virtual processor. Others are used by the 
Memory Controller in its implementation of the virtual processor's 
storage domain. The third group contains pointers to the main data 
objects that underlie the virtual processor's workspace and coir^utation. 
The naming system for context-block words—introduced here because 
it is useful later in the thesis—divides the space into three 8-word 
groups (not related to the three functions mentioned above). Each group 
is denoted by a letter, thus : A-headers, B-headers, and C-headers. 
Within each group, individual words are denoted by integers between 0 
and 7, as in "A-header-5," or, more compactly, "AH5." 
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Computations 
How does the Interpreter make use of SYMBOL'S structured storage in 
responding to commands and executing confutations? One instance of the 
use of a storage string is as a terminal workspace, whose one-dimensionality 
and unlimited length are well served by the corresponding characteristics 
of storage strings. Storage strings are also used in the internal repre­
sentations of confutations, created by the Interpreter upon receipt of a 
RUN command. Rather than executing a program directly from the workspace 
string in which it is stored, the Interpreter translates it (as mentioned 
above), i.e., scans the source program and generates an instruction string 
and, for each block of the computation, also generates a name table giving 
the attributes of each identifier used in the block. Each of these objects 
occupies its own storage string. When the generation of the instruction 
string and name tables representing a confutation is complété, the Inter­
preter commences execution of the computation. Biis leads to the generation 
of other structures that are also stored in storage strings—multi-word 
values, subscript lists, input and output buffers, and execution stacks, 
to name a few. Such details of these structures as concern the file 
system are set forth in chapter 4, in connection with the file system's 
inf lementation. 
In the absence of a software system, the sole use of storage strings 
outside of confutations is the System Public Library. The library's 
implementation uses a storage string for its directory (the System Name 
Table), which contains procedure-names interspersed with pointers to other 
storage strings in which are stored the sour ce-text definitions of the 
procedures. When the Interpreter, having generated a confutation's 
instruction string and name tables, discovers a procedure-call that is not 
matched by any procedure-block, it searches the library ' s directory for 
the procedure-name, follows the pointer to the procedure's source text, 
and resumes the scanning of text and the generation of instructions 
exactly as if it were still working on the workspace program proper. 
Unlike many systems, which share executable copies of library procedures, 
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SYMBOL thus provides a separate copy of each library procedure's 
instruction string for each calling program. 
Inside the Interpreter 
Whereas we have heretofore referred to the Interpreter as a single 
monolithic processor, it is in fact composed of several semi-autonomous 
processors capable of concurrent operation. These processors—Autoncxtious 
Functional Units (AFU's) in SYMBOL parlance—are specialized to handle 
particular functions. The five AFU's that provide processing services 
in direct implementation of computations are listed below. 
1. The Channel Controller handles control- and data-character traffic 
between the mainframe and the terminals. 
2. The I/O Processor [17] is responsible for program loading and 
editing, and cooperates with the Central Processor in executing I/O 
statements. 
3. The Translator [2, 3, 18] scans source programs stored in workspaces 
and generates internal representations of computations. 
4. The Central Processor [4, 9, 16] executes computations. 
5. The Memory Reclaimer [27] cooperates with the Memory Controller in 
reclaiming de-allocated space. It has two modes of operation: one 
returns de-allocated storage-string space to page lists• free-space 
pools, and the other reclaims page lists for the system's free-page 
pool. 
A sixth processor, known variously as the Job Controller and as the 
System Supervisor [25, 31], keeps track of each virtual processor's 
current processing mode, effects mode transitions in response to external 
interrupts and internal events, and schedules and dispatches AFU's to 
service the virtual processors according to their processing modes. 
The System Supervisor maintains queues of virtual processors, one each 
for the I/O Processor, the Translator, the Central Processor, and the 
page-reclamation section of the Memory Reclaimer. At any instant, each 
virtual processor is receiving service from at most one of these AFU's, 
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and each AFU is servicing at most one virtual processor. The other two 
AFU's—the Channel Controller and the string-reclamation section of the 
Memory Reclaimer—manage their own dispatching by polling virtual proc­
essors continuously for service requests. A virtual processor may thus 
receive service simultaneously from either or both of these AFU's and from 
one of the queue-driven AFU's dispatched by the System Supervisor. 
The overall effect of the multi-processor inçlementation of the Inter­
preter is to allow concurrent processing of several independent computa­
tions. Although this is a highly significant feature of SYMBOL from an 
architectural and engineering point of view, it is only marginally important 
with respect to the file system. With a few exceptions (noted when they 
are encountered), we can for the most part ignore SYMBOL'S multi-processor 
dimension, and continue to employ the simple monolithic-Interpreter model 
in our discussion of the file system. 
Implementation of virtual storage 
As one might infer from our use of the term virtual storage, SYMBOL' S  
absolute-addressed storage medium is actually inplemented by two levels 
of physical storage having different accessibility characteristics. The 
larger of SYMBOL'S two storage devices is a magnetic drum which provides 
permanent storage locations for 4096 (4K) pages, or a total of a million 
words (the remainder of SYMBOL'S 64K-page address space remains unimple-
mented as of this writing). The other storage device is an 8K-word 
random-access magnetic core memory, which provides teir^orary storage for 
28 pages of virtual space at any one time, the remaining IK words being 
used for virtual-processor context blocks, input and output buffers, and 
miscellaneous system data. 
When the Interpreter requests access to a Virtual Storage location in 
a page that happens to be core-resident at the time, the Memory Controller 
maps the address submitted by the Interpreter into the corresponding core 
location, which it uses to perform the actual access. This mapping does 
not involve the Interpreter—the physical location in core memory of 
Virtual Storage locations is known only to the Memory Controller, by means 
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of its internal 28xl6-bit associative-memory Page Table. The virtual 
aspect of Virtual Storage is evident to the Interpreter only in that 
when it requests access to a location in a non-core-resident page, it 
receives a page-fault signal instead of the expected result. The 
interpreter reacts by suspending service to the Virtual Processor in 
whose behalf the page-fault was incurred, unloading its registers into 
the virtual processor's context block, and turning its attention to some 
other virtual processor. At some later time, after the necessary page 
has been transferred into core from the drum, the Interpreter reloads 
its registers from the original virtual processor's context block and 
resumes processing from the point of interruption. 
In our discussion of the file system, we will for the most peurt 
ignore the physical realization of storage, and ençjloy the one-level 
Virtual Storage idealization. Readers interested in SYMBOL'S paging 
mechanisms and page-replacement policy are referred to [25] and [31] . 
Provisions for software 
Since SPL is explicitly devoid of any means by which a computation 
can gain explicit access to storage locations, or control anything other 
than its own terminal's I/O devices, it would seem too limited to be 
useful for system software. On the other band, it is the system's natural 
programming language, and is therefore the only reasonable medium for 
expressing system programs. The dilemma is resolved by the provision 
of an extended version of SPL, which we shall call ESPL, that includes 
certain additional capabilities to suit the language to the tasks of 
system programming. 
The main feature restricted to ESPL is the memory-statement, which 
allows an ESPL computation explicit access to the system's entire Virtual 
Storage without restriction. A memory-statement consists singly of a 
key-word and a variable-name. The key-word selects the particular type 
of memory operation to be performed, from among 15 available types (all 
but one of the Memory Controller's operations, plus several variants 
supplied by the Interpreter). ESPL computations thus gain the power to 
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command allocation, storage, retrieval, and de-allocation operations, as 
well as access to all virtual processors' context blocks. The value 
of the variable named in a memory-statement specifies other parametsrs 
of the operation, namely, its page-list number, address, and datum (the 
virtual-processor number of the operation is not controllable) . 
In executing a memory-statement, the Interpreter transmits to the 
Memory Controller a memory-operation request whose parameters are derived 
from the value of the specified variable; after the operation's conpletion, 
the variable's value is altered to reflect the information (i.e., address 
and datum) returned to the Interpreter by the Memory Controller. Memory-
statements thus give ESPL confutations Interpreter-like power to examine 
and specify the contents of any storage location (indeed, the variables 
named in a confutation's memory-statements bear a significant functional 
resemblance to the address and data registers by which the Interpreter 
communicates with the Memory Controller). To specify the contents of some 
storage location, a computation begins by assigning to some variable a 
character-string value (created using the normal facilities of SPL) 
specifying the storage location's address and the datum to be stored in it; 
then it executes a store memory-statement (naming the variable as argument), 
which causes the specified memory operation to take place. To examine 
the contents of some storage location, the computation first assigns to a 
variable a value—again constructed using SPL operators—specifying the 
location's address. Then it executes a fetch memory-statement, which 
alters the variable's value to show the target location's contents (and 
also to show the address of the "next" location, if the original location 
is part of a storage string). After the operation, the variable's value 
is subject to inspection by the conç>utation, using the ordinary SPL 
character-processing facilities. 
Page faults incurred by memory-statements are invisible to the craapu-
tations executing them, since they are treated in the same fashion as any 
other page faults occurring during execution of a computation. The Memory 
Controller does provide a modicum of validity checking; for example, a 
confutation submitting an address in the interior of a storage string for 
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string de-allocation causes the Interpreter to receive a memory-error 
signal from the Memory Controller, to which the Interpreter reacts by 
terminating the confutation with an error indication. But there are 
no restrictions against accesses outside the confutation's storage 
domain, nor any safeguards to prevent corruption of the memory structure. 
Successful system programming thus requires that system programmers under­
stand and observe the same rules regarding memory operations as those 
wired into the Interpreter. 
The multi-processor implementation of the Interpreter impinges to 
some extent on system programming, in that ESPL algorithms are executed 
by the Central Processor; testing and conditionally altering the contents 
of arbitrary storage locations (such as those involved in the imple­
mentation of processor queues) could yield indeterminate results, in 
cases where the same storage locations are subject to alteration by 
some other processor. Of particular relevance to system software is 
the danger of interference between the software and the System Super­
visor, since the two must frequently cooperate in performing various 
operating-system functions. This danger is averted by the SYSTEM 
statement—the other extension defining ESPL—which synchronizes the 
software with the System Supervisor by means of a momentary shutdown 
of the Central Processor, during which the System Superviser executes 
a primitive program, prepared in advance by the software, that modifies 
certain pivotal processor queues and context-block locations. 
Obviously, the power of unrestrained access to storage must be 
denied to users' computations, to protect both the users' privacy and the 
system's integrity. The conventional approach has been to define two 
execution modes—a "user" mode aiid a "system" mode [35, p. 117], and tc 
confine "dangerous" instructions to system-mode execution by generating 
error interrupts when attempts to execute them are detected while the 
system is in the user mode. SYMBOL takes a different approach—it 
applies the system-user distinction during program translation, rather 
than during execution. User-mode translation (i.e., translation accord­
ing to the rules of SPL) singly fails to recognize restricted statements; 
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constructs that would be memory-statements or SYSTEM statements in ESPL 
are treated as mere identifiers in SPL. Discriminating between system-
mode and user-mode statements during translation takes the place of check­
ing for attempts to execute illegal instructions, and eliminates the need 
for changing from one mode to the other during execution. 
The translation-mode designation applies at two levels, namely, to 
entire confutations and to individual System Public Library procedures. 
Each virtual processor's context block includes a "privileged" flag; any 
computations translated in behalf of a virtual processor whose privileged 
flag is set to 1 are translated in ESPL mode. This is used for the trans­
lation of such privileged confutations as the Terminal Monitors. Each 
library procedure also has a "privileged" flag; if its value is 1, the 
procedure is translated in the ESPL mode regardless of the flag of the 
virtual processor in whose behalf it is being translated. Privileged pro­
cedures allow the system to provide user-callable services requiring ESPL 
facilities—e.g., system timer readings and Terminal-Monitor calls—without 
granting system-mode powers to the entire user-computation, by encapsulating 
the restricted statements in library procedures, which the user can call 
but cannot modify. During execution, entry into a privileged procedure is 
no different from entry into a non-privileged procedure, since no switch 
from user-mode to system mode is required. 
Because "privileged" flags are located outside the name spaces of 
computations, they cannot be altered by non-privileged computations ; a 
program can thus be made privileged only by some privileged predecessor. 
The chain of privilege that this implies begins with the Loader, which is 
the computation that originally loads the software operating system and 
the System Public Library; the Loader is made privileged by what amounts 
to a switch on the system's mainframe. The last software-system component 
to be translated on behalf of each virtual processor is its Terminal 
Monitor, which uses its privileged status to switch its virtual processor's 
"privileged" flag off before allowing the first terminal session to begin. 
In addition to the programming-language extensions that allow ESPL 
computations to access arbitrary storage locatios, SYMBOL'S hardware 
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includes a mechanism for invoking system software upon the occurrence 
of a variety of events. There are approximately 80 potential software-
call events, including the following; 
1. processing errors, such as syntax and execution errors in computations; 
2. processing completions: loading, I/O, translation, and execution 
con^letions; 
3. external signals; most of the command keys; and 
4. system conditions: timer underflow, virtual-storage overflow. 
The system can be configured for either software or hardware responses 
to most of these events; in many cases, the hardware/software choice can 
be specified for each virtual processor separately. 
The computation invoked by a software call is in every case a 
particular confutation that permanently occupies Virtual Processor Zero 
(VPZ). This computation is called the Supervisor, and should not be 
confused with the hardwired processor called the System Supervisor. 
Invocations of VPZ are queued in the Supervisor Queue (which is inçle-
mented as a subset of the System Supervisor's Central Processor Queue) , 
and serviced by the Supervisor sequentially. To avoid excessive delays 
in responses to software calls, the Supervisor itself performs no I/O 
or other time-consuming operations. Indeed, the hardware allows no 
physical terminal to bs attached to Virtual Processor Zero. Accordingly 
the Supervisor generally invokes some other system-software computation, 
running on the virtual processor identified with the software call, to 
provide the bulk of the processing required to service it. 
In contrast to many conventional systems, the Supervisor is treated 
in most respects like any other execution task, and must contend for 
core-iTieiriory space and Central Processor service along with ordinary 
confutations running on other virtual processors. It is worth noting 
that SYMBOL provides for no permanently core-resident system software. 
This is possible because all of the heavily used and time-critical 
operating-system functions, such as paging mechanisms and I/O routines, 
are implemented directly in hardware, leaving only the least critical 
functions to be performed by software. 
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The current software system 
The software system currently operational on SYMB0L-2R^ consists of 
several conputaticns, as shown in Figure 5: the Supervisor, running on 
Virtual Processor Zero, and a Terminal Monitor (TM) confutation for each 
of the other virtual processors. Each TM alternates with its companion 
user-confutation for control over its virtual processor, supplying to the 
user-computation various services that augment and amplify the capabilities 
of the Interpreter. 
VP, 
Supervisor 
queue 
Supervisor 
TERMINAL 
MONITOR 
TERMINAL 
MONITOR 
TERMINAL 
MONITOR 
USER USER USER 
VP, VP 15 
Fig. 5. Current software system. 
^The latest in a series of systems constructed by the author, with 
significant contributions by P. C. Hutchison and R. E. Wolf at ISU. 
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The Supervisor's principal role is in transferring control between 
user-conçjutations and the corresponding TM's. Software assistance in 
such transfers is necessary because the computation that controls a 
virtual processor does so by occupying its context block. Since the 
hardware defines a single fixed context block for each virtual processor, 
a transfer of control from one confutation to another requires the 
substitution of the second computation's context-block data for that of 
the first computation. The substitution requires several memory 
operations, during which the virtual processor is not consistently 
bound to either confutation. Hence the transfer cannot be performed 
by either of the confutations involved in it. The Supervisor, however, 
running on another virtual processor that is not involved in the control 
transfer, can perform the necessary context-block substitution, while 
the two computations directly involved are held dormant by the System 
Supervisor.^ The context-block data belonging to the confutation not 
currently in control of a virtual processor is stored in an auxiliary 
context block in the TM's storage domain, where it is accessible to the 
Supervisor via a pointer in the hardware-defined context block. When 
a TM has control of a virtual processor, it can inspect and modify the 
user-confutation's context-block data in the auxiliary context block, and 
can thereby gain access ro the entire user-computation. While itself 
being executed by the Interpreter, the TM thus functions, with respect 
to the user-computation, as an extension of the Interpreter, so that the 
uninformed user is unable to distinguish between services provided 
directly by the Interpreter and those that ccsne through the TM. 
"""R. G. Luckeroth has pointed out how two context blocks could be 
defined for each virtual processor, eliminating context-block substitution 
in favor of a simple pointer change. Although clearly superior to the 
present system, this suggestion would require a substantial effort in 
analysis of its system ramifications. Since the current approach does 
not appear to be causing any problems, the suggested alternative has 
received little attention to date. 
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We explained above how the hardware invokes the Supervisor (which in 
turn invokes a TM) in response to software-call events by putting the 
virtual processor identified with the event into the Supervisor Queue. 
A privileged confutation (or a privileged procedure) can also invoke the 
Supervisor, by using memory- and SYSTEM-statements to put itself into 
the Supervisor Queue. This allows for explicitly programmed software 
calls—a facility of considerable usefulness in the file system. 
Summary 
This chapter has described some aspects of SYMB0L-2R that are most 
directly related to the file system. We began with an outline of the high-
level programming language, SPL, whose implementation dominates the system 
design, and sketched the exterior attributes of the system as seen by its 
users. Turning to the implementation of the system, we described in some 
detail the structured "logical storage" facility that serves both the 
hard-wired Interpreter and the software system, and briefly indicated some­
thing of the interior structure of each of these entities. The functional 
relationships between the various parts of the system are summarized in 
Figure 6, which presents SYMBOL as a collection of concentric shells.^ 
In this figijre,- the outermost surface represents the activities of the 
users' programs in the solution of application problems. Each of the 
inner shells represents a named machine (e.g., "virtual storage") whose 
functional capabilities form the basis for the implementation of the next 
outer machine. 
Three aspects of the system stand out from the foregoing description 
because of their special importance to the definition and implementation 
of the file system. The programming language SPL, including its procedure 
library, is the starting point for the file system's definition, and its 
orientation towards the interests of the user in^oses a similar bias on 
the file system. As we show in chapter 4, SYMBOL'S absolute-addressed 
^This representation was suggested by [14]. 
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Application 
Machines 
Augmented 
Virtual 
Processors 
Virtual 
Processors 
users' computations 
Software system; Supervisor 
Terminal Monitors, (File System) 
System Public Library 
AFU's 
TRANSLATOR, CENTRAL PROCESSOR 
I/O PROCESSOR, CHANNEL CONTROLLER: 
load, translate and execute programs 
MEMORY CONTROLLER: 
"INTERPRETER" structures and allocates 
virtual storage 
MEMORY CONTROLLER: 
maps virtual addresses 
onto core addresses 
Virtual 
Storage 
Physical SYSTEM SUPERVISOR: 
allocates core storage 
\ manages paging tasks 
MEMORY 
SYSTEM SUPERVISOR: 
manages computations; schedules 
anrl fH cnatrViPC ATTTT'B 
Fig. 6. Hierarchical view of SYMBOL -2R implementation. 
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Virtual storage provides the basis for a simple, powerful set of mechanisms 
for sharing information. And the interposition of the high-level-language 
Interpreter between every user and the machine's storage space, denying 
all users explicit access to storage locations, provides the means by which 
the sharing is controlled. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SYMB0L-2R FILE SYSTEM: FUNCTIONS 
Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to set forth the main assumptions on 
which the file system design is based, and to proceed from there to show 
what the system looks like to its users, how it serves their purposes, and 
how its functional properties compare with those of other systems. 
Design Premises 
At the outset, we iitçosed certain boundary conditions on the file 
system as a priori design premises. Chief among these conditions were the 
following; 
1. The file system would make maximum use of the existing hardware-
inplemented algorithms of SYMBOL, both for reasons of efficiency and 
because one of the project's aims was to evaluate those very algo­
rithms. In particular, the memory-management facilities—both the 
paging hardware and the virtual-memory allocation, access.. and 
reclamation mechanisms—were to be used to the greatest possible 
extent. To move data, the hardwired Interpreter routines were to be 
enployed wherever possible in preference to software memory-statements, 
as suggested by W. R. Smith (personal communication,September 1971). 
2. Filed data would be stored in SYMBOL' S  Virtual Storage space. This 
decision is defensible on purely practical groijnds; SYMB0L-2R's 
coitplement of equipment includes no large-scale storage device other 
than its paging drum, and there is currently no prospect of acquiring 
one. This necessity can be viewed as a virtue, however. The 
8-megabyte address space currently implemented substantially exceeds 
the system's expected needs for computational working storage, and 
ought to provide enough file space for the purposes of this investi­
gation. In addition, it provides a large-memory environment logically 
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similar to that forecast by Gagliardi [14, p. 860] as a characteristic of 
near-future computer systems; if Gagliardi's expectations are borne out by 
events, then the file-management functions and file-implementation tech­
niques developed in the SYMBOL 2R context may prove useful in such systems 
of the future. 
Functional Goals 
The SYMB0L-2R File System is intended to provide its users with two 
fundamental amenities: 
1. a means of retrieving information entrusted to the system during some 
previous terminal session (because SYMBOL reclaims user-confutations' 
storage domains at the end of every terminal session, obliterating all 
information stored therein) 
2. a means of sharing information with other users (lacking a file system, 
SYMBOL keeps its users totally isolated from one another). 
It will be observed that the proposed file system is not intended to trans­
form SYMB0L-2R into a dedicated common-database system, such as support 
ticket-reservation and multi-teller-banking facilities, which serve users 
at many terminals simultaneously accessing and modifying a single shared 
data structure (although certain aspects of the SÏH50L-2R systexa may be 
useful in such systems). Instead, the general-purpose timesharing 
character of SYMB0L-2R is preserved, and (we believe) enhanced by the pro­
vision of long-term storage and a modest degree of information sharing. 
Elaborating on these goals, Watscn [35, p. 188] lists seven 
"intrinsic" requirements for a general-purpose timesharing file system: 
1. The user should be able to create, chcinge, and delete files. 
2. Users should be able to access each other's files in a controlled 
manner in order to build on each other's work. 
3. The user should be able to control who has access to his files, 
and the type of access allowed, such as read, write, and execute. 
4. The user should be able to structure his files in a form 
appropriate to his problem. 
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5. The user must be able to communicate information between files. 
6. The user should be provided with, file backup in case a file is 
accidentally deleted or damaged. 
7. The user should be able to access files by symbolic name, i.e., 
the file system should be hardware-independent as far as the user 
is concerned. 
The SYMBOL-2R file system achieves all of these requirements except the 
sixth (file backup), which will be shown to be logically feasible but 
would require I/O equipment whose design and construction (or selection 
and acquisition) exceeds the scope of the present project. 
File System Data Objects 
In a 1971 survey article. Denning [10, p. 191] lists four important 
problems facing a programmer who has at his disposal a single linear name 
space ; 
1) handling growing or shrinking objects ... ; 
2) providing long-term storage and retrieval for named information 
objects; 
3) allowing information to be shared and protected; and 
4) achieving programming modularity, according to which one module 
can be compiled . . . without having to be recompiled when other 
modules are [reconciled]. 
In many modem systems, the file subsystem is employed to solve all four of 
these problems. Denning points out the drawbacks : 
Yet, file systems have an important limitation, which is a consequence 
of the distinction between computational and long-term storage 
systems: in order to take advantage of the efficiencies of the 
addressing hardware, the programmer is forced to copy information 
between the file system and the computational store [10. p. 192]. 
This distinction between long-term and working storage leads naturally to 
the provision, in conventional file systems, of such file operations as 
READ, WRITE, and LOAD to effect the movement of data, and to file objects 
that are, for the most part, sequential or indexed collections of records 
(see, for example, [22]) simulating the data streams of ordinary input and 
output operations. 
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Denning goes on to show how the substitution of a segmented (i.e., 
two-dimensional) name space for the conventional linear name space elimi­
nates the need for programmed copying operations. Segments can grow, 
shrink, and be shared among processes, and compilers can employ the 
system's segment-linking mechanisms to achieve programming modularity; 
consequently, all that remains of the file-system's functions is to provide 
long-term storage and retrieval of segments—the logical distinction 
between long-term and conventional storage is eliminated. As Gagliardi 
puts it, 
. . . the current approach of buffering records into the address 
space of application processes should and will be abandoned and 
replaced by "linking" a whole section of the database to the address 
space of the application process. A forerunner of these notions 
is the HIS MULTICS System, whose file system is a collection of 
segments which can be linked (made "known") to the individual 
process by suitably modifying the process segment table [14, p. 860]. 
If we re-examine Denning ' s list of problems frcan the point of view 
of the SYMBOL programmer, we find that two of the problems are already 
solved in the absence of any file system. The dynamic multidimensional 
variability in size and configuration of the value of a SYMBOL-program 
variable [24] exceeds even the flexibility of a one-dimensional segment 
in accomodating growing or shrinking objects. And the high speed and 
low cost of translation (coiupilation) in tlie SYMBOL system [3] eliminates 
any motivation for avoiding the recompilation of program modules. All 
that remains for the SYMBOL file system to provide, therefore, are 
capabilities for long-term storage and sharing. 
And so, having disposed (we believe) of any possible reason to imitate 
the conventional input/output-stream file model, we return to the question 
of how the SYMBOL rile—systeati's data objects should be defined. In the 
MULTICS system, the fundamental data object common to all processes, 
namely, the segment, is also the data-object of the file system. SYMBOL 
has not just a single such data object, but two: the program module 
(procedure) and the value ; accordingly, it is the SYMBOL file-system's 
function to provide long-term storage of these two data objects. 
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Overview of File System Organization 
Access control policies 
In the frame of reference described by Wilkes [36] and adopted by 
Saltzer and Schroeder in their survey article [29, p. 1287], the SYMBOL 
file system's method of controlling access to sharable objects is primarily 
"list-oriented." Each sharable object—procedure or value—is equipped 
with an access-control list naming the users to whom the object's owner is 
willing to grant access. 
A user, wishing to make use of an access authorization granted him by 
the owner of some object, requests (or writes a program that requests) a 
capability to access that object; it is at this juncture that the file 
system inspects the object's access-control list to verify the authori­
zation. .Once he has been awarded the requested capability, the user (or 
his program) can employ it to effect the desired access. This access 
capability is an aspect of the system that Saltzer and Schroeder term 
"ticket-oriented" (after Wilkes); the SYMBOL system thus conforms to their 
observation that "... most real systems contain both kinds of sharing 
implementations—a list-oriented system at the human interface and a 
ticket-oriented system in the underlying hardware implementation" [29, 
p. 1287]. 
Another aspect of our system's access-control philosophy has to do 
with alteration of shared objects and revocation of access to them. We 
have adopted as a boundary condition for the file system the policy that no 
object can be modified by a computation whose capability to access the 
object is not exclusive. In other words, if there exist in the system two 
or more access capabilities referring to a given object, the object cannot 
be altered. A related policy prohibits the arbitrary revocation by an 
object's owner of access capabilities referring to it. We undertake to 
rationalize these policies, and to discuss their implications, in 
describing the file-system operations in which they manifest themselves 
(below). Further justification is provided in subsequent descriptions 
of the operations' implementations. 
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File types 
The file system is organized into three distinct types of files, whose 
principal attributes are as follows; 
1. Private Procedure Files (PPF's). Each PPF is a collection of pro­
cedures, and can serve as a run-time environment for computations 
belonging to its owner. PPF's cannot be shared. 
2. Shared Procedure Files (SPF's). Each SPF contains a single procedure, 
and can be borrowed (i.e., a capability for accessing it can be 
included in a PPF) or copied by other users, subject to authorization 
by its owner. In addition to a procedure, an SPF can also contain a 
specification of the procedure's run-time environment, in which case 
the content of the file is called a subsystem. 
3. Value Files (VF's). Each Value File contains a single value (in the 
SPL sense of the term), either scalar or structure. A confutation 
acquires a capability to access such a file by requesting the file 
system to link one of its variables to it; any subsequent reference 
to the variable accesses the file's value directly. Value Files 
can be shared, i.e., accessed by users other than their owners. 
Each and every file in the system belongs to a single owner; all the files 
belonging to a single owner are said to constitute his account. Files 
are added to accounts only when their owners create them, and deleted 
only when their owners destroy them; there is no provision, other than 
copying, for transferring a file from one account to another. The storage 
space occupied by each owner's files is separately accounted for, and a 
separate file-space limit can be imposed on each account. 
The set of all files directly accessible to a given user—procedure 
files and Value Files, his own files and those whose owners have 
authorized his access, either by name or as an anonymous member of the 
public—this set of files we call the user's file domaiin. 
Requestor identification 
Many of the file operations described below can be performed only on 
files belonging to the requestor of the operation; others can be performed 
! 
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on borrowed files, but only with their owners' permission. Identification 
of an operation's requestor is therefore an essential element in access 
control. Most of the file operations, moreover, are intended to be made 
available to users both as Terminal Monitor commands and as System Public 
Library procedures, so that users can invoke them either interactively or 
in their programs. When an operation is invoked as a ccxranand, or in a 
program module belonging to the user, then the user is identified as the 
requestor, for access-control purposes. If an operation is invoked by a 
borrowed procedure, on the other hand, the operation is considered to have 
been requested by the procedure's owner. 
File names 
Within a given user's account, files are designated by their file 
names. No two files of the same type and in the same account can bear the 
same file name (since each operation is applicable to only one file type, 
the same name may be used for two files of different types). A user can 
refer to any of his own files by its file-name alone. To designate a file 
belonging to another user, however, he employs a two-component vector 
name: <user-name | file-name>. 
Rather than burdening the SYMBOL user v;ith a nev? naming syntax.- we 
adopt for file names the syntax of SPL identifiers [24]. Informally, a 
name begins with a letter, and consists of nothing but letters, digits, 
and space-characters (i.e., carriage-returns, form-tops, and blanks). Two 
names are equivalent if both can be transformed into the same character-
string by changing all letters to upper case and replacing every string of 
space-characters by a single blank. 
Private Procedure Piles 
A Private Procedure File (PPF) is a collection of named capabilities 
for accessing procedure definitions. PPF's are designed primarily for use 
as run-time environments, thus functioning as "customized" replacements 
for the System Public Library. A user may create and own any number of 
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such files, giving each one a different PPF-name when he creates it. He 
can specify which PPF is to serve as his current terminal's run-time 
environment, and can modify the contents of his PPF's at will or destroy 
them altogether. He cannot, however, share his PPF's with any other user, 
nor access a PPF belonging to any other user; these functionalities 
are reserved for shared Procedure Files. 
A PPF's entries are classified according to the location of the pro­
cedure definitions to which they refer, as follows (Figure 7 shows an 
exaiiç)le : 
i 
I System Public Library 
I 
j4/PPF-name 
LIB I 
PPF-
^system entry 
/local entry 
I 
>1 PROCEDURE SQRT(X); 
^^borrowed entry 
capability—? 
USER-A's file space ) 
USER-B's file space 
shared procedure 
COS 
^PROCEDURE LINK(B,C,D); 
I I T TTJV 
SQRT 
Fig. 7. PPF-entry types: system, local, and borrowed entries. 
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1. a system entry refers to a procedure definition located in the System 
Public Library 
2. a local entry refers to a procedure definition located in file space 
belonging strictly to the PPF's owner 
3. a borrowed entry refers to a procedure definition located in file space 
(specifically, a Shared Procedure File) that may be owned by any user. 
To facilitate PPF-entry manipulations and (in the case of local 
entries) to conserve file ^ace, certain file operations link entries in 
different PPF's to a single procedure definition, to form what is termed a 
procedure family (two exanç)les of which are illustrated in Figure 8). 
PPF -name s 
/ ^FFF's^s 
k / \ B 
SORT • 
SQRT 
SORT • 
SQRT 
> PROCEDURE SQRT(X);... PROCEDURE SQRT(REAL,IMAG);... 
Fig. 8. Procedure families. 
The entries making up such a family are called one another's siblings ; in 
effect, they share the capability for accessing their common definition. As 
the figure suggests, all members of a family have the same procedure-name, 
but identically named entries do not necessarily belong to the same family. 
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PPF operations 
We now describe the operations, provided by the system, through which 
PPF owners can manipulate their files (the operations are listed in Table 1). 
Table 1. Summary of file operations 
Operation 
ORIGINATE (PPF) 
ACTIVATE (PPF) 
DUPLICATE (PPFl, PPF2) 
DISCARD (PPF) 
INSERT (PPF, proc, source) 
DELETE (PPF, proc) 
REDEFINE (PPF, proc, source) 
TRANSCRIBE (PPF, proc) 
DEPOSIT (SPF, proc, source, env) 
\ocr t Aojj-name; 
REVEAL (SPF, ACL-name) 
OBSOLETE (SPF) 
COPY (owner, SPF) 
CREATE (VF) 
DESTROY (VF) 
CûPYLIrîK (var, VF, ouccoHe) 
FREELINK (var, VF, outcome) 
UNLINK (variable) 
AUTHORIZE COPY ACCESS (VF, ACL-name) 
AUTHORIZE FREE ACCESS (VF, ACL-name) 
Effect 
creates a new, empty PPF 
establishes a Private Procedure File 
(PPF) as the terminal's run-time 
environment 
creates a new PPF identical to an 
existing one 
destroys a PPF 
adds a procedure to a PPF 
deletes a procedure from a PPF 
alters the definition of a procedure 
family 
copies a PPF-entry into the workspace 
creates a Shared Procedure File (SPF) 
authorizes borrowers of an SPF 
authorizes copiers of an SPF 
destroys an SPF 
copies an SPF into the workspace 
creates a Value File (VF) 
destroys a VF 
connects a variable to a VF 
connects a variable to a VF 
disconnects a variable from a VF 
specifies copy-accessibility of a VF 
specifies free-accessibility of a VF 
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Throughout this discussion, we ençiloy the notation of SPL procedure-calls, 
giving each operation a name and listing its principal parameters. This 
notation is used here solely for expository purposes, to provide a compact, 
concrete nomenclature for the file-system operations. We expressly disclaim 
any intent to describe a finished "human interface" for the file system, 
and caution the reader not to misinterpret our procedural notation as 
such.^ 
The first operations to be described are those which operate on entire 
files. The operation that brings an empty PPF into being and gives it its 
name is 
2 
ORIGINATE (PPF-name) 
A new PPF can also be created by 
DUPLICATE (PPF-name-1, PPF-name-2), 
whose first argument may specify either the System Public Library or an 
existing PPF. In the former ceise, the new PPF is a private copy of the 
System Public Library, and each of its entries is a system entry having 
no siblings. In the latter case, each entry is created as a sibling of 
the corresponding entry in the existing PPF, and is therefore of the same 
type. The new PPF is named by the second argument supplied to DUPLICATE. 
Although such details as the choice of nazes for =o=iands and the 
representation of their parameters are incontestably important matters 
influencing the ultimate usefulness of a file system, they are easily 
adjusted in the light of operational experience if the system's capabilities 
are fundamentally adequate. On the other hand, if the system is funda­
mentally deficient, clever "human engineering" can never provide a 
remedy. 
2 For the sake of simplicity, this discussion simply ignores the 
possibility of failures caused by improperly specified arguments (e.g., 
a null-valued parameter in a call of ORIGINATE). Appendix A contains a 
list of the error conditions that can arise in carrying out each of the 
operations. 
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A PPF is obliterated, and its space reclaimed, by 
DISCARD (PPF-name) 
Finally, a user can designate one of his PPF's to serve as his 
terminal's run-time environment by invoking 
ACTIVATE (PPF-name). 
This specification remains in effect until ACTIVATE is called again, the 
active PPF is DISCARDed, or the terminal session is terminated.^ 
Next we describe the operations that affect individual entries of a 
PPF. Two of these operations—INSERT and REDEFINE—create new entries , and 
consequently require parameters specifying both the procedure-name of the 
new entry and the location of the procedure definition to which it is to 
refer. The latter parameter, which we call source, allows four basic 
variations, as follows : 
1. a null value, indicating the System Public Library. The result is a 
system entry. If the library procedure is privileged, the new entry 
inherits the "privileged " attribute (aside from the DUPLICATE operation, 
this is the only way a privileged PPF-entry can be created). 
2. a string of blanks, denoting the requestor's workspace. The workspace 
is scanned for a procedure definition having the required procedure-
name (i.e., that of the entry being created); the definition is then 
uiic uwu. => / cuiw. a cix—my 
to it is created. 
3. a vector argument, of the form <user-name j SPF-name>, whose con^nents 
are taken to specify a Shared Procedure File, possibly one belonging to 
some other user. If the requestor has been authorized by the file's 
owner for BORROW-access to the file, then a borrowed entry is created, 
containing a capability for access to the shared procedure's definition. 
Note: unlike cases 1 and 2 above, the name of a borrowed entry can differ 
from that of the procedure definition to which it refers. (This stems 
from the fact that a Shared Procedure File's SPF-name is not necessarily 
From initiation of a terminal session until the first call to ACTIVATE, 
the terminal's run-time environment is provided by the System Public Library. 
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the same as its procedure-name, for reasons explained below.) Whenever 
such a name conflict arises, it is resolved in favor of the entry name; 
for all accesses via the entry's access capability, the procedure is 
known by the entry ' s nêune, rather than by that of the procedure 
definition. This allows a user to include, in a single PPF, entries 
referring to two Shared Procedure Files that happen to have the same 
procedure-names, instead of requiring cooperation before the fact 
between all owners whose shared procedures might someday be combined in 
this way. 
4. a scalar argument naming another of the requestor's PPF's. In this 
case, the new entry is created as a sibling of the like-named entry 
in the specified PPF, and inherits the latter's entry type. If the 
original entry is borrowed, the new entry singly shares its access 
capability, eliminating the need for another access-authorization 
check. 
The specific operations defined on individual PPF-entries are now 
described. 
INSERT (PPF-name, proc-name, source) 
siitply creates a new entry, of the type specified by source according to 
the rules given above, and adds it to the PPF indicated by the call's 
DELETE (PPF-name, proc-name), 
removes an entry from a PPF. If it is a local entry with no siblings, 
then its procedure definition ceases to exist; if it is a borrowed entry 
with no siblings, then its access capability is relinquished. 
REDEFINE (PPF-name, proc-name, source) 
^  1^ V » 4  « « •  ^  f  1  % V  / • »  < 2 »  f  o  ^  V * y  t a CUA ^ ^ JT • W • f 
denoted by PPF-name and proc-name, and of all of that entry's siblings) . 
The file system itself provides no operation for editing individual 
procedure definitions. Instead, it provides 
TRANSCRIBE (PPF-name, proc-name), 
which appends a copy of the indicated PPF-entry's procedure definition to 
the requestor's workspace. There it can be edited by means of the 
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Terminal Monitor's editing facilities, and the edited version restored to 
the PPF by means of INSERT or REDEFINE. Note : if the PPF-entry is borrowed, 
then the copying stops at the procedure definition's second semicolon. This 
allows a borrower to see the procedure's paraméter-list and a single NOTE-
statement (presumably giving instructions for use) without revealing to him 
the bulk of the text. 
Shared Procedure Files 
The rationale for providing two distinct procedure-file structures 
begins with our file-system's ground rule prohibiting the modification of 
shared objects. Were an owner's run-time-environment files to be made 
sharable, we discovered, this prohibition would give rise to continual 
interference between owners and borrowers, seriously diminishing the con­
venience and flexibility of the files as owner-manipulable procedure 
libraries. The tendency of procedure-file owners would likely be to set 
aside certain procedure files expressly for sharing, and to manipulate them 
as little as possible; for these files, the advantages of the procedure-
library type of organization would be largely irrelevant. The apparent 
likelihood of such de^ facto segregation led to the development of separate 
(and unequal) files whose operations and data structures are designed 
primarily to facilitate sharing—the Shared Procedure Files. 
The "Black-box" requirements 
Two of the requirements that a procedure-sharing facility ought to 
satisfy have been described by Vanderbilt as follows: 
To achieve controlled sharing, the user of a shared program must be 
able to execute the program without knowledge of its internal structure 
or operation. Furthermore, the user must be unable to obtain that knowl­
edge without specific provision by the owner of the program. 
[The first requirement enables a user] ... to make use of the 
results of another's work without necessarily understanding his methods 
or the steps used in obtaining the results. 
[A system satisfying the second requirement serves as] . . .a 
vehicle through which programs, whose structure is of a proprietairy 
nature, may be made available (presumably at a fee) for use by the user 
community. [34, p. 23] 
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A third requirement for orderly sharing of procedures is that a 
borrower must not be able to disrupt the operation of a borrowed procedure, 
i.e., to alter its operation in any way except as intended by its owner. 
Otherwise, the borrower might be able to corrupt the procedure in such a 
way as to illegitimately inspect or damage other files belonging to the 
borrowed procedure's owner. 
Our fourth requirement is symmetrical to the third: a borrowed pro­
cedure must be prevented from gaining any more access to the borrower's 
files than is specifically provided for by the borrower. 
These last two requirements are necessary if two programs—tne 
borrower's program and the borrowed procedure—are to cooperate without in 
the process surrendering more protection against each other's mistakes or 
evil designs than is necessary to accomplish the task at hand (this is 
the problem addressed by Schroeder in [30]). 
We believe that all four of these requirements must be met in a 
system that claims to support controlled sharing of information, and 
thereby to foster cooperation among its users. Borrowing a colloquial 
term from electrical engineering, we call them the "black-box" requirements, 
implying that a borrowed procedure must have a well-defined boundary, 
inçervious to penetration from either side except by means of a specified 
set of controls and indicators—the procedure's parameters—accessible to 
both sides. As we describe the file system's Shared Procedure Files, and 
the operations that are performed on them, we will show how they satisfy 
all four of these requirements. 
SPF structures and operati ons 
Shared Procedure Files (EPF's), in contrast to PPF's, contain only 
one procedure definition per file. The SPF's belonging to a given owner 
all have different SPF-names (which are unrelated to their procedure-names, 
allowing an owner to maiintain several versions of a procedure, all bearing 
the same procedure-name, among his SPF's). 
In general, SPF's allow only two modes of access by non-owners, 
namely, copying and borrowing. The former (much the less interesting of 
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the two) is provided by 
COPY (owner-name, SPF-name) 
which appends a copy of the procedure definition text to the requestor's 
workspace (provided that his request is authorized, as described below). 
The essential function of COPY is no more than could be obtained (albeit 
less conveniently) by distributing duplicate tapes or card decks. It 
certainly fulfills none of the "black-box" requirements, and we shall 
spend no more time discussing it. 
Procedure borrowing is a much more interesting and consequential form 
of access, and is the basis for much of the file system's usefulness. It 
conveys to the borrower a capability for using the procedure definition, 
while protecting the procedure against any attenpt by the borrower to 
examine or modify it (thus satisfying black-box requirement number two). 
The only file operations by which a borrower can request a capability 
to access a Shared Procedure File are those invocations of the PPF opera­
tions INSERT and REDEFINE in which the source specification designates an 
SPF. The result of such an operation (assuming the request is properly 
authorized) is to inplant, in a borrowed procedure-entry in the requestor's 
PPF, a capability for accessing the procedure definition. This capability 
is usable in only two ways: for references to the procedure definition by 
the Translator as part of a run-tinve envirorm«ent, and for the limited 
inspection provided by TRANSCRIBE (as described above). No other use can 
be made of the capability, singly because the user is dependent on the 
system to use it for him, and the system provides only these two access 
modes. The shared procedure is thus protected from inspection and 
modification by its borrower, as required. 
Eribarking on a more detailed description of Shared Procedure Files, 
we must distinguish between two types: sing)le shared procedures, and sub­
systems . The former type being the sinç>ler and less powerful of the two, 
we shall describe it first. Subsequently, having pointed out simple 
shared procedures' shortcomings, we will show how they are overcome by 
subsystems, and how the subsystem facility satisfies all four of our 
black-box requirements. 
An SPF containing a sinple shared procedure is created by an 
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invocation of 
DEPOSIT (SPF-name, proc-name, source, environment) 
in which the value of the lasr argument—environment—is null. The first 
argument, SPF-name, gives the new file its name, and proc-name and source 
together specify the location of the procedure definition that is to be 
filed. Source can take only two types of values : a string of blanks 
specifies that the procedure definition is to be found in the requestor's 
workspace, and a non-blank scalar specifies one of the PPF's (in which 
case proc-name must name a local entry). The net effect of the operation 
is to store a copy of the indicated procedure definition in the newly 
created file. 
In order to make an SPF accessible to other users, its owner must 
invoke one or the other (or both) of two authorization operations: 
REVEAL (SPF-name, ACL-name) 
and 
LEND (SPF-name, ACL-name). 
The former operation authorizes copying, and the latter borrowing, of the 
SPF named by the first argument. In both operations, the second argument 
designates the SPF's access-control list (ACL), a value-file containing 
a vector whose components are the user-names of users who are to be allowed 
access to the SPF. 
The value of ACL-name is iïi general a vector, <user-name | VF-name>, 
but three special cases are provided for; a null value denies access to 
all users except the owner; a vector consisting of two null-valued 
components (<|>) allows public access; and a scalar is interpreted as the 
name of a VF belonging to the owner of the SPF. REVEAL and LEND may be 
invoked at any time to alter an SPF*s access-control-list specification. 
The access-control list itself may be modified at any time (subject to the 
rules governing modification of value-files in general). These alterations, 
however, affect only subsequent requests for access to the SPF and have 
no effect on access capabilities already granted. 
Let us now impart some concreteness to the discussion by means of an 
example (see Figure 9). Suppose user UO wishes to use a shared procedure, 
PI, that belongs to user Ul. First he invokes INSERT or REDEFINE to place 
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Workspace 
EO 
UO 
U1 
PI PROCEDURE PI(A,B);...RETURN C;...END 
Fig. 9. Borrowing a single shared procedure. 
a PPF-entry containing a capability to access PI in one of his PPF's 
(named, in this example, "EO"). He also creates a program in his work­
space containing a call to PI, and ACTIVATES EO. 
When the program is executed, PI serves as part of the computation, 
just as if it had been declared in the workspace. Yet for all file-
system purposes, the distinction in ownership between the workspace 
portion of the computation and PI is preserved: an access request in either 
part xs honored acccrdxng to the access authorj_zat%on of zts owner, xlius 
PI can access Ul's files, and any other files whose owners have authorized 
Ul (either specifically or as part of the "public") to access them; 
similarly, the workspace part of the coirçutation can access only those 
files accessible to UO by virtue of ownership or authorization. 
The only exceptions to these access limitations are provided by the 
parameters of PI, through which Value File access capabilities can be 
passed in either direction. For example, UO could link a Value File to 
X before calling PI, which would then be able to access the Value File 
through its formal parameter A. On the other hand, PI could link a 
Value File to a formal parameter, B, or to a local variable, C; after Pi 
returns control to its caller, the Value File would be accessible to the 
calling program through its own local variable Y, or through the RETURNed 
reference to C. These mechanisms are described in more detail below. 
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in connection with access to Value Files; the main point of the present 
discussion is that when a procedure is borrowed, neither borrower nor 
lender risks exposing his program or files to the other party, except 
as he himself explicitly authorizes by means of the borrowed procedure's 
parameters. 
Problems with shared procedures 
For many applications, the simple-shared-procedure facility just 
described will be quite adequate. It provides "use-only" access to 
procedures implementing proprietary algorithms, and can be used to 
implement "caretaker" procedures controlling access to Value Files (as 
suggested above, and described in more detail below, in connection with 
Value File access considerations). If one looks more closely at the 
simple-shared-procedure facility, however, certain difficulties begin 
to appear. A minor problem is that GLOBAL statements in a borrowed 
procedure's outermost block (see Figure 10) can give illegitimate 
Workspace 
EO UO 
U1 
PI 
LINK(R,VFNAME);...Pl(X,Y) 
Fig. 10. A "Trojan horse" attack by PI on UO's Value File. 
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and undetectable access by the procedure to variables in the calling 
program, and thereby to any of the caller's files that happen to be 
linked to such variables. (This appears to be a variant of the "Trojan 
Horse" threat [29, p. 1303].) It can be countered by simply sifting out 
GLOBAL statements in the outermost blocks of all shared-procedure 
definitions in the process of filing them. A borrower can protect himself 
individually by enclosing his program in a BLOCK.. .END pair, which 
isolates his variables from the borrowed procedure, although this tactic 
fails to prevent a borrowed procedure from using GLOBAL statements to 
gain illegitimate access to other PPF procedures. In the end, however, 
it turns out that no specific anti-GLOBAL measures are needed, for the 
introduction of subsystems to solve more serious problems solves the 
GLOBAL problem as a side effect. 
The truly serious deficiency of the simple shared procedure mechanism 
is that, since it consists solely of a source-text string constructed by 
its owner, it cannot include any procedures to which its owner does not 
have copy-access authorization. This is a source of trouble when a shared 
procedure depends on either a privileged system procedure or another 
shared procedure. 
Suppose, for example, that PI in our last example calls a privileged 
system procedure, PSP (see Figure 11). In order for PSP to be accessible 
to PI, it must be included in EO,^ and only UO has control over EO. Our 
black-box requirement is thereby violated, not just once but twice. For 
one thing, UO has to know something about Pi's internal structure in order 
to use it, namely, that it requires PSP. For the other, UO can interfere 
with Pi's operations by substituting, for PSP, a procedure of his own 
devising, thereby frustrating Ul's intentions with respect to PI, with 
no possibility of detection by PI. 
^The text of PSP could be copied by Ul and appended by him to the 
text of PI, but it would lose its privileged attribute in the process. 
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Workspace 
EO 
UO 
U1 
U1 
System Public Library 
PSP 
CALL Pl(X.Y); 
PROCEDURE PSP(Z);...END 
PROCEDURE P1(A,B);...PSP(T)...END 
Fig. 11. A borrowed procedure calling a privileged system 
procedure. 
A related, though not identical, problem arises when a borrowed 
procedure calls another borrowed procedure, as illustrated in Figure 
12. As in the system-procedure problem above, we find the "black-box" 
requirements unsatisfied; UO must be aware that PI calls P2, and Ul 
must trust UO to include the "true" P2 in EO. A further difficulty 
surfaces in the need for U2 to ejçlicitly authorize UO to borrow P2; 
this would seriously impede the developir>£r.t of the sert cf r.ulti-lsvsl 
procedure sharing envisaged by Vanderbilt in his "DowJones" example 
[34, p. 127]. 
Subsystems 
The crux of the problems besetting a non-self-contained simple 
shared procedure is that it depends, for access to external procedures, 
on a run-time environment over which its owner has no control. 
Accordingly, a solution is to be found in the provision of a run-time 
environment along with the procedure definition, to form a combination 
which we call a subsystem. The run-time environment of a subsystem is 
specified by its owner at the time of its creation, via the fourth 
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Workspace 
UO 
EO 
U1 
U1 
U2 
P2 
PROCEDURE P2(P);...END 
PROCEDURE PI(A,B);...CALL P2(V)...END 
M 
J 
Fig. 12. A borrowed procedure calling another borrowed procedure, 
argument of 
DEPOSIT (SPF-name, proc-name, source, environment), 
where environment (null-valued in an invocation creating a single shared 
procedure) names a Private Procedure File belonging to the SPF's owner. 
iTust as the SPF's procedure def^n^t^on xs copied froxn %ts sourcs, the 
subsystem's run-time environment—including any local procedures it may 
refer to—is copied from the PPF that defines it, so that subsequent 
changes in the PPF have no effect on the subsystem. 
An example of a computation combining several subsystems is shown 
in Figure 13. Each subsystem's run-time environment defines external 
procedures called by that subsystem's "main" procedure. The environment 
specification is as invulnerable as the procedure text to inspection and 
modification by its borrower, and therefore provides its owner with 
assured access to any system or borrowed proceduras on which ii-s main 
procedure depends. Moreover, it absolves the borrower of any need to 
know about the subsystem's external-procedure calls—there is, in fact, 
no way for a borrower to distinguish between a single shared procedure 
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CALL PI(X,Y);...CALL P2(3,4);... 
EO 
PI 
P2 
UO 
U1 •\ 
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PROCEDURE P1(A,B); CALL P2(X);.. .END \ 
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P2 
P3 #-
1 
PROCEDURE P2(B) ;... P3(N) ;.. .Eljm | J 
\ 
/ 
/ 
\ 
a local procedure y 
/ 
/ U3 
N 
\ 
PROCEDURE P3(J);...PSP(T)...END^ 
E3 
PSP 
/ 
\ / TT *> 
/ 
PROCEDURE P2(M,N);...EKB 
E2 
\ J P3 
I / 
/System Public Library 
/ 
I I 
I \ 
/ \ 
'^PROCEDURE PSP(Z) ;.. .ÎËotI 
/ 
Fig. 13. Subsystems: schematic representation of subsystem definitions 
and the hierarchical relationships between them. 
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and a subsystem. The figure shows an exançjle of a local procedure, 
copied into the SPF at the time of the latter's creation (i.e., the P2 
that is called by PI) , a subsystem called by a subsystem (P3, called by 
PI and P2) , and a system procedure called by a subsystem (PSP, called 
by P3). 
The static scope rules governing subsystems are those that apply to 
entire confutations : the outermost block of a subsystem's main procedure 
is treated exactly like the outermost block of a confutation. Conse­
quently, GLOBAL statements in that block are treated as translation errors 
(eliminating the "Trojan Horse" threat mentioned above), emd any procedures 
called from the main procedure but not defined in its text are resolved 
from the SPF's run-time environment, regardless of any procedure definitions 
elsewhere in the computation. Thus is prevented any communication between 
the subsystem and the rest of the confutation except by the main procedure's 
parameters. At times, this isolation may give rise to a certain amount of 
waste, as exemplified by Figures 13 and 14, in which the subsystem P3, 
called by two other subsystems—PI and P2—is actually duplicated in the 
computation. This is the price we pay for integrity, however, for if PI 
and P2 were to call the same instance of P3, and P3 were to retain infor­
mation between invocations in its local variables, then PI and P2 could 
interfere (ccsnmunicare) with one another via P3, and UC would have dis­
rupted the operations of two subsystems merely by combining them in a 
single computation. 
Subsystem nesting suggests the possibility of a subsystem whose run­
time environment includes a pointer to the subsystem itself, either 
directly or through one or more intermediate subsystems. In view of the 
meaning we have inçuted to multiple capabilities referring to a single sub­
system (as in the exanfle above, in which each capability referring to P3 
produced a separate instance of the subsystem) , we must infer that such a 
structure implies an unbounded number of instances of the self-referenced 
subsystem. Such a situation would have disconcerting implications for our 
implementation, in which certain physical resources are allocated, in 
assembling a computation for execution, for each instance of a subsystem. 
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= PI 
P2 
P3 
P2 
P3 
two independent 
instances of P3 
Legend: 
block boundary 
=• subsystem boundary 
Fig. 14. Block-structure relationships of subsystems 
^11 CI WC* • 
Fortunately, no such situations can arise, for at the time a subsystem 
is DEPOSITed, all the access capabilities in its run-time environment 
refer to procedures and subsystems already in existence. A self-
referencing subsystem, therefore, cannot be created unless it already 
exists. 
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The multi-level nesting of subsystems could be construed as a loophole 
allowing unrestricted propagation of capabilities, thereby violating the 
access-control specifications set by subsystems' owners. Suppose, for 
example, that in the computation shown in Figure 13, users UO and U3 are 
conpetitors (as suggested by Rotenberg [28, p. 145]), so that U3 wants 
to deny P3's services to any confutation serving UO. Yet here is P3, 
involved in a computation for which UO is responsible. This charge can be 
countered with several arguments. Most directly, we can provide a 
privileged system procedure by means of which P3 can discover who owns its 
caller, its caller's caller, and so on, out to the owner of the computation; 
on discovering that it is working for UO, P3 could immediately return, 
or provoke a fatal-error termination, thereby witholding the service for 
which it was called. But this solution is itself vulnerable to a further 
objection: under some circumstances, the discovery by a subsystem of the 
identity of the owner of the computation in which it is used could be 
construed as a violation of the borrower's rights—e.g., it might enable a 
subsystem owner to "steal" a list of the borrower's clients. 
A second method of preventing the use of P3 by any users other than 
those explicitly mentioned in its access-control list would be the 
provision of a "no-lending" attribute which, if possessed by a subsystem, 
wculd prevent a. capability referring to it from being included in a sub­
system environment, without hindering its inclusion in a PPF. Thus Ul 
and U2 could use P3 in their own cc«ç>utations, but would be unable to 
allow its use by any other users. This is a blunt instrument under the 
circumstances, however, for it denies indirect access not only to UO but 
to all other potential users not explicitly authorized by U3 to use P3. 
We have chosen net to complicate cur system vrith such a provision,- partly 
because we have been unable to conjure up a realistic situation in which 
it would be useful, in a time-sharing system of SYMBOL'S modest scale. 
Our principal reason, however, is that what is happening here does not 
truly amount to a propagation of a capability, as defined in [29, p. 1294]— 
UO does not gain any long-term capability to include P3 in his PPF's, or to 
call it from arbitrary programs, but only gets the temporary and indirect 
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use of it under conditions controlled by its authorized borrowers, 
Ul and U2. If any violation has occurred, it is the violation of U3's 
trust in Ul and U2. As Graham and Denning have put it, ". . . trust 
is a distinctly nontechnical concept . . . the complete solution to 
the protection problem must strike a balance between technical and 
nontechnical issues." [15, p. 424] 
If one is persuaded by the above discussion that subsystems are 
sufficiently isolated from their borrowers to satisfy the "black-box" 
requirements, then one might well ask whether the need for communication 
between subsystem and caller is adequately served by SYMBOL'S procedure-
parameter mechanisms. We cannot deal with this issue in its entirety 
at this point, for part of it concerns Value Files, which we have yet 
to describe in detail. 
We can, however, show how SYMBOL'S "call-by-name" parameter 
mechanism allows a borrower to supply a procedure definition for use 
by a subsystem, in instances where it is intended that a procedure 
called by a subsystem is to be left unbound to a definition until the 
subsystem is put to use in a confutation. (Such a facility is useful 
in such applications as general-purpose numerical-integration 
procedures, where the function to be integrated is supplied by the 
caller in the form of another procedure.) A simple exanple is shown 
in Figure 15a, in which UO's program contains a declaration of a 
procedure P, which it passes to subsystem PI by name via the parameter 
of the call to Pi. Therefore, when PI calls Q(Y)—where Q is Pi's 
formal parameter—PI actually calls P(Y) as intended. In a computation 
involving nested subsystems, a procedure can be passed down to 
arbitrary depth, as illustrated by Figure 15b. Finally, the procedure 
passed in by parameter may itself be a system procedure or a sub­
system, as in the example of Figure 15c.^ 
^Like the subsystem nesting problem discussed above, this could 
be construed as a violation of an owner's intentions. With the 
exception of the "no-lending" attribute, which would have no bearing 
on the parameter mechanism, the same arguments apply. 
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UO 
P1(P);...PROCEDURE P(X);...END 
PI 
/ ui 
/ 
PROCEDURE PI(Q);...Q(Y)...END 
calls UO's "P" 
a. subsystem calling a procedure declared in calling 
block. 
UO 
P1(P);...PROCEDURE P(X);...END 
PI 
/m 
PROCEDURE P1(Q) ;.. .P2(Q) . .END 
U2 
/ U3 
.END 
^calls UO's "P' 
b. 
/ *^=xâll " 
multi-level transmission of a procedure-name. 
Fig. 15. Subsystems calling borrower-supplied procedures. 
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UO 
U2 
P1(P2); 
PROCEDURE P2(R) .END 
PI 
PROCEDURE P1(Q);...Q(Y) END 
c. borrower passing one subsystem to another. 
Fig. 15—Continued 
SPF modification 
The preceding discussion has included explanations of how a user 
can create a Shared Procedure File, and how he can authorize its use 
by other users. In the closing paragraphs of the section, we turn to 
questions of modification and ultimate disposal of Shared Procedure 
Files. 
In fact, the file system provides no mechanism by which a Shared 
Procedure File can be modified piecemeal, but allows only its replace­
ment toto. The reason for this is found in the file system policy 
prohibiting alteration of shared objects and revocation of access 
already granted. Were operations provided by which shared procedures 
could be modified, they would surely prove most irritating to use, for 
they would fail when applied to SPF's for which other users happened 
to possess access capabilities. 
Of course, the same considerations apply with equal force to 
operations which replace or obliterate Shared Procedure Files—these 
operations too must be forbidden if any other user possesses a 
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capability referring to the file. How, then, can we eliminate this 
inconvenience, imposed by borrowers of SPF's upon their owners? Our 
solution is the operaticsi 
OBSOLETE (SPF-name), 
wliich registers the SPF-owner's intent to dispose of the file, but delays 
the actual disposal until all access capabilities referring to it have 
been relinquished by their possessors. Regardless of when the final 
disposal takes place, however, the file's SPF-name is dissociated from it 
immediately. The granting of new capabilities to access the obsolete 
file is thereby prevented, and the SPF-name can be re-used immediately 
to name a new version of the file. 
An owner who desires to issue a revision of an SPF can do so at any 
time by OBSOLETE-ing the old version, and immediately DEPOSIT-ing the 
new version under the same SPF-name. Any borrower who prefers the new 
version exchanges his old capability for the new one by simply repeating 
the INSERT or REDEFINE operation by which he obtained its predecessor, 
using the same value to specify the procedure definition's source. But 
no borrower is ever compelled to accept the new version, for the old one 
continues to exist as long as any user retains a capability to access it. 
This arrangement provides an atmosphere conducive to the development of 
proprietary services in which 
. . .  n o  p r o p r i e t a r y  s e r v i c e  i n  u s e  m a y  b e  m o d i f i e d .  ( T h i s  w o u l d  
not prevent a new version of the service from being offered.) The 
enforcement would create the needed trust between user and owner, 
because the user would know that the proprietary service could not 
be modified. [28, p. 143] 
It is not difficult to iuiâyînc hOw âii SFF's COulu êiiCOUxayê 
a borrower to relinquish his capability to access the SPF. For exazgle, 
the owner could program the shared procedure to access a certain private 
Value File, by which its owner could signal it to refuse to cooperate, 
or to print a message to the borrower calling attention to the new 
version. 
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Revocation of access capabilities 
Whether borrowers' access capabilities ought, as a matter of 
general policy, to be arbitrarily revocable by the owner of a shared 
object has been the subject of some controversy in the literature. 
Saltzer and Schroeder, in their recent survey article [29], apparently 
take it for granted that access is to be revocable, and show how 
revocation is easier to inclement in a list-oriented system [p. 1296] 
than in a ticket-oriented system [p. 1294]. In his dissertation, 
published previously, Schroeder asserts that "... the inability to 
revoke access permission once given, would be unacceptable in a 
practical facility" [30, p. 33], but offers no supporting arguments. 
Graham and Denning, writing at about the same time, at least give 
space to both sides of the question: 
[A certain access-control rule] . . . permits t^ie owner of 
an object to revoke arbitrarily any access held by any non-
subordinate subject to that object. This ability is open to 
question. Vanderbilt argues that no such ability is warranted 
as, in effect, the owner of an object and those to whom access 
has been granted have entered a contract (19)—i.e., the non-
owners presumably have used the object in their programs and 
depend on its presence. Lampson, on the other hand, argues that, 
for the proper implementation of cooperation among mutually 
suspicious subsysteiTis, absolute power of revocation is warranted 
(16). The latter view is reflected in our model. [15, p. 424] 
16 B W LAMPSCN 
Protection 
Proc Fifth Annual Princeton Conference on Information Sciences 
and Systems Department of Electrical Engineering Princeton 
l&iiversity Princeton New Jersey 08540 March 1971 pp 437-443 
19 D H VANDERBILT 
Controlled information sharing in ^  computer utility 
MIT Project MAC report MAC-TR-67 October 1969 
Consulting Lampson's paper for his views on access revocation we find 
only the following: 
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The [access] rules above do not permit the 'owner' of an object 
to take away access to that object. Whether this should be permitted 
is an unresolved issue. It is permitted by most systems; see (13) 
for a contrary view. [19, p. 21] 
13. Vanderbilt, D. H., "Controlled Information Sharing in a 
Conçuter Utility, MAC-TR-67, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., Oct. 1969. 
As an argument that "absolute power of revocation is warranted," the above 
quotation seems less than totally conçelling. At last we turn to 
Vanderbilt's thesis, where we find: 
. . . under normal circumstances, a user loses abilities only 
through his own action . . . once a borrower has gained access to 
shared information, that ability will not be lost unless it is 
relinquished by the borrower. The reason for this is that the 
borrower will in general have done work, such as constructing other 
procedures and offering them to others or embarking on a research 
program, which depends on the availability of the shared information, 
and the owner should therefore not be able to arbitrarily remove an 
access privilege already granted . . . the establishment of the 
borrower's access ability represents the formation of a contract 
which binds the owner to provide use of the information. [34, p. 38] 
Without wishing to conceal the fact that arbitrary revocability of access 
capabilities would be difficult to implement in SYMBOL (as is explained 
in sosia detail bslcv;), v:s nevsrtheless feel that, anong the arguments ve 
have seen, Vanderbilt's carries the day. 
Nevertheless, two problems remain to be cleared up. One is that the 
borrower of an SPF, by refusing to relinquish his capability to access it, 
inposes on its owner an unfair burden, in that the SPF occupies some 
fraction of its owner's file space. But this is a burden only if file 
space is a limited resource (as it assuredly is in any real system) , in 
which case the borrower will presumably have agreed to compensate the 
owner in some way for the capability to access the SPF (perhaps units of 
file space would be a suitable medium of exchange). The "burden" can 
then be offset by proper adjustment of the rate of such condensation. 
A more serious problem grows out of this one, and is also more 
general: a borrower might refuse to pay legitimate (i.e., previously 
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agreed-upon) conçjensation for a capability, or might go bankrupt, and 
still refuse to surrender the capability. This is an instance of a 
contract violation, i.e., a dispute between the two parties to an 
agreement, and like all such violations, requires adjudication by a 
higher authority. Since the passing of such judgments seems likely to 
remain outside the realm of the computing art for some time to come, 
we will assume that the "higher authority" will be a person responsible 
for the administration of the conç>uter system. Having made his 
decision, he will have the corresponding power to carry it out, 
revoking access capabilities as required, by means provided especially 
for such situations. The principle remains, however—owners cannot 
arijitrarily revoke borrowers' access capabilities, nor modify nor 
destroy the <&ject to which they have granted access. 
Value Files 
Corresponding to the procedure files (SPF's and PPF's) which provide 
storage for the active conçonents of confutations, Value Files provide 
storage for the passive cooiponents, i.e., the data objects upon which 
procedures operate. The internal representation of the values stored 
in Value Files is identical to that of the values of ordinary 
variables in confutations, so that Value Files' values can be accessed 
directly, by means of the same program constructs that operate on 
variables' values. 
The steps by which a user obtains direct access to a Value File 
are analogous to those by which he gains access to a procedure file: 
first he (i.e., his confutation) executes a request for a capability 
to access a file (the granting of such capabilities is governed by 
access-control lists, as for access to shared procedures); then, 
assuming the capability is granted, the computation may use it to 
effect actual accesses to the file's value. When a Value File access 
capability is granted, it is embedded directly in a particular program 
variable specified by the access request, thereby binding the variable 
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to the file's value; because of this, there is no way the program can 
duplicate or modify a capability—it can at most use the capability to 
access the value to which it refers. (In the latter part of the 
discussion that follows, we show how these direct-access Value File 
capabilities can be combined with the procedure-sharing facilities 
described above to provide indirect access to Value Files via user-
programmed sharing controls.) 
The system provides two modes of capabilities for direct access to 
Value Files. A copy-mode capability allows only those accesses that cannot 
modify a file's value; if a variable bound to a Value File by a copy-mode 
capability appears as a recipient in an assignment or input statement, 
any attenpt to execute the statement triggers an execution error. A 
free-mode capability, on the other hand, allows any operation expressible 
in SPL to be performed on the value. (These access modes are analogous 
to the "read-only" and "read-write" access modes provided by many con­
ventional file systems, e.g., [22]). 
Value Files can be created and destroyed only by their owners. A 
new Value File is created by means of the file operation 
CREATE (VF-name), 
where VF-name is some file name not currently used to name a Value File 
in its owner's account. The initial value or a newly created Value 
File—like that of a program variable—is a null scalar. A Value File is 
destroyed by invoking 
DESTROY (VF-name) , 
which, like OBSOLETE, postpones the value's actual reclamation until 
the last capability referring to it has been surrendered by the computation 
possessing it. 
A computation obtains a Value File access capability by invoking 
COPYLINK (variable, value-file, outcome) 
or FREELINK (variable, value-file, outcome). 
These are System Public Library procedures that bind the named variable 
to the value of the specified Value File (the capability's access mode 
being indicated by the operation's name). The third parameter-routcome— 
69 
is assigned a value by the system when the access-capability request 
is processed. Its value, after control returns to the calling 
program, indicates whether the requested capability was granted and, 
if not, the reason for its denial. The possible reasons for denial of 
a capability request include the following: 
1. the specified file does not exist, or the requested access 
capability has not been authorized by the file's owner 
2. some other confutation currently possesses a free-access 
capability to access the same file 
3. the request is for a free-access capability, and some other 
confutation currently possesses a capability—free or copy-mode— 
to access the same file. 
The last two restrictions enforce the file-system policy prohibiting 
the modification of objects via non-exclusive capabilities. The 
system allows any number of computations to possess copy-mode 
capabilities for the same file simultaneously, but a free-mode capa­
bility for a given file is always exclusive. 
Once granted, a Value-File access capability persists until either 
the confutation invokes 
UNLINK (variable), 
which surrenders the capability held by the naoed variable, or the 
computation is liquidated, at which time all its capabilities are 
relinquished. Thus Value-File capabilities, in contrast to borrowed-
procedure capabilities, have limited lifetimes, expiring automatically 
with the confutations possessing them. 
During a capability's lifetime, it binds a variable to a filed 
value by means of the same internal mechanisms that bind an ordinary 
value to a variable. Consequently, any reference, subscripted or 
unsubscripted, to the variable bound to a Value File actually 
references the file's value directly. Value Files can thus be 
operated upon by all of the SYMBOL Programming Language's operators 
(except, if the capability in question is copy-mode, for the value-
modifying operators—assignment and input). 
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The owner of a Value File is authorized by virtue of his ownership 
to cA)tain copy-mode and free-mode capabilities to access its value, and 
is the only user who can DESTROY the file. He can authorize other users 
to access its value by invoking 
AUTHORIZE COPY ACCESS (VF-name, ACL-name) 
or 
AUTHORIZE FREE ACCESS (VF-name, ACL-name). 
Analogous to LEND and REVEAL, these operations specify access-control 
lists (which are themselves Value Files) for a particular Value File. The 
conventions governing the interpretation of ACL-name ' s value are the same 
as for LEND and REVEAL (q.v. ). 
A user requests a capability to access a Value File belonging to 
another user by invoking COPYLINK or FREELINK and supplying a vector value 
(of the form <user-naroe | VF-name>) for its value-file peirameter. Before 
granting the capability, the system checks the requestor's authorization; 
the request is considered to be authorized if one or more of the follow­
ing ccsiditions is true: 
1. access to the Value File in the requested mode is open to the public 
2. the requestor's user-name appears in the access-control-list file 
corresponding to the Value File and access mode specified in the 
request 
3. the requested capability is copy-mode, and the requestor is authorized 
for free-mode access according to one of the previous conditions. 
Thus a user who is authorized for free-mode access to a Value File is 
ipso facto authorized for copy-mode access to it. 
In general, then, each user can access not only his own Value Files, 
but also certain others, namely, chose that are publicly accessible, and 
those in whose access-control lists his user-name appears. To the set 
of all files that a user has authority to access, we apply the term 
authorization domain. 
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Attribution of access requests 
At this point in the discussion, an important policy question 
presents itself: To whom is an access-capability request to be 
attributed, for the purpose of determining whether the request is 
authorized? It is tempting to attribute every access request to the 
owner of the computation in which it originates—it is, after all, 
the confutation owner's initiative that is ultimately responsible for 
the occurrence of the request. But this choice leads to several 
severe limitations, which have been described by Saltzer and Schroeder 
[29, p. 13021. 
The first of these limitations is that "only those access 
restrictions provided by the standard system facilities can be enforced. " 
The reason is that if a user, UO, wanted to allow another user, Ul, 
to access one of his Value Files (say, VO), then DO would have to name 
Ul in VO's access-control list, for this would be necessary for any 
confutation of Ul's to gain access to VO. But if Ul's name appears 
in VO's access-control list (or VO is a public file, which is equivalent 
for the purposes of this example) , then any variable in any coiiç>utation 
belonging to Ul could equally well be linked to VO. The only protection 
for VO against Ul would be the defense against modification afforded 
by the copy-mode access authorization. As Saltzer and Schroeder 
observe, there are many circumstances in which these controls are 
inadequate. Their example is an instructor's file of grade records 
for a course; although the standard access modes and controls would 
suffice for the instructor's own accesses, it would be awkward to allow 
each student to see only his own record and perhaps the grade distri­
bution for each assignment. And it would be incessible to provide 
for teaching assistants to enter new grades, while preventing them from 
altering grades already awarded. Vanderbilt gives a logically similar 
exanple of a file of medical records ("Medbank" [34, p. 131]), to 
which doctors, patients, and medical researchers each have different 
types of access rights, none of which matches either of the standard 
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system-supplied access modes. Still other exaiiç>les are suggested by 
Schroeder [30, p. 14], Conway et al. [7] and Wulf et al. [37]. 
The other limitation is that, if file-access requests were attributed 
to the owner of the confutation in which they are generated, then a 
borrowed procedure could gain access to its borrower's entire authorization 
domain, in another variety of "Trojan Horse" attack. 
In view of these difficulties, we abandon the notion of attributing 
file-access requests to the owner of an entire confutation. Instead we 
attribute each request to the owner of the particular program or procedure 
in which it originates. A confutation incorporating borrowed procedures 
thus operates not in a single autnorization domain, but in several; at 
any given moment, its authorization domain is that of the owner of the 
program or procedure that is currently executing. In specific terms, 
this means that when FREELIMK or COPYLINK is invoked, the access request 
is attributed to the owner of the procedure in which the statement calling 
it actually appears. 
This policy eliminates both of the limitations described above. 
First, it prevents a borrowed procedure from invading the borrower's 
files; since a borrowed procedure operates in the authorization domain 
of its owner, rather than assuming the borrower's authorizations, the 
borrower is protected against unauthorized raids by the procedure on 
his files. 
Caretaker procedures 
Secondly, the attribution of access requests to the owners of 
procedures that invoke them allows users to construct "caretaker" pro­
cedures for their Value Files (like those described by Vanderbilt 
[34, p. 28]) that provide other users' only means of accessing the files. 
Non-owners are allowed no direct access to such a Value File. Instead, 
they are allowed to borrow a certain shared procedure belonging to the 
Value File's owner. Then, instead of accessing the Value File directly, 
by binding a variable to it and executing references to the variable, 
the non-owner calls the borrowed procedure, which accesses 
73 
the Value File on his behalf (see Figure 16). Since the shared 
procedure belongs to the Value File's owner, the Value Pile is in 
its authorization domain; it can therefore call COPYLINK or FKEELINK 
to bind one of its own variables to the file's value. The borrower 
expresses his requests to access the file by means of the procedure's 
parameters; the procedure can be programmed to enforce the desired 
access controls, which may be far more elaborate than sinple copy-
only protection, before returning the results of the access (if any) 
to the caller. 
UO 
Y * Pl(X+2); 
PROCEDURE Pi (A); COPYLINK(B, IVFlj ) ; RETURN B[3,A]; END 
Fig. 16. A "caretaker" procedure: PI allows UO's program 
restricted access to Value File VFl. 
In the grade-record exaitple of Saltzer and Schroeder, the instructor 
could make a procedure available to his students which would return to 
its caller (i.e. , the owner of the computation) his own grades or the 
distribution of grades over the class, but would refuse any other 
requests. To his teaching assistants, the instructor would make 
available a different procedure, which would write new grades in any 
student's record, but would refuse to alter grades already assigned. 
The effect of a "caretaker" procedure is thus to define a new 
mode of access capability, thereby extending the system's copy-mode/ 
free-mode repertoire to enconpass any arbitrary individual-access 
restrictions that can be expressed in a procedure. This facility 
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provides the kind of "user-programmed sharing controls" that, according 
to Saltzer and Schroeder, characterize "only a few of the most advanced 
system designs" [29, p. 1281]. 
In Vanderbilt's model, caretaker programs provide the only means of 
access to shared data, which "reduces data sharing to a particular type 
of program sharing" [34, p. 29]. Clearly, any conceivable mode of 
direct-access capability can be simulated by a caretaker procedure possess­
ing the same capability, so that direct access offers no logical function 
beyond that obtainable through caretaker procedures. Yet Vanderbilt 
concedes that he is not concerned with questions of efficiency, and that 
"existing systems all allow the direct sharing of data . . . because of 
efficiency considerations." Schroeder, too, asserts that "prohibition on 
direct sharing of data among users . . . would be unacceptable in a 
practical facility" [30, p. 33]. And it is not hard to imagine instances 
in which a Value File owner would want to control not the access mode 
itself, but only the circumstances under which a standard mode of access 
capability would be granted- Elaborating slightly on one aspect of an 
example suggested by Conway et al. [7, p. 213], we suppose that the owner 
of an employee personnel/payroll file wants to allow other users in the 
personnel department to write their own programs to extract data from the 
file in various ways for various purposes, but co restrict their con^/U-
tations accessing the file to run only between 9 AM and 5 PM on weekdays, 
and only from a terminal located in the payroll office. To be sure, he 
could provide a caretaker procedure of the sort described above, but 
this would require users to call it for each individual reference to the 
file's value. It would be more efficient if the caretaker procedure 
could sinçily ascertain that the intended access criteria were satisfied, 
and then grant the calling program a direct copy-mode access capability. 
Such a procedure would substitute user-designed controls, not for the 
system's access modes, but for its single list-controlled capability 
granting mechanisms. 
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It could be argued that a caretaker procedure of this second 
variety would violate the file system's authorization-domain structure, 
which identifies each procedure's authorization domain with the set of 
files that the procedureowner has authority to access. At the 
same time, the usefulness of such a mechanism is obvious—it is clearly 
desirable to eliminate procedure invocations that serve no useful 
purpose. 
To untangle this apparent conflict between the rules governing file 
accesses and these clearly useful mechanisms, it is helpful to define 
a new type of access domain, namely, the capability domain. A 
procedure's authorization dcssain, as the reader will doubtless recall, 
consists of all the files its owner is authorized to access; it is, 
therefore, the set of all files to which the procedure can bind a 
variable by calling COPYLINK or FREELINK. A procedure's capability 
domain, for cortparison, consists of the files for which it actually 
possesses direct-access capabilities, binding variables of the procedure 
to files' values. In a system allowing only direct sharing, a procedure's 
capability domain would be strictly a subset of its authorization 
domain. Caretaker procedures of the second kind eliminate this 
restriction, allowing direct access by a procedure to files outside its 
authorization domain, in the context of a specific confutation. 
The means by which a user-written procedure can confer a direct-
access capability on its caller is, of course, the procedure's parameter 
list. A program, wishing direct access to a Value File to which access 
is controlled by a caretaker procedure of the second kind, calls the 
procedure instead of calling COPYLINK or FREELINK, and presents, as 
an actual parameter, the variable to vAiich it wants the file's value 
bound (see Figure 17a). The caretaker procedure (PI in the figure) 
performs the necessary confutations to determine whether the access 
criteria to be enforced by it are satisfied; if they are, it calls 
COPYLINK or FREELINK to bind the caller's variable (using the formal-
parameter name by which it is known within the caretaker procedure) 
to the file's value. The parameter mechanism works also in the 
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opposite direction, conferring capabilities obtained by the cciLling 
program liçon a borrowed procedure (see Figure 17b), and thus allowing 
it to access Value Files outside its authorization domain. 
UO 
/ U1 
PROCEDURE PI(A); IF...THEN COPYLINK (A,VFILE) END END 
/ 
a. borrowed procedure conferring a capability on its caller. 
UO 
P2 PROCEDURE P2(A,B);...END 
COPYLINKCX.VFl); FREELINK(Y,VF2); P2(X,Y); 
/ 
b. caller conferring a capability on a borrowed prccsdure. 
Fig. 17. Transmitting direct-access capabilities 
via parasssters. 
The system's accommodation of nested subsystems allows the trans­
mission of direct-access capabilities across any number of parameter 
interfaces (see figure 18), so that the access capability conferred by 
a caretaker procedure is not necessarily restricted to its immediate 
caller. A similar possibility became evident in our examination of access 
to shared procedures, and similar arguments apply here. In the case of 
shared Value Files, if UO (referring to the figure) obtains access to 
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UO 
Pl(X); 
^ PROCEDURE P1(Y); P2(Y); END 
P2 
U2 
PROCEDURE P2(Z); FREELINK(Z,VF2); END 
Fig. 18. Multi-level transmission of a direct-access 
capability. 
VF2 in violation of U2's intentions, he may use it to inspect VF2 or 
to modify it. If he inspects it, the violation is equivalent to Ul 
copying the file and revealing the copy to UO. Since Ul is specifically 
authorized to copy the file, this amounts to an instance of the 
confinement problem^ which our system makes no attempt to solve. If, 
on the other hand, UO modifies VF2, he has done nothing more than Ul 
could have done himself using the same operations. In either case, 
the responsibility for the violation is Ul's, and whether PI itself 
actually performs the operations on VF2 that violate U2's intentions, 
or merely allows UO's program to perform them, it is clearly Ul who 
1 i.e. , the problem of preventing a borrowed procedure from 
remembering and subsequently divulging data to which its borrower has 
given it access. "An income-tax computing service, for example, must 
be allowed to keep billing information on its use by customers, but not 
to store information secretly on customers' incomes" [15, p. 417]. 
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has allowed them to take place. The problem is therefore the violation 
by U1 of the trust placed in him by U2; as we remarked eeirlier, such 
violations of trust appear to be insoluble by purely technical means. 
We conclude that the types of violation that can occur as a result of 
subsystem nesting are beyond what our system is claimed or intended 
to prevent. 
Delegation of Authorization Authority 
Various authors have expressed concern over the danger that a 
borrower, having obtained a capability to access a protected object, may 
violate the intent of the object's owner by giving away copies of the 
capability to other users. If, as Saltzer and Schroeder suggest, "the 
ability to make a further copy (and potentially a new authorization) is 
coupled to possession of a capability and is not independently controll­
able" [29, p. 1295], then it can be nearly impossible to enforce access 
controls, or to track down all the outstanding copies of a capability to 
find out to whom a given protected object is accessible- Lanpson pro­
poses adding a copy flag [19, p. 21] to each capability when it is 
originally granted, indicating whether its holder is to be permitted to 
propagate it. 
In the SYMBOL system, as we have seen, access capabilities cannot be 
accessed directly by users' programs, but only used by them, thereby 
eliminating any possibility of unauthorized propagation. Such capability 
copying as does take place is performed by the system's internal 
mechanisms, and allows only the degree of intra-computation propagation 
necessary to effect procedure calls and parameter substitution. 
The SYMBOL system, moreover, completely separates capabilities from 
authorizations. The latter—i.e., the access-control lists that govern 
the granting of capabilities—can be delegated arbitrarily, by means of 
the access-control lists governing the access-control list V2. If VI 
and V2 belong to the same owner, U, then U can maintain complete control 
over access to VI by keeping V2 private. Or he could allow U' free access 
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to V2, thereby permitting U ' to participate in controlling access to 
VI. Or U could allow U' free access to \'2's access-control list 
(say, V3), so that U' could share in decisions as to who could partic­
ipate in controlling access to VI. In another vein, U could designate, 
as VI's access-control list, a Value File inaccessible to himself— 
for exaitple, a project personnel roster—though he would, as owner of 
VI, always retain the power to change the specification of VI's 
access-control list (though not, in this example, its content). 
While these examples demonstrate the flexibility of the SYMBOL file 
system's access-control mechanisms in accommodating various access-
authorization arrangements, we make no claim to have investigated its 
implications with any thoroughness. While we doubt that much of this 
flexibility will prove particuleirly useful, the separation of authori­
zations from capabilities does appear to solve the problem of uncon­
trolled propagation of capabilities without unduly restricting the 
delegation of access-control authority. 
File Status Information 
No file system would be complete without a set of commands (and a 
corresponding set of system procedures) complementing the file 
operations, which an owner can invoke to find out various kinds of 
information about his files. The detailed specification of such 
commands, and the precise format in which the desired information is 
presented, appear to be straightforward matters of implementation, and 
hence will not concern us here. A few examples of the sort of 
information to be provided will be sufficient for our purposes: 
1. lists of file-names of the owner's Value Files, Private Procedure 
Files, and Shared Procedure Files (the last with the corresponding 
procedure-names) 
2. for any individual Value File or Shared Procedure File, the amount 
of storage space occupied by it, its accessibility specifications 
(e.g., the VF-names of its access-control lists), and the names of 
users currently holding capabilities to access it 
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3. for any individual Private Procedure File, a list of its entries by 
procedure-name, each identified as to entry type 
4. for any Private Procedure File entry, its family (i.e. , a list of 
the other PPF's containing pointers to the same procedure definition); 
if borrowed, its user-name and SPF-name; if local, the amount of 
storage space occiç>ied by it. 
Summary 
This chapter began by describing the SYMBOL file system design's 
major premises, which are consequences of the hardware setting in vdiich 
it is to operate. After a short discussion of the kinds of functions to 
be expected of any file system, we showed how these considerations, 
together with the initial assxjnçxtions, lead to the definitions of the 
data objects to be handled by the file system. 
The remaiinder of the chapter was devoted to a fairly detailed 
description of the structure and functions of the file system from its 
users' point of view. After a brief introductory overview of the 
system and the main policies governing its operations, there followed 
am examination in some depth of each of the three types of files 
accommodated by the system, and an explanation of the purposes served by 
each and its relationship with the others. Comparing our file system's 
functional properties to those of other systems described in the litera­
ture, we discovered that, in terms of its access-control and protection 
facilities, the SYMBOL system ranks with the most advanced. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SYMB0L-2R FILE SYSTEM: IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFICATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter describes how the file system, whose external properties 
have been described in chapter 3, is implemented in the environment 
provided by the SYMBOL-2R hardware. The basic structure of the file 
system is described first, followed by the data structures by which each 
of the three types of files is represented internally. We outline the 
software iinplementation of each of the file operations, and examine in 
some detail the interactions between certain hardware mechanisms and the 
file system's data objects. 
File System Storage Domains and Computations 
The first questions to be settled, in implementing our file system, 
were where file data should be stored and how it should be managed. From 
our premise that the file system was to employ SYMBOL'S existing storage-
management mechanisms, it follows that new storage domains must be 
established for the files. User-computations' storage domains are 
clearly out of the question, for they are reclaimed at the end of each 
terminal session, if not sooner. Storing files in Terminal Monitors' 
domains would either bind each user permanently to a particular terminal 
(and preclude file sharing) or require a very complex network of 
communication and synchronization between Monitors. Finally, using the 
Supervisor's domain—making file management a direct responsibility of 
the Supervisor—would seriously degrade its response time in attending 
to its other duties. 
The conclusion is inescapable that our system requires a storage 
domain established specifically for files, with a permanent confutation. 
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running in that domain, to manage them. We dedicate Virtual Processor 15 
to run this confutation, vdiich we call (by analogy with Terminal Monitors) 
the File Monitor (see Figure 19). File operation requests originate in 
confutations—users' computations or Terminal Monitors—running on user-
terminal Virtual Processors, and are transmitted to the File Monitor, 
which processes them one at a time and transmits the results back to the 
requesting confutations. 
Supervisor 
Terminal 
Monitor 
T 
Supervisor 
Queue 
A A A 
Terminal 
Monitor 
File 
Monitor Monitor 
User 
Comp. 
G) 
Priv. Sys. Proc. 
User 
Comp. 
User AM AM AM 
Comp. 1 2 n 
VPl VP2 VP14 
VP15 
Fig. 19. Computations involved in the SYMBOL File System (showing inter-
computation communications). 
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In a further refinement of the file-storage plan introduced above, 
we store each owner's files in a separate storage domain, rather than 
storing them all together in the File Monitor's own domain. The major 
advantages are that (1) this allows us to use SYMBOL'S hardware pro­
visions for limiting each user's file-space consunçjtion; (2) it probably 
reduces, on the average, the number of pages spanned by each file, and 
thereby the working-set sizes of the confutations accessing them; and 
(3) it permits each page containing file data to be identified with a 
single account, which enables the system to determine the ownership of 
any shared procedure by a simple reference to one of the "page-overhead" 
words of any page occijfied by it. Within each separate file-storage 
domain, all operations requiring any storage allocation are performed 
by a separate confutation, running in the domain, known as its Account 
Manager (AM). These computations stand in the same relationship to 
the File Monitor that user-computations bear to Terminal Monitors, in 
that the AM's and the FM run alternately on Virtual Processor 15, the 
switching of control from one computation to another being effected by 
the Supervisor. Whenever a file operation requires file-space allocation, 
the FM selects the appropriate AM and transfers control to it via a 
Supervisor call; after the operation's confletion (or interruption, in 
to the FM via another Supervisor call. 
Communications Between Computations 
In keeping with its policy of total isolation between users, the 
original dcSxgn of SYMBOL included no provisions for communications of 
any kind between confutations. It did, however, provide for the 
Supervisor confutation, running on Virtual Processor 0, which in turn 
makes possible inter-confutation communications of the sort required by 
our file system. 
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There are two distinct cases of communication between computations. 
The simpler of the two cases, in which a pair of computations runs 
alternately on a single Virtual Processor, has been described in chapter 2 
and [25]. Communication between them is simply a matter of one member of 
the pair reading a message left by the other, or writing a message to be 
read by the other. Since SPL provides a non-privileged computation with 
no access to any storage outside its own name space, at least one manber 
of the pair must be privileged. In the system under discussion, one 
member of the pair is a Terminal Monitor (privileged), and the other is 
the corresponding user-confutation. Communication between the two may be 
entirely one-sided, ais when a hardware interrupt in the user-coiiç>utation 
results in transfer of control to the TM, which can inspect and modify the 
user's confutation before returning control to it. Alternatively, the 
user-conç)utation may deliberately pass control to the TM by calling a 
privileged system procedure provided for the purpose; in this case, messages 
may be passed via variables in either confutation's name space, or via 
some other storage location(s) external to both. 
The other case of inter-confutation communication involves trans­
mission of messages from one Virtual Processor to another. In particular, 
our file system requires the File Monitor to receive file-operation 
requests from several Terminal Monitors, and to transmit replies back to 
them. The multiplicity of independent message senders, and the inability 
of the File Monitor—a sequential ccxnputation, like all confutations in 
SYMBOL—to handle more than one request at a time, requires us to provide 
a queue in which to accumulate messages that arrive while the FM is busy. 
The natural choice for management of this queue (the EM Queue) is the 
Supervisor. The TM's call the Supervisor to enqueue their FM messages, and 
the FM calls the Supervisor when it is ready to receive a message. (The 
hcurdware provides a Supervisor Queue—a subset of the Central Processor 
Queue—to handle calls that arrive while the Supervisor is busy. And 
while the Supervisor is answering a call, the confutation that called it 
is blocked, so the caller can sinfly leave a message for the Supervisor 
before calling it, and read its reply on resuming.) To minimize the load 
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on the Supervisor, we arrange for a file-operation message handled by 
it to consist solely of a pointer to the complete specification of the 
request, which the TM stores in a storage string in its domain known as 
its File Message String (FMS). The same storage string serves as a 
receptacle for the File Monitor's reply. 
A typical sequence of messages passing between the various compu­
tations taking part in a file operation is illustrated by the numbered 
communication paths shown in Figure 19. A description of each message, 
and the activities called forth by it, follows: 
1. A user-computation running on Virtual Processor 2 (VP2) initiates a 
file-operation request by calling a privileged system procedure, 
which in turn passes the request to the Terminal Monitor (TM2). 
2. TM2, having validated the user's request, loads its File Message 
String with the parameters of the requested operation and 
initiates a Supervisor call, which is added to the Supervisor Queue. 
3. Upon reaching the top of the Supervisor Queue, TM2's call activates 
the Supervisor at its File-operation entry-point. If the File 
Monitor (FM) happens to be idle, the Supervisor immediately passes 
TM2's request to it. If the FM is busy, however, the Supervisor 
merely adds TM2's request to the File Monitor Queue. Then it 
suspends itself, leaving VP2 clocked. 
4. TM2's request is received by the FM after it calls the Supervisor 
to report completion of some previous operation. The FM obtains the 
parameters of the requested operation from VP2's File Message String. 
If the operation involves no allocation of memory space for file 
storage—for example, a mere verification of access authorization— 
then the FM itself satisfies the request, and goes directly to 
step 7. Otherwise, it selects the Account Manager responsible for 
the storage domain affected by the allocation, and passes control to 
it by means of a Supervisor call. 
5,6. The Account Manager performs the operation requested of it by the 
FM, and returns control with a message indicating the results. 
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7. The FM records the results of the operation in VP2's File Message 
String, and calls the Supervisor to report completion of the operation 
and its readiness for a new request. 
8. Upon activation by the FM's call, the Supervisor unblocks VP2. Then, 
before suspending itself, it inspects the FM Queue for a pending file-
operation request. If one is waiting, the Supervisor passes it 
immediately to the FM; otherwise, it leaves the FM idle, to be 
awakened by the next file-operation request. 
9. Resuming execution, the Terminal Monitor obtains from the FMS the 
results of the operation. Assuming a successful completion, it returns 
control (via a Supervisor call) to the system procedure in the user-
computation. 
10. The system procedure returns control to its calling point. 
The last operation in step 3 above (". . . leaving VP2 blocked") is 
necessitated by a certain problem that SYMBOL'S architecture presents for 
our system. The difficulty arises when a user happens to press a control 
key (such as "CLEAR") at a time when his Terminal Monitor is waiting 
for a reply to a file-operation request. It can best be explained by 
conparison with the normal sequence of events following such an 
external control signal. When such a signal is received by the 
Channel Controller from, let us say, terminal 3, it is passed to the 
System Supervisor, whose first reaction is to determine whether 
Virtual Processor 3 is at that moment receiving processor service. If 
so, the System Supervisor transmits a "quit" command to the processor, 
stores a code identifying the control signal in Terminal 3's context 
block, and takes no further action in response to the control signal 
until the processor has complied with the "quit" command. (It is, 
in fact, the processor's shutdown that prompts the System Supervisor 
to initiate the particular response appropriate to the external 
control signal.) If, on the other hand. Virtual Processor 3 were not 
receiving processor service, the System Supervisor would proceed at 
once to service the control signal. 
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If no precautions were taken, an external control signal could 
awaken a Terminal Monitor awaiting a reply to a file-operation request. 
Such an externally caused awakening is not always detectable by the 
Supervisor. Upon completion of the file operation, therefore, the 
Supervisor is unable to resynchronize the locus of control represented 
by the file operation with that of the TM; if it performs its TM-
awakening operation on a running TM, the resulting havoc—e.g., corruption 
of processor queues—is likely to bring down the entire system. 
In our system we avoid such disasters by means of a context-block 
flag, defined by the hardware for each virtual processor, whose effect 
is to block the virtual processor from responding to any external control 
signals. Primarily intended to ensure the co!ïç>letion of such uninter­
ruptible operations as translation and page-list reclamation, this flag 
is set by the Supervisor in step 3 of the file-operation sequence, and 
cleared in step 8. If a blocked virtual processor receives a control 
signal, the System Supervisor saves it in the virtual processor's con­
text block, to be acted upon after the virtual processor becomes 
unblocked. 
Though it avoids the resynchronization problem, blocking a virtual 
processor that is waiting for a file operation falls considerably short 
of an ideal solution, for it can escape antagonizing users only if the 
waiting times are sufficiently short. And ensuring short waiting times 
requires not only that every file operation be speedily completed, but 
that the File-monitor Queue never grow too long. Not only does it 
preclude the use of queues to handle temporarily denied access requests 
(as will be explained in more detail belcw), but it forecloses any 
possibility of allowing a user to query the system during a lengthy 
file operation, to find out what is happening or to cancel the operation 
before its completion. 
File System Data Structures and Operations 
Having described the collection of cooperating computations under­
lying the file system's implementation, we now describe the data 
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structures by which files are represented internally, and the cdgorithms 
by which the file operations are inplemented. Two primary principles guide 
many of the decisions involved in the design; 
1. File operations generally call into action both the Terminal Monitor 
(of the user requesting the operation) and the File Monitor. The File 
Monitor is subject to contending demands from several users, and is 
therefore more likely to constitute a system bottleneck than is any 
individual Terminal Monitor, which serves only a single user. Conse­
quently, in apportioning file-operation coinputations between the File 
Monitor and the Terminal Monitors, we assign as much of the work as 
possible to the latter, in spite of the extra cost in memory space 
occupied by the file-operation routines dvplicated in Terminal-Monitor 
computations. 
2. In order to ensure that file-modifying operations have exclusive access 
to their operands, the system must keep accurate records of the number 
of access capabilities in existence referring to each file. Fciilure 
to record the issuance of a capability would permit a violation of the 
exclusive-access policy; failure to record the termination of a 
capability could render a file permanently unmodifiable. 
In pursuit of the maximum benefit from the power and efficiency of 
SYMBOL's high-level hardware-inç)lemented processing algorithms, the file 
system uses SPL-program variables to store as much as possible of its data 
base. We call this information name-space data, to distinguish it from 
so-called external data, which for one reason or another cannot be repre­
sented by SPL values. 
Most of the file system's name-space data—including every item that 
outlasts a terminal session—belongs to the File Monitor, in the form of 
structured values of three of its variables, namely, STAT, DYN, and TEMP. 
Briefly, the data stored in each of these variables—tabulated in Table 2— 
can be characterizsd as follows: STAT contadns file information that is 
modifiable only by the file's owner; DYN contains file information that 
is subject to modification by non-owners; and TEMP records (redundantly) 
all volatile file-access capabilities, i.e., those that are held only by 
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Table 2. Summary of File Monitor's name-space data concerning the a-th 
account 
STAT[a,l] - VF data (see Table 5) 
STAT[a,2] - SPF data (see Table 3) 
STAT [a,3] - PPF data; 
STAT[a,3,j,1] - PPF-name of j-th Private Procedure File 
STAT[a,3,j,2] - pointer to j-th PPF's directory 
STAT[a,4] - user-name of a-th account's owner 
STAT[a,5] - password for a-th account 
STAT[a,6] - pointer to STAT[a] 
DYN[a,lj - VF data (see Table 5) 
DYN[a,2] - SPF data (see Table 3) 
DYN[a,3] - Account-Manager computation state (includes page-list 
control words for account's file-storage domain) 
TEMP[t,l,a,m] - number of volatile capabilities referring to the a-th 
account's m-th VF currently held by the terminal-t 
coirçiutation 
TEMP[t,2,a,n] - number of volatile capabilities referring to the a-th 
account's n-th SPF currently held by the terminal-t 
confutation 
computations, and are therefore implicitly terminated when the confu­
tations holding them are terminated. STAT and DYN are organized by 
account, in that STAT[a] and DYN[a] contain data pertaining to the ^ -th 
account. TEMP, in contrast, is organized by virtual-processor number; 
TEMP[v] records all volatile capabilities held by the confutation 
running on Virtual Processor v. 
After initiating a terminal session, the user is prevented from 
accessing his files until he has given the user-name by which the system 
knows him. The Terminal Monitor (TM) passes the user-name to the File 
Monitor (FM), which searches for a value of a such that the value of 
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STAT[a,4] matches it. If it finds one, it passes the value of STAT[a,6] 
back to the TM, which uses its value to link its own variable ACCT to 
STAT[a]. Thereafter the TM references STAT[a] directly, by referring to 
ACCT, which reduces the frequency of calls to the FM. 
The TM now asks the user for his password, scrambles his response, 
and coup ares the result to ACCT[5], which contains the account's pass­
word; if the two values match, the user is considered to have identified 
himself, and his subsequent requests to access his files will be honored. 
Procedure Files: Data Structures 
Private Procedure Files 
STAT[a,3] is the vector containing Private Procedure File (PPF) data 
belonging to the £-th account (no PPF data need be stored in DYN because 
PPF's are accessible only to their owners). Each component of STAT[a,3] 
refers to a separate file. If the account's ^th PPF exists (in which case 
2 is its "PPF-number"), STAT[a,3,j,1] contains its PPF-name, and STAT 
[a,3,j,2] contains the address of its procedure directory. And that is all 
that STAT[a,3] contains; the internal representation of the remainder of 
the PPF data—directories and procedure-text strings—is dictated by the 
requirement that it be accessible by the Translator, which prohibits its 
representation as SPL values. 
PPF directories retain enough of the Translator-imposed System Name 
Table format to serve as translation environments. A PPF directory is stored 
in a logically contiguous storage string (see Figure 20) , and consists of a 
directory control word^ followed by an arbitrary number of procedure entries. 
Each procedure entry consists of an identifier—the procedure-name— 
occupying as many 8-character words as necessary, followed by a one-word 
descriptor. The most important part of a descriptor is its left-hand 
address field, in which is stored the capability for accessing the 
^Never accessed by the Translator, this word is included in the System 
Name Table format for conpatibility with the format of Program Name Tables, 
which are scanned by the same Translator mechanism. 
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Fig. 20. Internal representation of Private Procedure Files; 
directories. 
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procedure—i.e., a pointer to the procedure text. As Figure 20 indicates, 
the data of interest to the Translator occupy less them half of the 
descriptor, leaving ançle space for the file system's other needs, vAiich 
consist of an entry-type indicator and a family link. Figure 21 shows 
how procedure families are implemented as circulcir linked lists. In the 
directory control word we store the file's account number and PPF number 
(combined into a decimal fraction for convenient retrieval), so that by 
traversing the links of a family, and scanning from each entry back to 
its directory control word, an account-status routine can derive the PPF 
numbers, and thence the PPF names, of all the files in which the family's 
entries appear. 
4 3 
O P E N  S E S  
A M E  
4 2 
O P E N  S E S  
A M E  
1 
r •— 
\ 
Legend; 
text link 
family link 
4 6 
O P E N  S E S  
A M E  
00000 
1 11 -
EDDRjE ID PEN SE SAME ( 
length of text 
EPF's 2, 3, and 6 of account 4 all have 
"OPEN SESAME" as an entry. 
Fig. 21. In^lementation of Private Procedure Files: procedure family. 
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The source-text defining a procedure is stored in a logically 
contiguous string like a source program,^ and the descriptor's text-
address field points to the first word of the text. The source text 
of a local procedure actually begins in the second word of its string; 
the first word is a convenient place to record the length of the text, 
where it is invisible to the Translator but accessible to the account-
status software via any of the descriptors pointing to it. 
The inplementation of procedure aliases is shown in Figure 22. 
Ideally, the Translator would determine the name of a System Name Table 
procedure from its SNT entry, and the procedure text would begin with 
its formal-parameter list (as illustrated in Figure 22a). This would 
allow a procedure to be known by different names in different directories. 
As it happens, however, the Translator uses the SNT-entry name only for 
directory-searching purposes; the name entered in the calling program's 
name table is determined by the procedure's text. We circumvent this 
unfortunate name binding by interposing an alias string, between the 
SNT entry and the procedure text, that substitutes the SNT-entry name 
for the text name without altering the latter. As shown in Figure 22b, 
the alias string starts off like a procedure definition; scanning it, 
the Translator initiates the procedure's instruction string and binds it 
to the alias-name in tne calling program, before encountering the back­
space (hexadecimal: 04} character which causes it shut down with an 
error indication. This invokes software—the Terminal Monitor—which 
2 
recognizes the backspace as a software artifact, further identified 
^In illustrating logical strings, SYMBOL literature generally shows 
consecutive words either stacked vertically (in data structures in 
which word boundaries are significant, e.g., name tables), or strung 
out horizontally (when the boundaries are not important, as in source-
text strings). 
2 The backspace is never encountered in source text under normal 
circumstances, since it is removed from all incoming records by the 
I/O Processor. 
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Fig. 22. Implementation of procedure aliases. 
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c. actual implementation: software intervention. 
Fig. 22—Continued 
by the "81" character (which serves to distinguish the "alias" trap 
from other uses of the backspace) , and performs the simple Translator-
state alteration shown in Figure 22c. When the Translator resumes, its 
current-source-location pointer has been switched to the beginning of 
the formal-parameter list in the procedure-text, from which point it 
continues to translate normally. The net effect of the software inter­
vention can be summeirized as a "junp" by the Translator from the alias 
string to the procedure-text string. 
Shared Procedure Files 
Intimately involved with Private Procedure Files through the 
borrowing operation are the Shared Procedure Files (SPF's). The name­
space data concerning SPF's are listed in Table 3. Here we see the 
first use of DYN and TEMP, necessitated by the multiple-computation 
accessibility of shared files. DYN records all grants of capabilities 
to access the file, principally to enable the system to determine when 
the file can safely be modified. TEMP records all volatile capabilities 
currently held by each user computation, so that when a confutation 
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Table 3. Shared Procedure Files' name-space data 
NOTE: a = account number; f = SPF number 
STAT[a,2,f,1] - SPF-name 
STAT[a,2,f,2l - procedure-name 
STAT[a,2,f,3] - address of source text 
STAT[a,2,f,4] - user-name 
STST[a,2,£,51 - w-name ^ " 1 } STAT[a,2,f,6] - user-name STaT[a,2,f,71 - VF-name ^ (see note II 
STAT[a,2,f,8] - address of environment directory (subsystems only) 
STAT[a,2,f,9] - length of text 
DYN[a,2,f,l] - nunber of outstanding capabilities referring to this file 
(if nonzero, file cannot be destroyed) 
DYN[a,2,f,2] - account nunber") 
DYN[a,2,f,3] - VF-number 
DyN[a,2,f,41 - account number" 
orata,2,£,5J - VF-n«ber J " 
I of COPY user list (see note 2) 
TEMP[t,2,a,f] - number of volatile capabilities referring to this file 
currently held by the terminal-t confutation 
Notes : 
1. If user-name and VF-name are both null, no access is permitted; 
if only VF-name is null, PUBLIC access is permitted. 
2. Stored at time of first access to the file, these components 
eliminate subsequent searches for the access list by user-name 
and VF-name. 
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terminates, all of its capabilities can be terminated in a single 
transaction between its Terminal Monitor and the File Monitor.^ 
A Shared Procedure File's external (i.e., non-name-space) data 
consist of its source-text string and, if the file contains a subsystem, 
its environment's procedure directory and the text strings of the 
environment's local procedures and alias strings. These structures are 
illustrated in Figure 23- The procedure-text string is provided with 
a prefix containing the file's account number and SPF-number (for 
identification of the procedure via its text's address), so the text 
itself begins in the second word of the storage string. 
If the file is a subsystem, the far end of the main procedure's 
text string contains a pointer to the file's environment directory. 
The pointer is preceded by a Translator-trapping backspace for, like 
procedure aliases, shared subsystems require software intervention during 
translation (the details of the software's intervention are described 
in Appendix B) . The directory itself is identical to that of the Private 
Procedure File from which it is copied, except that the family-links of 
the descriptors are unused. Local procedures and alias strings are 
copied into the file space, to free them from any connection with the 
Private Procedure File from which the environment of the subsystem is 
copied. 
The ownership of a procedure must be determined whenever it requests 
a capability to access a Value File by calling COPYLINK or FREELINK 
(in the following discussion, we refer to these two procedures jointly 
by the name "LINK," which in no way indicates any connection with the 
LINK construct of SPL). At first glance, this may seem to be an 
impossible requirement, since in SYrîBOL it is the source text of the 
^A secondary benefit of TEMP is that it allows termination of a 
computation's capabilities even if its Terminal Monitor crashes and is 
unable to explicitly request their termination. This facility helps to 
limit damage resulting from system malfunctions, thereby increasing the 
system's robustness. 
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Fig. 23. Data structures implementing a subsystem. 
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procedure that belongs to its owner, whereas LINK is actually called 
by a reference in some instruction string derived from the source text. 
In this situation, however, the Translator is positively helpful, for 
as it generates an instruction string, it inserts from time to time a 
pointer to its current source-string location. Originally intended to 
support diagnostics of run-time errors, source-pointer "instructions" 
(effectively no-ops, as far as execution is concerned) occur generally 
at the end of each statement, and point to the corresponding word in 
the source text. 
We make use of this feature by labelling each page containing any 
part of a procedure-file's source text with the file's account number; 
since we have ensured that accounts never share pages between them­
selves, this nuinber is uniquely determined. The path leading from a 
user-computation's context block to the account number of a file-
operation requestor is shown in Figure 24. 
Procedure Files : Operations 
Before we embark on this section's narrative descriptions of the 
implementation of the operations defined on procedure-files, a couple 
of remarks about the treatment of invalid parameters is in order. First, 
the operations themselves are designed to leave the files unaltered by 
any operation that cannot be carried through to completion. Secondly, 
although error-handling provisions are undeniably important in the 
inplementation, an attenpt to intermingle descriptions of them with the 
narration of successfully completed operaticxis would introduce yet 
another element of confusion into the essentially one-dimensional prose 
to which we are restricted. Therefore we have tabulated all error 
conditions separately in Appendix A. 
The operations described below are available not only as inter­
active TM commands, but also as System Public Library procedures—the 
latter to enable users to construct confutations for managing their 
procedure files. To insure against any borrowed procedure using this 
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Fig. 24. Path followed by software to identify owner of LINK' s  caller. 
mechanism to gain illegal access to its borrower's procedure-files, the 
Terminal Monitor checks every call to a procedure-file-operation system 
procedure to verify that it has been called from a program belonging to 
the confutation's owner. (This also guarantees that for any a, STAT [a] 
is accessible to only one confutation at a time.) 
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ACTIVATE 
One of the siitç>lest operations in the repertoire is ACTIVATE 
(PPF-name), the purpose of which is to establish a specified Private 
Procedure File as the translation environment for the terminal from 
which the request is issued. This requires only that the address of 
the file's directory be deposited in the virtual processor's context 
block (in word BH5), which does not involve the File Monitor. The 
Terminal Monitor singly searches for an ACCT[3,f,l] that matches the 
designated PPF-name, and stores the corresponding directory address 
(obtained from ACCT[3,f,2]) into BH5, 
A null-valued PPF-name is a special case, designating not a 
private-procedure file but the System Public Library. The TM handles 
this by storing the library's address in BH5. 
ORIGINATE 
The TM responds to an invocation of ORIGINATE (PPF-name) by first 
verifying that its argument is not already in use as a PPF-name, and 
finds an unused component of ACCT[3] (i.e., STAT[a,3]) for the new file. 
Then it calls the FM, which in turn calls the account's AM to allocate 
space for the new directory (storing into it a single entr^' to 
accommodate the Translator's inability to cope with an empty directory). 
The AM returns control to the FM, which makes the appropriate entries 
in STAT [a,3]—the new PPF-name and directory address—and returns con­
trol to the TM. 
DUPLICATE (PPF-naine-1, PPF-name-2) is a somewhat more complex 
operation than the two described above. Since it involves the allocation 
of space for a new directory, the File Monitor and an Account Manager 
are necessarily involved. If the value of PPF-name-1 is non-null, 
the TM finds ^  such that ACCT [3,f ,1] matches PPF-name-1. The TM also 
makes sure that the Value of PPF-name-2 is not already in use as a 
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PPF-name, and locates an unused component of ACCT[3] (i.e., it finds an 
integer, such that ACCT[3,g] is null) to which to assign the new file. 
The FM receives from the TM the index of the unused component, the 
new PPF-name, and the address of the directory to be duplicated. It 
passes the directory address to the account's Account Manager (AM), which 
allocates a new storage string and proceeds to copy the directory into it, 
word for word. 
When the AM has duplicated the last entry, it passes control back to 
the FM, along with the new directory's address. The FM assigns a structure 
value : 
<new PPF-name | new directory's address> 
to the enç>ty component of STAT[a,31,- and returns control to the TM, to 
which we assign the task of establishing the new directory's family links. 
If the original directory is that of the System Public Library, every entry 
of the new directory constitutes a family in itself (i.e., its family link 
points to itself). Otherwise, each of the original directory's entries is 
a member of some family, and the new entries are inserted into the families 
of the corresponding original entries (as illustrated in Figures 25a and 
25b). 
Claim 
The file operations INSERT, REDEFINE, and COPY have in common the need 
to obtain procedure-access capabilities of various kinds. This function 
is incorporated into a procedure (part of the TM) which we shall examine 
in some detail before describing the operations' individual implementations. 
As we explained in an earlier discussion, procedure-access capabilities 
can be obtained from sources of four types: the System Public Library, 
Private Procedure Files, Shared Procedure Files, and work spaces. All of 
these the Terminal Monitor handles uniformly, by calling 
Claim (proc-name, source), 
which obtains a procedure-access capability from the indicated 
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Fig. 25. Link manipulations in procedure-family operations. 
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source.^ Claim returns its results in a vector value whose components 
e:q)ress the type and location of the procedure definition as listed in 
Table 4. The next few pairagraphs explain briefly how Claim obtains its 
results in each of these cases. 
Table 4. Procedure-access capabilities returned by Claim 
Type Capability 
(component 1) (coitqponent 2) 
1 System Public Library entry (pointer to descriptor) 
2 PPF entry (pointer to descriptor) 
3 TM copy of workspace procedure (pointer to text) 
4 capability for COPY access to SPF (pointer to text) 
5 capability for BORROW access to SPF (pointer to text) 
0 error message (see Appendix A) 
If source's value is null (denoting the System Public Library), or 
matches one of the requestor's account's PPF-names, then Claim searches 
the indicated directory for an entry whose identifier matches the value of 
proc-name. If successful, it returns a pointer to the entry's descriptor, 
with an integer indicating the capability's source ("1" for a System 
Public Library entry, "2" for a PPF-entry). 
A source value conposed of one or more blanks indicates that a 
procedure definition is to be derived from the workspace belonging to the 
requesting confutation's owner. Since a workspace can contain an arbitrary 
character string. Claim has to scan the text, searching for the key-word 
"PBDCEDUBE" followed by a procedure-name that matches the value of 
proc-name. On finding this combination, it allocates a storage string 
We distinguish names of user-accessible file operations from names 
of the TM's internal file operations by spelling the former entirely in 
upper-case letters, and using upper- and lower-case for the latter. 
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(in the TM's storage domain) and copies the procedure text into it, 
stopping when it encounters the "END" marking the end of the procedure 
(and replacing it with an end-of-record character as required by the 
Translator). The address of the string is then returned to the caller, 
with its capability-source code equal to "3". 
A request for a Shared Procedure File access capability is 
indicated to Claim by a vector-valued source parameter, whose conponents 
are interpreted as follows: 
<user-name | SPF-name> 
If Claim's proc-name parameter is null-valued, a COPY-mode capability 
is being requested; otherwise, the capability is assumed to be BORROW-
mode. The TM passes the request to the FM with the necessary parameters : 
the requestor's account number, the user-name and SPF-name identifying 
the file to be accessed, and the requested access mode. The FM responds 
by carrying out the following operations: 
1. it locates the SPF identified by user-name and SPF-name 
2. it verifies the requestor's authorization to access the SPF in 
the requested access-mode ("COPY" or "BORROW") 
3. it records the issuance of a capability to access the SPF 
4. it returns control to the TM (i.e., to Claim), passing with it the 
requested capability—a pointer co rhe shared procedure's source 
text. 
The following discussion examines each of these steps in greater detail. 
T_ 
Locating the SPF^ is simply a matter of finding ^  such that 
STAT[i,4] matches user-name, and then such that STAT[i,2,j,1] matches 
SPF-name (if user-name's value is null, ^  is simply set equal to a, 
the requestor's account number). 
Next the FM verifies that the requested access is permitted by the 
file's owner. If _^ = ^, then the requestor is the owner himself, and 
no explicit authorization is needed; otherwise, the file's accessibility 
specifications must be examined. (In the narrative that follows. 
^In following this discussion, the reader may find Figure 26 helpful. 
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we suppose that the requested access mode is "COPY"; a simple adjustment 
of STAT*s and DYN's subscripts suffices to adapt the description for 
"BORROW".) If STAT[i,2,j,4] and STAT[i,2,j,5] are both null, the access 
is denied; if only the latter is null, the access is permitted. If 
neither is null, then the two values are taken to be the user-name and 
VF-name identifying a Value File in which is stored a list of names of 
users permitted to copy the procedure. 
If a capability for COPY-access to this file has ever been requested 
before, then the Value File's account number and VF-number will have 
been stored in DYN[i,2,j,2] and DYN[i,2,i,3]; if these values are null, 
or if STAT[DYN[i,2,j,2],4] differs from STAT[i,2,j,4] or STAT[DYN[i,2,j,2], 
1, DYN[i,2,j,3], 1] from STAT[i,2,j ,5] (as it may if the SPF's accessi­
bility specifications have been modified since the last request for 
COPY access to it), then the FM must search for STAT[m,4] matching 
STAT[i,2,j,4] and STAT[m,l,n,l] matching STAT[i,2,j,5] (storing m and n 
in DYN[i,2,j,2] and DYN[i,2,i,3] in hopes of bypassing the search on 
the next request for COPY-access to the SPF). Finally, having found 
m and ii specifying a Value File, the FM scans its value until it finds 
a conponent that matches the requestor's user-name. 
The FM then records the issuance of the capability, by incre-
Ktenuifiy DXINli,2, J ,Ij . Also, i^scause the CAPABZLZTY iS at THZS poznt 
held only by the Terminal Monitor, and is therefore classified as 
volatile, the FM increments TEMP[t,2,i,j] (where ^  is the requestor's 
terminal number). Last of all, it passes the value of STAT[i,2,j,3]— 
the procedure-text's address—to the TM as it returns control to it. 
Claim then returns the text's address to its caller, with its 
definition type equal to "4" (for a COPY access) or "5" (for a BORROW 
access). 
INSERT 
The TM's first task in executing the operation INSERT (PPF-name, 
proc-name, source) is to verify that the Private Procedure File 
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designated by PPF-name does not already contain a procedure named proc-name 
(if it does, an error message is generated—see Appendix A). Then it 
calls Claim (proc-name, source) to obtain the requested procedure 
capability. Provided that Claim is successful, the TM then sends the FM 
a request to append an entry for proc-name to the PPF's directory. The 
FM calls the account's AM, which adds an entry that is incomplete in that 
it has a family link, pointing to the entry's own descriptor, but lacks 
the capability and entry-type code. These are filled in by the TM after 
it regains control. Since this operation, like Claim, is common to a 
number of file operations, it is incorporated into an internal TM pro­
cedure , Attach. 
Attach 
The function of Attach is to bind a procedure-access capability 
obtained by Claim to a specified family of Private Procedure File entries. 
It is invoked by calling 
Attach (capability, proc-name, family), 
where capability is the vector value produced by Claim, proc-name is the 
procedure-name by which the family is known (used only when capability 
refers to an SPF) , and family points to the descriptor word of one of the 
family's entries. The operations performed by Attach in binding each type 
of capability produced by Claim are as follows :^ 
1. System procedure. Attach uses the pointer returned by Claim to obtain, 
from the System Public Library entry's descriptor, the procedure's 
privileged indicator and text address, which it propagates to all of 
the family's descriptors. The entry-type codes of all the descriptors 
are set to "1". 
^When Attach is called in the course of an INSERT operation, the 
family consists of a single descriptor; in a HEDEFINE operation, however, 
the descriptor may belong to a multiple-entry family, in which case the 
capability is bound equally to all of its members. 
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2. PPF procedure. Attach obtains from the source descriptor the 
procedure's privileged indicator, text address, and entry-type code, 
for propagation to all of the family's descriptors; then it 
manipulates family links to merge the tv:o families into one, as 
illustrated in Figure 25c. 
3. A procedure definition copied from the workspace eventually yields 
a local entry, but since Claim produces a definition stored in the 
TM's storage domain. Attach must call the FM to have it copied into 
the requestor's file-storage domain.^ After completing the copy 
(an operation actually carried out by the account's AM), the FM 
returns the text's address to Attach, which de-allocates the TM's 
copy, and stores in every one of the family's descriptors the new 
text address and the local-entry type code. 
4. Type-4 capabilities are used only by COPY, which does not call on 
Attach. 
5. A procedure-access capability pointing to a Shared Procedure File 
results in a borrowed-procedure entry. Since Claim has already 
obtained the capability (or failed in the attempt), one might 
anticipate no further interaction with the FM. But the capability 
obtained by Claim is classified as volatile, because it is held 
ûiily by âïï àctxvé coiïipùcâcioiï (j.n tlixs câSâ, tl'iê xH). Tïiê act ox 
storing the pointer to the procedure's text in a file—where it 
would survive the computation's demise—transforms the capability 
into a non-volatile one. Accordingly, we define a single 
In principle, the copying operation could be eliminated by 
assigning to the FM the task of isolating the workspace procedure 
definition in the first place. To do so, however, would violate our 
policy of minimizing the FM's work, for isolating the procedure from the 
surrounding text entails far more computation—mainly in lexical analysis— 
than is involved in straight copying. Moreover, certain TM's have name­
space access to their workspaces, an advantage not shared by the FM. 
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indivisible FM operation, in which the FM stores the SPF-access 
capability into the PPF descriptors of the whole family (with borrowed-
entry type codes) and in the same operation decrements TEMP[t,2,i,j]. 
If the procedure-name given by the requestor for his PPF-entry differs 
from the SPF's procedure-name, the FM also calls the requestor's AM to 
generate the required alias string (as illustrated in Figure 22b) in 
the same operation. 
DELETE 
•Rie complement of the INSERT operation is DELETE (PPF-name, proc-
name), whose ultimate effect is to remove an entry from a Private Pro­
cedure File. It is implemented in three sub-operations: surrender of the 
entry's procedure-access capability, severance of the entry from its 
family, and deletion of the entry from the file's directory. 
The first two of the sub-operations are alternatives, at most one of 
which is exercised in any given invocation of DELETE. If the entry points 
to a system procedure and has no siblings, then neither operation is 
called for. If the entry being deleted is a member of a multiple-entry 
family, then it is severed from its family as illustrated in Figure 25d. 
On the other hand, if the entry has no siblings, and its type is local or 
borrowed, then the FM is called to effect the surrender of the capability. 
In the case of a local entry, this amounts to the de-allocation by the FM 
of the storage string containing the procedure definition. If it is a 
borrowed entry, however, the FM obtains the account number {^) and SPF 
number (j_) of the shared procedure from the text-string's prefix, and 
records the surrender of the capability by decrementing DYN[i,2,j,l]. In 
addition, the FM de-allocates the entry's alias string, if it has one. 
Now all that remains is to delete the entry's identifier and 
descriptor from the directory. If the entry happens to be the last one in 
its directory, it is deleted by setting the "last-entry" bit in the 
preceding descriptor. In all other cases, it is necessary to move all of 
the deleted entry's successors to fill the words occupied by it, and to 
make the appropriate adjustments in the family links pointing to the 
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shifted entries-^ 
DISCARD 
The operation DISCARD (PPF-name) is implemented very simply by 
DELETE-ing all of the file's entries (without, however, bothering to 
remove them individually from the directory), and then calling the FM 
to de-allocate the file. The FM de-allocates the directory string and 
any alias strings associated with it, and assigns a null value to 
STAT [a,2, j], where a and % are the account number and PPF number 
obtained from the file's directory control word. 
REDEFINE 
The only operation that applies simultaneously to all members of 
a family, REDEFINE (PPF-name, proc-name, source) has approximately the 
same effect as DELETE-ing all members of the family and then re-INSERTing 
them with the definition specified by source. The implementation, of 
course, enç)loys certain shortcuts. It calls Claim (proc-name, source) 
to obtain the new capability. If this is successful, the old capability 
is surrendered (as in the operation DELETE) and the new capability 
bound to all members of the family by Attach. 
TRANSCRIBE 
Strictly a Terminal Monitor operation, requiring no FM involvement, 
TRANSCRIBE (PPF-name, proc-name) simply locates the indicated PPF-entry 
and copies it into the workspace. If the entry's type is borrowed, the 
copying negotiates the alias-string "jump", if any, and stops at the 
text's second semicolon. 
^We could have chosen sirtçly to "null out" the deleted entry. But 
this would have left the directory less compact, increasing the cost 
of scanning it, and complicated the INSERT operation by requiring 
comparison of new entries' lengths with the lengths of voids, to find 
spaces of appropriate size. 
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COPY 
The objective of COPY (owner-name, SPF-name) is to append a copy of 
an SPF's procedure definition to the requestor's workspace, so that he 
can display it, edit it, and so forth. The TM begins by calling Claim 
(null, source) , where the value of source is of the form <owner-name | 
SPF-name>- (The null-valued first parameter signals Claim that the 
requested access mode is COPY.) If Claim succeeds, it returns a type-4 
capability containing the address of the procedure's text,which the TM 
uses as the starting point for copying the definition into the workspace. 
After finishing the copy, the TM calls the FM to announce that it is 
surrendering the capability, and the operation is confie te. 
DEPOSIT 
Since the purpose of DEPOSIT (SPF-name, proc-name, source, environ­
ment) is to create a new Shared Procedure File, the TM scans the account's 
existing SPF-names to verify that SPF-name is not already in use. If 
environment is non-null, it also scans the account's PPF-names to find the 
address of the corresponding directory. If source is blank, the TM calls 
Claim to obtain a copy of the named procedure from the workspace; otherwise, 
it finds the nszsd procedure (and verifies that it is a local entry) in 
the PPF named by source. Then it passes SPF-name, proc-name, the 
environment's directory address, aind the procedure-text's address, to the 
FM, which uses these values to create the new Shared Procedure File. The 
FM calls the account's AM to copy the text—preceded by a prefix word 
containing the file's account number and SPF-number—into the requestor's 
file-storage domain. If the anvircnment's director;' address is non-null 
indicating that the SPF being created is to be a sybsystem, the AM also 
generates the subsystem's environment directory and related structures 
(illustrated in Figure 23). After determining the address of the new 
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directory^ and storing a pointer to it at the end of the text, the AM 
copies each of the original PPF directory's entries into the new 
directory. Descriptors of system procedures and non-aliased borrowed 
procedures are simply copied. Local entries require the AM to make a 
copy of the procedure's text, and alias strings must also be copied. 
When the last entry has been copied, the AM returns control to the FM. 
The latter scans the newly created directory and, for each borrowed 
entry, increments its capability counter (specifically, DYN[i,2,j,l] and 
and DYN[i,2,j,2], where ^  and are obtained from the borrowed procedure's 
prefix word). This is necessary because the capability stored in the 
subsystem's environment directory is a new capability, independent of 
the PPF-entry capability from which it is copied. It is not, however, 
necessary to verify the subsystem owner's authorization before issuing 
the new capability: the existence of the capability from which it is 
copied is proof of authorization. 
Before returning control to the TM, the FM sets up its name-space 
data describing the newly created file (see Table 3 for a list of 
these data). Finally, the TM regains control, and, if the procedure 
had originally been copied from the workspace by Claim, the TM 
de-allocates its copy. The Shared Procedure File is now ready for use. 
^Although the figure implies that the main text, the directory, 
each local procedure, and each alias string occupy separate storage 
strings, they are actually stored all together in a single string. 
This is possible because once it has been created, a subsystem is never 
altered piecemeal, but remains unchanged until it is finally 
de-allocated. And storing the entire subsystem in a single storage 
string saves a little space, and allows it to be de-allocated in a 
single operation. 
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LEND and REVEAL 
The TM's only role in the execution of LEND (SPF-name, access) and 
REVEAL (SPF-name, access) is to pass to the FM the following parameters: 
1. The account number (i_) and SPF number (j^) corresponding to SPF-name 
2. an access-mode indicator (k) : "4" for COPY, "6" for BORROW 
3. an accessibility indicator: null, "PUBLIC", or a two-component vector. 
The FM then makes the necessary modifications to STAT and DYN (see Figure 
26). If the accessibility indicator is scalar, then its value is assigned 
to STAT[i,2,j ,k], and a null value is assigned to STAT[i,2,j,k+l]; if 
it is a vector, its first and second conponents are assigned to 
STAT[i,2,j,k] and STAT[i,2,j,k+l]. The values of DYN(i ,2,j,k-2] and 
DYN [i,2 , j ,k-lj are both set to zero. 
OBSOLETE 
The purpose of OBSOLETE (SPF-name) is the demolition of a Shared 
Procedure File and the recovery of its file space, without violating our 
policy of non-preemption of accesses to shared files. The TM's only part 
in this operation is to find j_, the SPF number corresponding to SPF-name, 
and to pass it to the FM along with the requestor's account number i^. 
I'Jhat the FM actually does with the file depends upon whether any 
capabilities to access the file are in existence, as indicated by the 
value of DYN[i,2,j,1]. If its value is zero, the FM immediately demolishes 
the file so that its space becomes available for re-use. In the case of 
a non-subsystem file—indicated by a null environment-directory pointer— 
the FM siirply de-allocates the file's text string, obtaining its address 
from STAT[i,2, j,3]i and assigns null values to STAT[i,2,j] and DYN[i,2,j], 
thus erasing all traces of the file and releasing all of its space. A 
subsystem file requires a bit more work, due to the possibility that its 
environment may include borrowings of other Shared Procedure Files. If 
the file is a subsystem, the FM scans its environment directory looking 
for borrowed-procedure entries, and decrementing the capability counter 
(DYN[m,2,n,l], where m and n are obtained from the borrowed procedure's 
prefix word) of each one it finds. Upon reaching the end of the directory, 
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the FM de-allocates the storage string containing the subsystem. 
If DYN[i,2,j,1]*s value is greater than zero, however, the file is 
currently referred to by one or more capabilities, and it would violate 
our policy to demolish it. In this case, the FM merely assigns a null 
value to STAT[i,2,j,l], erasing the file's SPF-name. This not only 
frees the name for re-use in naming another Shared Procedure File, but 
also precludes the issuance of any new capabilities to access the file 
(except for entries in subsystems being created by owners of PPF's 
holding capabilities to access this file). Moreover, it "arms" a 
heretofore unmentioned feature of the FM*s access-termination mechanism: 
whenever the FM, in decrementing DYN [i ,2, j ,1] , assigns to it a new 
value of zero, it examines STAT[i,2,j,1]—the file's SPF-name; on 
finding the latter's value null, the FM then proceeds to complete the 
file's demolition as described above. This, of course, may trigger 
the demolition of one or more other obsolete SPF's, which were being 
preserved only by the existence of the capabilities now being surrendered. 
This gives rise to trees of obsolete subsystems; to handle these trees, 
OBSOLETE maintains a stack, onto which it places a pointer to any 
obsolete SPF discovered in the course of demolishing a subsystem. At 
the completion of any demolition operation, the stack is checked, and 
the demolition process repeats until the stack is empty. 
Procedure files' hardware context 
One of our goals, in the design of the procedure-file facility, has 
been to mesh it cleanly with the hard-wired Interpreter routines that 
read the System Name Table. For the most part, we have succeeded— 
an ACTIVATED PPF successfully impersonates a System Name Table except 
for the procedure-renaming and subsystem facilities, where software 
intervention is necessary. 
Another facet of the hardware context—the multiprocessor imple­
mentation of the Interpreter—provides pragmatic justification for our 
policies prohibiting arbitrary revocation of access capabilities and 
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alteration of procedure files accessible via such capabilities. As 
Vanderbilt puts it, 
. . .  i t  m a y  b e  q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  a n d  b y  w h o m  a  p r o g r a m  
is being used at any given time. Since a program cannot be altered 
while it is being executed, choosing a time to alter it is quite 
difficult. [34, p. 36] 
Our system's File Monitor can determine by whom a shared procedure is 
potentially being used, by locating the access capabilities that refer 
to it. But determining exactly when an access capability is in actual use, 
i.e., exactly when the shared procedure's text is being read by the 
Translator, is very much more difficult, sinply because the Central 
Processor and the Translator run independently of one another, and SYMBOL 
provides no convenient mechanism for synchronizing them. 
Value Files 
Because the interactions of Value Files with SYMBOL' S  existing hard­
ware mechanisms are somewhat more complex than those of procedure files, 
we preface our discussion of Value Files' inplementation by an exami­
nation of their hardware context. (The reader is cautioned against inter­
preting the following discussion as a coitplete or definitive description. 
We have deliberately omitted details wherever possible, and have in sozis 
areas described SYMBOL as we believe it ought to be, rather than as it 
happens to be. To avoid misleading the reader, we have tried to point out 
every important place where we have taken such liberties.) 
Value Files' hardware context 
The internal representation of a SYMBOL computation consists of an 
instruction string and one or more name tables (see Figure 27). The 
instruction string bears a close relationship to the source-text string 
from which it is generated [2,3], in that its instruction set corresponds 
approximately one-to-one with the elements of the SYMBOL Programming 
Language. The order of operators in expressions—infix notation in the 
source-text—is altered to Polish postfix, in preparation for the use of 
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Fig. 27- Basic program structures. 
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an operand stack during execution. And for each occurrence of an 
identifier in the source text there is generated in the instruction string 
a descriptor reference, i.e., a pointer to the identifier's descriptor. 
(For a more detailed description of SYMBOL computations and their 
execution, see [16].) 
Descriptors A computation's descriptors are grouped together in 
name tables. One name table is generated for each block in the computation 
(i.e., for each BLOCK...END, PROCEDURE...END or ON..-END pair in the source 
text). The name tables' format is similar to that of the System Name 
Tables; name tables consist of an arbitrary number of entries, each of 
which consists of an identifier and a one-word descriptor. Each distinct 
identifier in a block gives rise to an entry—the identifier and its 
descriptor—in the block's name table. 
Identifiers in an SPL program serve as statement labels (i.e., objects 
of GO TO statements) and procedure-names, as well as variable names; each 
identifier's descriptor indicates into which of these categories it falls. 
For the purposes of this discussion, we restrict ourselves to a 
consideration of variables and their descriptors. 
The primary purpose of a variable's descriptor is to bind a value to 
the variable. As the figure indicates, variable-descriptors take three 
basic fonss : 
1. an indirect descriptor contains a pointer to the variable's value, 
which is stored in a separate storage string of its own. If the 
variable has an associated ON-block,~ its descriptor also contains 
a pointer to the Œ^-block's first instruction. 
2. a direct descriptor contains the variable's value. This arrangement 
is possible only when the value's representation occupies a single 
word and the variable has no ON-block. 
3. a global descriptor contains a pointer to a descriptor in some other 
block's name table. Global variable descriptors are produced by 
GLOBAL declarations in the source-text; also, a formal parameter's 
^A variable's ON-block is executed immediately after any replacement 
operation affecting the variable's value. 
119 
descriptor is set vp in global form whenever it is bound to an 
actual parameter consisting simply of an identifier. 
The type of any particular variable-descriptor is indicated by an 
eight-bit tag that is part of the descriptor itself. 
Values Values are represented in SYMBOL as shown in Figure 28. 
data characters (ASCII) ^ | 
|%|D a m n t 4 e  t o r  pie|d| o d ! %:x 
-end tag 
- one storage string 
a. scalar value. 
component 1 component 2 last component end marker ^  
y 
one storage string 
b. structure value. 
one or more words-
scalar tag. J 
c. scalar-valued component. 
one 
word substructure descriptor 
llpl > i 
structure tag—^ ^CSUB \ 
structure 
current pointer 
i-th component 
d, structure-valued component. 
Fig. 28. Internal representation of scalar and structure values. 
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Only two basic types of values are known in SYMBOL, namely, scalar values 
and structure values. Every scalar value (see Figure 28a) begins with an 
eight-bit tag that not only identifies its subtype (a level of distinction 
that is invisible to users, and will not concern us here) but also 
identifies the value as such in various contexts—an instruction string, 
a descriptor, a vector, or an execution stack—where it has to be dis­
tinguished from things other than values (for an extensive discussion of 
tagged information objects, see [12]). Following the tag is the actual 
data content of the value, consisting of an arbitrary number of eight-bit 
characters or four-bit BCD digits (depending on the value's subtype), 
terminated by an end-tag. 
A structure value is sinç>ly a vector, as shown in Figure 28b, each 
of whose conçonents is either a scalar or a structure (shown in Figures 
28c and 28d). (Alternatively, a structure value can be viewed as a tree-
structure, each of whose terminal nodes is a scalar value.) Each vector 
in a structure value occupies a separate storage string, in which each 
con^)onent occupies some integral number of words. A vector's last 
component is followed by a one-word end-vector marker. Each scalar 
conponent is a scalar value in the form described above, occupying its 
logical position in the parent vector's storage string and identified as 
a scalar by irs tag. Structure-valued components, in contrast, are net 
actually stored in the parent vector's storage string, but are represented 
there by one-word substructure descriptors containing pointers to separate 
storage strings where the values themselves are stored. Substructure 
descriptors are distinguished from scalar values by a special tag.-
In addition to its tag and the pointer to its value, a substructure 
descriptor often contciins a two-digit subscript (CSUB) and a pointer 
(CPTR) to the CSUB-th component of the vector to which the descriptor 
points. Known collectively as a Current Pointer, each substructure's 
CSUB and CPTR are updated in the course of every access to a conçonent of 
the substructure. The Current-Pointer mechanism, used to speed access to 
vector coitç>onents, is described more fully below. 
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The stack In executing a computation, the Interpreter employs 
an auxiliary data structure—a last-in, first-out stack known as the 
Central Processor Stack (or simply as "the stack"). The stack is 
in^lemented in a single storage string, whose unbounded extendibility 
is well suited to such an application. A new stack is created, 
temporarily displacing the current stack, whenever the Interpreter enters 
a block; it is used for temporary storage of operands during the block's 
execution. Whenever an operand is encountered in the instruction 
string, a corresponding stack entry is added to the top of the stack. 
When an operator is encountered, one or two entries are withdrawn from 
t h e  t o p  o f  t h e  s t a c k — t h e  n u m b e r  w i t h d r a w n  d e p e n d s  o n  w h i c h  o f  S Y M B O L ' S  
20-odd operators is involved—and replaced by a new entry representing 
the result of the application of the operator to the values of its 
operands. Replacement operations—input and assignment instructions— 
also operate on stack entries, although somewhat differently from 
operators, as we shall see below. In the next few pages, we examine 
the subject of stack entries in some detail, because it is through them 
that values—and Value Files—are accessed. We describe first the 
referencing operations that produce stack entries. Then we take up the 
evaluation and replacement operations by which stack entries are consumed. 
References We are interested here in the treatment of operands 
that are simple or subscripted references to variables (leaving out 
labels, procedure-calls, and constants), such as are illustrated in 
Figure 29. A single variable-reference stack entry is produced when 
the Interpreter encounters a variable-descriptor reference in an 
instruction string (Figure 29a). The resulting stack entry consists 
simply of a pointer to the descriptor, identified as such by an "E2" tag." 
^This is one of the instances alluded to above, in which we describe 
SYMBOL as it ought to be, rather than as it is at the time this is written. 
As a result of an error in the original implementation, stack entries 
generated by simple variable-references currently contain two pointers— 
one to the variable's descriptor and one to its value. As is pointed out 
in a subsequent footnote, the value pointer is prematurely bound. 
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If the instruction string's descriptor reference points to a global 
descriptor, cis shown in Figure 29b, the Interpreter follows the global 
link(s) until it finds a non-global descriptor. Variable-reference stack 
entries therefore always point to non-global descriptors. 
The translation of a subscripted variable-reference produces an 
instruction substring consisting of a descriptor reference followed by a 
subscript list, as shown in Figure 29c. When it is executed, each sub­
script expression is evaluated and its result put onto the stack; the 
instruction that separates adjacent subscript expressions serves as a 
monadic operator, converting the expression's value into a one-word 
"subscript" stack entry containing the subscript's value. Execution of 
the "]" instruction marking the end of the list not only produces the 
final subscript stack-entry, but also replaces the entire subscript list 
in the stack—descriptor reference plus subscript entries—with a single 
stack entry that points to a copy of the subscript list stored in a 
separate storage string.^ The completed data structure, known as a 
conponent reference, is shown in Figure 29d. 
Evaluation When a variable or component reference stack entry is 
used as an operand, it has to be evaluated before the operator can be 
applied. Evaluation of a variable reference requires merely an inspection 
of its descriptor, cind the addition of a value pointer and a type tag to 
2 
the stack entry, as shown in Figure 30. 
^This describes the subscript mechanism as it is currently imple­
mented. It differs substantially from the original design [16], which had 
serious problems involving premature binding of conç>onent locations. 
2 
In SYMBOL's  current inclement at ion, this step is erroneously omitted, 
and the operator is applied to a value whose address is stored in the stack 
entry at the time of its creation (as mentioned in a footnote above). If 
a "side-effect" of a procedure alters the variable's value during the 
interval of the variable-reference's residence in the stack, then the 
original value pointer may be invalidated by movement of the value to a new 
location. This premature binding of the variable reference to the 
variable's value can be corrected by postponing the evaluation of references 
until their values are actually used. 
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Fig. 30. Stack-entry modification resulting from evaluation 
of a simple reference. 
Evaluation of a component reference—illustrated in Figure 31— 
requires the Interpreter to find the component designated by the sub­
script string. If we ignore various "speed-up" measures for a moment, 
we can say that, in principle, the Interpreter locates a component by 
scanning over successive vectors, using successive subscripts to count 
coirponents, until it finds the one it is seeking. In the example shown 
in the figure, the Interpreter locates the [i,j,k]-th conçsonent as 
follows: it scans the value's top-level vector until it reaches the i-th 
component, and then scans the i-th conçionent's top-level vector down to its 
j-th conçonent, whose top-level vector it scans until it reaches its k-th 
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component. This is the [i,j,k]-th component of the value, i.e., the 
object of the search. The Interpreter now de-allocates the storage 
string containing the subscript string, and replaces the component-
reference stack entry with a component-value entry containing pointers 
both to the vciriable descriptor and to its [i,j,k]-th component. 
Two "speed-up" measures reduce the number of storage accesses necessary 
to locate components. The so-called "Rapid Search" mechanism yields an 
eight-fold reduction; it is described in [16] and, since it has little 
inçjact on Value Files' implementation, will not detain us further. The 
other "speed-up" measure—"Current Pointer"—makes use of the subscript 
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(CSUB) and component pointer (CPTR) that are located in each substructure 
descriptor (and in value-descriptors of such structure-valued variables 
as have no ON-blocks—the ON-block pointer occupies the same descriptor 
field as CPTR, and has priority). The Current Pointer comes into action 
whenever a vector's CSUB is less than the subscript of the component being 
sought within the vector; in this situation, the Interpreter begins its 
scan at the location pointed to by CPTR, thereby eliminating the first CSUB 
components of its scan. Since a vector's CSUB and CPTR are updated 
every time a component of the vector is accessed. Current Pointer is 
most useful when components are accessed in ascending order, and useless 
when they are accessed in descending order.^ 
Two special cases of component-reference evaluation deserve mention. 
Figure 32 shows a reference in which the component-locating scan reaches 
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Fig. 32. Evaluation of a reference to a non-existent component. 
An improved method of accessing structure values' components has 
been described in [1]. 
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the value's boundary before the subscript list is exhausted. When this 
occurs, a null value replaces the component reference on the stack. The 
other special case is that of the IN-reference, of which an example is 
shown in Figure 33. Intended to provide for programmed tests of compo­
nents' existence, the IN-reference is indicated by a special tag in its 
subscript list's descriptor entry. It is evaluated by the usual scan to 
find the indicated component; if the search is successful, the value "1" 
replaces the IN-reference on the stack, whereas if the scan reaches the 
value's boundary without finding the couponent, the value placed on the 
stack is "0". 
descriptor 
"IN"-tag 
BEFORE EVALUATION AFTER EVALUATION 
X=0: not IN 
1: IN 
value 
Fig. 33. Stack-entry modification resulting from evaluation of an 
IN-reference. 
Operator Application When all the operands (i.e., one or two) 
required by an operator have been evaluated, the operator is applied to 
their values (with—as one would expect—no effect upon the values). 
Upon the operation's coiiçletion, the Interpreter discards the operand 
entries from the stack, replacing them with a new entry representing the 
operation's result. 
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Output and assignment instructions are executed in some respects 
like operators. When an output instruction has a variable reference 
or conponent reference as an operand, the reference is evaluated, 
by the process described above, and then the value itself is copied onto 
the stack (whence it is transmitted to the terminal for output). An 
assignment instruction invokes similar actions with respect to a 
variable or conç>onent reference on its right—the replacement value is 
copied onto the stack before the replacement operation begins. 
Replacement Replacement operations—i.e., assignments or input 
operations—also consume variable-reference stack entries. A replacement 
operation's starting conditions are shown in Figure 34: the new value 
to be bound to the variable occiç>ies the topmost position in the stack, 
taking up as many words as it requires; immediately beneath it is a 
reference to the variable to which the value is to be bound. The 
Interpreter execute s a replacement operation by copying the new value 
from the stack into a storage string whose address is stored in the 
value-pointer field of the variable's descriptor (whether a new storage 
string is allocated for the new value and the old value's string is 
de-allocated, or the new value is stored in the old value's storage 
string, depends on the types of values involved). In case the replace-
vnavif" 4 c T>aa Trinl t-î o—acc-î rmTnor»^ c+• P+"OTnor»t . -hHo vo-nl aooTnont xrsa 1 no 
is left on the stack, and the variable-reference to which it has just 
been assigned is cleared, effectively deleting it from the stack. If 
the variable has an enabled ON-block, it is invoked at this point. 
Replacement of a component of a structure value is accomplished by 
a replacement operation acting on a component reference. As in the 
variable-reference case described immediately above.- the operation 
begins with the new value already located in the stack (see Figure 35), 
with the component reference immediately beneath it. The Interpreter 
begins with the same subscript scanning operation used in component-
reference evaluation; after the component denoted by the subscript list 
has been located, it is replaced by a copy of the new value. This may 
involve de-allocation and allocation of storage strings, and even 
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insertion of new storage locations into an existing string; the intricate 
details need not concern us here. After completion of the replacement, 
the subscript string is de-allocated, the conponent-reference stack entry 
is cleared, and the variable's ON-block, if any, is executed. 
An interesting special case of component-reference replacement is 
shown in Figure 36. If the component-reference refers to a component 
that is not possessed by the structure value, the Interpreter generates 
null scalar conponents to extend vectors and create new vectors, expanding 
the structure until the designated component is created. Then it performs 
a normal replacement operation on the new component. 
descriptor 
t^CSUB 
or 
ON-enabled 
flag 
ON-enabled flag 
staj 
BEFORE EVALUATION AFTER EVALUATION 
pre-repiacement 
end of vector . 
<lnull-scalar 
components added 
during operatic 
Fig. 36. Structure expansion during a component-reference 
replacement operation on a non-existent conponent. 
Value Files in the hardware context 
The reference, evaluation, operator application, and replacement 
operations described above form the context into which Value Files must 
fit harmoniously in order for their values to be accessible by all the 
133 
sane SPL program constructs as ordinary values. While the description 
of this context is still fresh in our minds, let us proceed at once to 
an examination of how Value File access capabilities are used, and how 
the hardware operations on their values are managed, with the under­
standing that we will return later for a description of how such files 
are created and administered. 
FREELINK and COPYLINK Value File access capabilities are issued 
in response to requests expressed as calls to FREELINK and COPYLINK 
(to which we shall refer jointly as "LINK"). As was described in the 
preceding chapter, such a capability serves to bind the file's value 
to a variable specified by a parameter of the request. Accordingly, 
a Value File access capability is singly a pointer to the file's value, 
inserted by LINK into the descriptor field that normally points to the 
variable's value (see illustration in Figure 37). LINK also sets bit 3 
of the variable's descriptor; not previously used, this bit now serves 
as an external-value flag, signifying a variable bound to a Value File. 
When LINK performs this binding operation, it wipes out the 
variable's previous value, as an assignment operation would do, and 
de-allocates any space occiçjied by it. The descriptor's ON-block pointer 
and ON-enabled flag, if any, are preserved by LINK; if it has a Current 
Pointer (CSUB, CPTR), however, it is cleared (since it refers to the 
defunct value)• 
In addition to the user-computation's variable-descriptor, LINKed 
to the file's value, Figure 37 also shows a VF descriptor, accompanied 
by a word—the VF-descriptor* s storage-string successor—that identifies 
the VF-descriptor's account number and VF number. These are fabricated by 
the File Monitor when the file is created; their use will emerge in the 
discussion of Value File replacement (below). 
The Terminal Monitor of the computation invoking LINK also 
participates in its execution. Each TM maintains a table—TMCT—con­
taining a set of three entries for each VF-access capability held by 
the confutation. These entries record the address of the variable-
descriptor in which the capability is lodged, the capability's access 
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Fig. 37. LINKing a variable to a Value File. 
node, and a pointer to the Value File's VF-descriptor. Whenever LINK is 
executed, the participating TM finds an empty entry in its TMCT and records 
these particulars for the newly acquired capability. 
Value-File References, etc. Now that we have a variable bound to 
a file value, let us see how it performs under the reference, evaluation, 
cçerator application and replacement operations described above. 
Figure 38 shows the situation immediately following execution of a 
reference to a variable bound to a file value. Comparison with Figure 29a 
discloses no difference between the two; the externality of a variable's 
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Fig- 38- Stack entry resulting from a reference to a 
variable bound to a VF value-
value has no effect upon references to it- The same holds true for 
component references (we dispense with the duplicate illustration, and 
refer the reader to Figures 29c and 29d). The lack of effect of 
external values on references is hardly surprising; since the referencing 
mechanism never actually accesses the value, the value's location ought 
not to matter. 
As it turns out, the evaluation and operator-application mechanisms 
are similarly indifferent to the distinction between values that belong 
to the confutation being executed, and values that belong to Value Files. 
But here we need to investigate somewhat further, in order to demon­
strate why this is so- We begin with the assumption that the VF's value 
is validly represented- Since every Value File is created with a 
valid (null) value, and every subsequent modification of it is per­
formed by the hardware mechanisms and therefore transforms it into 
another valid value, this seems a reasonable assumption-
The only difference, therefore, between a Value File's value and 
that of an ordinary variable is that the latter occTç>ies the storage 
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domain of the confutation that accesses it, whereas the file value occupies 
a different storage domain, one that belongs, moreover, to a different 
virtual processor from that of the confutation accessing it. We have to 
assure ourselves that a cross-domain evaluation of a reference to a Value 
File, and the subsequent application of an operator to it, are free from 
hazards. 
First we consider the memory-structure implications of cross-domain 
evaluations and operation applications. In SYMBOL's original configuration 
(pre-software), no computation ever attempted to access a storage location 
outside its own storage domain. It is not unreasonable to inquire, 
therefore, whether such an access might cause trouble. It turns out that 
problems do arise when a computation attempts certain memory operations— 
allocation and de-allocation—that would have the effect of altering the 
underlying structure of some storage domain other than the one in which 
it is running. The danger is that certain of the two domains' underlying 
list structures[27] may become intermingled, so that information intended 
for one domain winds up in the other; this sows seeds of disaster, which 
sprout and bloom when one of the domains is subsequently reclaimed. We 
ask, therefore, whether evaluations and operator applications involving 
file values invoke any such memory operations across domain boundaries. 
The answer turns out to be negative: evaluations involve neither allo­
cations nor de-allocations; operator applications sometimes involve 
allocations, and component-references involve de-allocations, but in both 
cases the affected storage strings belong to the computation's own storage 
domain. Memory operations that leave the structure of a storage domain 
unaltered—fetches and stores—clearly cannot damage the domain's structure, 
whether performed across domain boundaries or not. We conclude that 
cross-domain evaluations and operator applications threaten no harm to 
SYMBOL's logical memory structure. 
There are, however, certain paging considerations to be examined 
[25]. The designs of certain of SYMBOL's processors rely on enforcement 
of a system-wide policy barring the removal from core memory of pages 
belonging to computations that are receiving processor service. When such 
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a page is scheduled for removal, the processor servicing the confutation 
to which it belongs is first commanded to quit, the page transfer is 
delayed until it has done so, and the confutation is blocked from 
receiving further service until the page has been removed. This policy 
allows the processor to select a convenient time to shut down after 
receiving a "quit" command, and guarantees no loss of currently 
accessible pages until it has done so^ and therefore demands less in 
the way of processor-state saving logic (and context block space) than a 
strict requirement that the processor be prepared to handle page faults at 
arbitrary times. The connection between this policy and the file system 
is that pages are attributed to confutations via their VP-numbers : a 
page marked with VP-number ^  is assumed to belong to the computation 
2 
currently running on the i-th VP. This e^qjoses a processor, executing 
a confutation on the i-th VP and accessing a Value File (whose pages 
are all marked "VP 15") to the danger of losing pages containing the 
file's value when it least ejcpects it. 
Fortunately, however, the only page-fault-sensitive algorithms are 
those that modify the value being accessed. Typically, such a modifi­
cation requires a sequence of changes in several different words of 
the value's representation, in order to complete a transformation from 
one validly represented value to another; a page fault in the middle 
of such a sequence leaves the representation invalid, and the processor, 
unable to shut down and resume at arbitrary points in such a sequence, 
^Note the similarity to our file-system policy prohibiting 
revocation of access capabilities! 
2 
Here again our description departs slightly from reality. In 
the original design, attribution of core-resident pages to computations 
depended on a record of which VP incurred the page fault responsible 
for the page's most recent transfer into core memory. This mechanism 
fails when an unowned page is brought into core by one VP and subse­
quently allocated to some other VP. The necessary circuitry has been 
designed, but has yet to be installed. 
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is helpless to complete it. What cross-domain value-modifying 
operations are invoked by evaluations emd operator applications? The only 
one is the storing of Current Pointers into structure-value and sub­
structure descriptors. The processor's design assumes that, having 
accessed such a descriptor before scanning a vector, it will be able to 
store (CSUB, CPTR) into the same descriptor after locating the target 
conçxsnent. If the page containing the descriptor has been removed from 
core memory in the meantime, the old Current Pointer value remains (the 
processor singly ignores the page fault incurred by its attempt to store 
the new Current Pointer). The old Current Pointer is still valid, however, 
since the evaluation cannot have altered the vector to which it refers; 
the only effect of the failure to update it is a minor loss of effective­
ness of the "speed-up" that depends on it. We conclude, therefore, that 
evaluations and operator applications can be performed across storage-
domain boundaries without significant risk. 
Value File replacement Nothing of the sort can be said for 
replacement operations—as the foregoing description made clear, these 
make heavy use of storage allocation and de-allocation functions. To 
avoid having replacement Operations on Value Files performed across storage-
domain boundaries, we arrange to have them performed by confutations that 
résidé in thé âàîué âtûragé douiairis as the Value Files, namely, the Account 
Managers. To make a long story short, we provide for a transfer of 
control to the appropriate AM whenever a user-conçutation attempts a 
replacement on a file value, and for return of control when the replace­
ment is complete. Just as in the reference, evaluation, and operator-
application operations described above, replacement of file values, either 
as a whole or by conçonent, requires no special provisions by the appli­
cation programmer (other than calls to LINK). Unlike these operations, 
however, the replacement of file values does require considerable soft­
ware intervention, as well as certain modifications of SYMBOL'S hardware. 
These will be described in some detail in the following discussion. 
The hardware modifications provide that any attençt at a replacement 
operation on a descriptor whose "external" flag is set causes an 
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execution-error trap. When this happens in a user-confutation, control 
is transferred to its Terminal Monitor, which discovers the situation 
shown in Figure 39a. The TM searches the user-confutation ' s stack for 
its uppermost variable (or component) reference, which is the object 
of the replacement, and searches its own TMCT table for an entry, 
TMCTii], such that TMCT[i,l] contains the address of the variable's 
descriptor; TMCT[i,2] then gives the access mode of the descriptor's 
capability. If the access mode is "COPY", the attempted replacement is 
not permitted by the capability; the TM therefore responds to it as to 
an execution error, and the user-computation goes no further. 
If the descriptor contains a FREE-access capability, however, the 
TM alters the variable-reference in the user-computation's stack to 
point to the VF descriptor instead of the user-computation's descriptor. 
Then it transmits to the FM a request for the replacement operation to 
be performed, with parameters containing the user-computation's stack-
pointer {<3 in the figure) and the Value File's account number (the 
latter obtained from the VP-identification word that accompanies each 
VF-descriptor, as shown in Figure 37b). 
The FM initializes the account's Account Manager with the user-
conputation's stack pointer, so the AM will treat the user-computation's 
stack as its own. Tlae AI-I's instruction pointer ( [l] in the figure) 
points at a fabricated "assign" instruction; the situation at this point 
is shown in Figure 39b. The FM then transfers control to the AM, which 
executes its "assign" instruction. The hardware mechanisms carry out 
the replacement of the file's value, allocating and de-allocating 
storage strings as necessary, updating the VF descriptor to reflect 
the new value's type and location,^ and clearing the variable-reference 
entry frcxn the user-coirputation's stack. Upon completion of the 
^Note how this changes the value (i.e., the pattern of 24 bits) of 
the capability without altering its meaning. We are able to get away 
with this only because a capability can be thus modified only by 
request of a computation that holds the only copy of it in existence. 
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replacement, the AM advances to its next instruction; this is a "System" 
instruction, which (due to prior arrangements by the FM) hcis the net 
effect of transferring control back to the FM. The FM signals cOTipletion 
of the replacement to the user-computation's TM, which wakes up to dis­
cover the state of affairs shown in Figure 39c. Since the user-conpu-
tation's vetriable-descriptor still reflects the pre-replacement value, the 
TM adjusts it to agree with the contents of the VF descriptor (see Figure 
39d).^ Finally, the TM determines, from the user-computation's descriptor, 
whether the variable whose value has just been replaced has an enabled 
ON-block. If so, the TM alters the user-confutation's state so that, on 
resuming, the user-confutation invokes the ON-block; otherwise, it allows 
the user-confutation to resume execution at the instruction following the 
replacement instruction that caused the original shutdown. 
A possibility not taken into account in the foregoing narrative is 
that the file storage space avaiilable in the file's account may be 
insufficient to contain the new value. In this case, the AM's execution 
of the replacement operation is terminated before its conpletion by a 
heurdware-generated "page-usage overflow" interrupt, and control passes 
Clearly.- ve cannot store a one-word value in the user-computation's 
descriptor, for this would obliterate its "external" flag. There arises 
therefore a question as to what to do if a one-word value should be stored 
by the hardware replacement mechanism into the VF-descriptor. One 
alternative would be to point the user-confutation's descriptor at the 
VF-descriptor, instead of copying the value-pointer from the latter to 
the forzsr; another would be to move the value out of the VF-descriptor = 
We choose a third alternative, which eliminates the special case entirely: 
by setting the VF-descriptor*s end-of-name-table flag, we inhibit the 
hardware from ever storing a one-word value in it. 
2 An interrtfted replacement operation is terminated in such a way that 
the variable's new value, although an inconflete copy of the intended new 
value, is nevertheless a valid internal representation. 
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to the FM with a failure indication, which the FM transmits back to 
the TM. After adjusting the user-computation's descriptor to agree 
with the VF-descriptor, the TM treats the failure message as an 
execution-error interrupt in the user-coirputation, outputting diagnostic 
messages and restraining it from further execution. 
Replacement of a component of a file's value is accomplished by a 
series of steps similar to those by which an entire value is replaced, 
with a few elaborations to accommodate subscripting. As in the variable-
replacement case, the user-confutation traps on the attempt to replace 
a value via a descriptor flagged as "external," and the TM, gaining 
control of the processor, finds the situation shown in Figure 40a. If 
the descriptor's capability allows COPY-mode accesses only, the TM treats 
the attempted replacement as an execution error. Otherwise, it prepares 
for the replacement by copying the user-computation descriptor's Current 
Pointer, if any, into the Current Pointer field of the VF descriptor. 
Requesting the FM to perform the replacement, the TM sends not only 
the user-conputation's stack pointer and the Value File's account 
number, as in the variable-replacement case, but also a pointer to the 
component-reference stack entry. The FM uses the last parameter in 
creating a new subscript string in the Value File's storage domain— 
employing tlie user-computation ' s own subscript string for the replace­
ment would entail a forbidden cross-domain de-allocation. The new 
string (see Figure 40b) contains the same subscript entries as its 
prototype, but its variable reference points to the file's VF-descriptor, 
rather than to the user-computation's descriptor. The FM adjusts the 
component-reference stack entry to point to the new subscript string, 
and starts tiié AI-î with its stack pointer and instruction pointer set 
up as in the variable-replacement case. 
The AM carries out the replacement operation and shuts down, 
returning control to the FM. The effects of the operation are shown 
in Figure 40c: the file's value has been modified and its VF descriptor 
adjusted accordingly, the component-reference entry has been cleared from 
the user-computation's stack, and the AM's subscript list has been 
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de-allocated. The FM notifies the TM of the operation's conpletion, and 
the TM de-allocates the user-confutation's subscript list. The structure-
value flag of the user-conçutation's descriptor is set (in case the file's 
pre-replacement value was a null scalar), and if it has no ON-block, its 
Current Pointer is copied from that of the VF-descriptor. Finally, the 
TM transfers control to the user-computation—to its ON-block, if it has 
one and it is enabled, else to the instruction following the replacement 
instruction. 
A component- rep lacement can run afoul of two types of interrupts in 
addition to the insufficient-space interrupt that can prematurely terminate 
a variable-replacement operation. One of these occurs when the processor, 
replacing a shorter conponent by a longer one (the so-called "field-
expansion" operation), incurs a page fault; it can neither continue pro­
cessing nor store enough of its internal state to resume after the missing 
page has been obtained, and so shuts down with an execution-error 
indication. When a user-conç>utation incurs such an interrupt, its Terminal 
Monitor intervenes to complete the replacement operation by means of soft­
ware memory statements, and control returns to the user-computation with 
no visible indication of any abnormal occurrence (the Terminal Monitor 
also handles its own field-expansion page-fault interrupts). We provide 
the same facility in the File Monitor, so that whenever an Account Manager 
is interrupted by a field-expansion page-fault, the FM conçiletes the 
replacement and returns a normal-conpletion message to the TM. 
The other type of interrupt to which coitç>onent replacements are subject 
stems from a programming error in the user-confutation ; it occurs when a 
subscript list specifies a conçjonent of what is in fact a non-null scalar 
value. The FM treats this case as a replacement fëiilure, like the 
insufficient-space interrupt, and the TM handles it as an execution error. 
Summary We have shown, in the foregoing description, how Value 
Files are integrated into the SYMBOL system's existing hardwaure-implemented 
value processing mechanisms. We demonstrated how it is arranged that, once 
a file value has been bound to a variable in a confutation, it is 
accessible in exactly the same way as an ordinary value, as far as the 
147 
user-computation is concerned. We showed that the hardware mechanisms 
can handle references, evaluations, and applications of operators to 
file values and their components, but that due to storage-domain 
constraints, replacement of file values requires software intervention. 
Concurrency of sharing 
Having conçileted our examination of how Value Files interact with 
SYMBOL's value-processing hardware, we are in a suitable position to 
put into perspective the issue of the concurrency with which Value 
Files can be shared, and the role of the hardware mechanisms in 
influencing this attribute. 
By "concurrency" we mean the extent to which any two independent 
confutations can simultaneously exercise capabilities to access a single 
Value File. The maximum possible concurrency is achieved when the two 
computations are allowed to arbitrarily interleave the storage 
accesses by which they access the file's value; at the opposite (i.e., 
lower) end of the concurrency spectrum would be a policy allowing only 
one confutation at a time even to possess a capability to access a 
given file. The degree of concurrency to be permitted by a system may 
« 3  ^ WW f  y   ^ ^  t  « •  «  ^  ^  ^ f  ^  i a  —  
tations in question are designed, but if the integrity and continued 
proper functioning of the system itself are threatened by an excess of 
concurrency, these considerations clearly impose an upper bound. It 
is precisely these considerations which we must examine with respect 
to SYMBOL. 
Two characteristics of the SYMBOL system combine to limit the 
concurrency with which Value Files can be shared in our system. The 
first is that the internal representation of a data object in SYMBOL 
may extend over arbitrarily many words. The other is that the 
semantics of a data object are largely contained within its internal 
representation, and not all bit strings constitute meaningful repre­
sentations. These characteristics combine to threaten the system's 
integrity in two out of three modes of interaction between two 
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confutations simultaneously accessing a single value (by "simultaneously" 
we meëin that their accesses to storage are arbitrarily interleaved) , as 
follows: 
1. Two confutations simultaneously replacing a value can produce a 
meaningless result, as shown in an exanfle in Figure 41, in which the 
confonents of the result have start-tags but no end-tags. Since the 
Computation A; \ \! % % 4 (v 1 
' \ 1 \ 1 
Result A: % 
1 A 
s e e  
s V V 
Computation B: 
Ï 
Legend: ^5- scalar-start tag 
Sg- scalar-end tag 
Ey- end-vector tag 
Arrows show last datum stored in each word of result 
Fig. 41. Two confutations, simultaneously replacing a single vector 
value, produce a meaningless result. 
operator circuitry was designed to be applied only to valid repre­
sentations of values, the effects of operations using meaningless 
representations are not generally predictable; in many instances, 
execution-error interrupts occur quickly, but in others, extensive 
damage is wreaked not only upon the computation using the corrupted 
value, but on other computations as well. The type of interference 
that leads to such invalid representations may be likened to a photo­
graphic double ejcposure—it may yield constructive results if care­
fully planned, but usually produces a mess when it occurs accidentally. 
2. A confutation evaluating a value that is s imultaneously being replaced 
by another computation may obtain a meaningless result (extending our 
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photographie analogy, this can be compared to the image-blurring 
effect of a moving subject)• For exanple, a computation evaluating 
a compcHient reference, as in Figure 31, could be scanning a vector 
as another computation, performing a replacement operation on the 
same value, de-allocated the vector. The first computation would 
then be caught in a race with the memory-reclamation processor, 
and could be led into scanning through the storage domain's free-
space pool, with highly unpredictable results. 
3. Two computations both evaluating or applying operators to the same 
value pose no threat either to the value or to one another; neither 
confutation alters the value, and neither can affect the other's 
operation via its access to the value. 
These considerations are reflected in the extent to which our file system 
restricts the concurrency of Value File sharing. The first hazard 
mentioned above—destrictive interference between simultaneous replace­
ment operations—requires no special precautions, for two reasons. 
First, the replacement-operation hardware is so constructed that if it 
is interrupted (e.g., by a page fault or time-slice expiration) and 
subsequently restarted on the same operation, it repeats the operation 
from the beginning; it is impossible, therefore, for two computations 
to actually alternate accesses as in Figure 41—one computation or the 
other will always finish last, and will therefore determine the final 
result. The other reason, of course, is that all replacement operations 
on file values are performed sequentially under the aegis of the File 
Monitor^ because of the storage-domain considerations described above, 
which are essentially independent of the whole concurrency issue. 
The third mode of sharing described above—simultaneous access in 
the form of evaluations or operator applications—is specifically per­
mitted by the file system, which allows any number of COPY-mode access 
A very low degree of concurrency; it prevents not only simultaneous 
replacement operations on any given value, but even simultaneous 
replacement operations on totally independent file values. 
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capabilities referring to a given file to exist and be exercised 
simultaneously. 
Hie second sharing mode—evaluation by one confutation coincident 
with replacement by another—is the one that necessitates restrictions on 
concurrency of sharing in our system, namely, the requirement that a 
computation executing a replacement on a Value File have an exclusive 
capability to access it. The reason is that there seems to be no obvious 
way, in the present hardware configuration, for the File Monitor to detect 
whether any given value is being accessed, at any given moment, by an 
evaluation or operator-application operation. The only way it can be sure, 
therefore, that a replacement operation is not interfering with an 
undetectable evaluation operation on the value being replaced, is to 
prohibit replacement operations on any values that are accessible to any 
confutations other than the one requesting the replacement. 
Although this requirement lies behind our policy of issuing COPY-mode 
capabilities freely, but FREE-mode capabilities one at a time, it does not 
by itself confletely determine that policy. An alternative policy would 
have been for the FM to issue a single type of value-access capability, 
and to wait until a computation requested a file-value replacement before 
ascertaining whether any other computation possessed a capability to 
access the same value. But in cases where another confutation did hold 
such a capability, neither of the FM's options under such a policy would 
be acceptable: it could postpone the replacement operation until all the 
other capabilities had been surrendered by their holders, thereby infosing 
an arbitrarily long delay on the confutation requesting the replacement; 
or it could treat the replacement request as an error, which would 
effectively surrender to pure chance—the timing of LINK calls invoked by 
independent computations—the success or failure of confutations attenpting 
to modify shared files. Under the policy adopted for our system, a 
computation designed to modify a Value File can request a FREE-access 
capability for it before "burning any bridges," i..e., before expending 
large amounts of confuting resources or modifying other files, and can 
count on continuing to be able to access the file until it surrenders the 
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capability voluntarily. 
A possible extension of the policy actually adopted would have 
been the provision of a third type of access capability, namely, a 
"replacement-only" capability, which would have allowed replacements 
of the values involved, but not evaluations. Replace-only capabilities 
could be issued freely, since the File Monitor's sequential handling 
of replacements would prevent interference. This seems a much less 
useful facility than our COPY-mode and FREE-mode capabilities, however; 
to the extent that it is useful, it can be provided by shared care­
taker procedures. 
Another alternative policy would have been to issue a single type 
of capability freely, but to require all file accesses—evaluations as 
well as replacements—to be handled by the File Monitor, whose sequential 
processing of access requests would prevent simultaneous accesses to 
any file value. But this would be a clear case of overkill—not only 
would it inç)ose the overhead of software invocation and intercomputation 
message transmission upon every single file access, but it would 
unnecessarily "sequentialize" independent accesses to separate files. 
Under the circumstances, the sharing policies adopted for the 
system we have been describing seem preferable to any of the feasible 
alternatives we have been able to iraagine. xliis is not to say, 
however, that no better system can be devised. Ideally, one would seek 
a system that would restrict concurrency of sharing only to the extent 
necessary to protect the system's fundamental integrity. In the SYMBOL 
context, this would require some means of detecting, at the component 
level, whether any given value is currently undergoing any evaluation 
or replacement operations, and some means of delaying an operation that 
would interfere with an operation already under way, only long enough 
to prevent the interference. If this could be accomplished, it would 
no longer be necessary to control the simultaneity of accesses by 
centralizing them in the File Monitor; if the cross-storage-domain 
problems of replacement operations could be oversome—perhaps by 
identifying each shared value as to its "home" storage domain—then the 
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last of the software overhead incurred in operations accessing file values 
could be eliminated. A system with these features begins to look more 
and more like a database machine; clearly beyond the range of this thesis, 
the design of such a system would generate additional insight into the 
essential generality of the SYMBOL approach to computing. 
Auxiliary data and administrative operations 
The "superstructure" of name-space data used in the administration of 
Value Files is shown in Table 5. STAT, DYN, and TEMP contain Value-File 
data very similar to the Shared-Procedure-File data described above. The 
only structure unique to Value Files is the Capability Table (TMCT) 
maintained by each Terminal Monitor, in which is kept a record of each 
capability held by the user-conçutation for which the TM is responsible. 
Other than the file values themselves, the only non-name-space data 
involved with a Value File are its VF-descriptor and the accompanying 
file identification word, whose function has been e^^lained above. Each 
account's VF descriptors are contained in a single storage string, 
alternating with their identification words as shown in Figure 42. 
Operations 
The software file operations by which Value-File owners manage their 
files are few, conpared to the procedure-file operations, and relatively 
straightforward. We list them here for the sake of completeness, and 
give a short description of each one. 
CREATE When a user-computation calls CREATE (VF-name), its TM 
forwards the file-name and the calling program's account number; to 
the FM. The FM ensures that the VF-name is not already being used in 
the account, and finds some ^  such that STAT[a,l,f] is null; this ^  will 
be the VF-number of the new file. If the VF-number liaS not been used 
previously, then a new VF-descriptor and identification word are set up. 
The VF-descriptor is bound to a null scalar initial value, as illustrated 
in Figure 43. 
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Table 5. Value Files' name-space data 
Note; a = account number 
f = VF number 
File Monitor data 
STAT[a,l,f,1] 
STAT[a,l,f,2] 
STAT[a,l.-f/3] 
STAT[a,l,f,4] 
STATta,l,f,51 
STAT[a,l,f,6] 
VF-name 
pointer to VF-descriptor 
user-name 
- VF-name 
- user-name 
- VF-name 
of COPY-access user-name list 
of FREE-access user-name list 
DYN[a,l,f,l] - number of outstanding capabilities referring to 
this file (= 1 for FREE-access capability) 
DYN[a,l,f,2] 
DYN[a,l,f,3] 
DYN[a,l,f,4] 
DYN[a,l,f,5] 
account number1 
VF-number j 
account number! 
VF-nuniber J 
of COPY-access user-name list 
of FREE-access user-name list 
fTTCKTO r 1^4- f capabilities referring to this file 
currently held by the terminal-t computation 
(all VF-capabilities are volatile) 
Terminal-t Monitor data 
TMCT[i,l] - pointer to user-computation descriptor containing a 
capability to access (a,f)-th Value File 
TMCT[i,2] - access mode of the capability 
TMCT[i,3] - pointer to the file's VF-descriptor 
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STAT [a,1,1,2] 
STAT [a,l,2,2] •" 
STAT [a,1,3,2] •" 
STAT [a, 1,4,2] •" 
STAT [a,l,n,2] •" 
VF descriptors file values 
A 0 -
a 1 
0 
a 2 
«0 
a 3 
a 4 
# > >f "A # 
a n 
L 
Fig. 42. VF-descriptor string for a-th account. 
descriptor 
r 
V a 
VF-id: a = account number 
,r 
null scalar 
f = VF-number 
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DESTROY Like the OBSOLETE operation that destroys Shcired Pro­
cedure Files, DESTROY (VF-name) provides for delayed action in the event 
that the Value File to which it refers has a non-zero capability count 
(i.e., DYN[a,2,f,l] is non-zero). If the count is zero when DESTROY is 
invoked, the FM immediately calls the account's AM to de-allocate the 
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file's value, and upon regaining control, assigns null values to 
STAT[a,l,f] and DYN[a,l,f]. If the capability count is non-zero, these 
actions are delayed until the next time a zero value is assigned to 
DYN[a,l,f,1]. 
COPYLINK and FREELItJK The access-authorization provisions of 
these routines are similar to those of Claim in verifying a requestor's 
authorization for COPY or BORROW access to a Shared Procedure File. The 
only significant difference is that whereas an SPF's COPY and BORROW 
authorizations are independent of one another, a VF's FREE and COPY 
authorizations are related, in that a requestor authorized for FREE access 
is considered to be authorized for COPY access regardless of whether he is 
explicitly mentioned in the VF's COPY list. In responding to a COPYLINK 
request, therefore, the FM checks both COPY-access and FREE-accèss lists 
before refusing access. 
Once a LINK request has been determined to be authorized, the FM 
must further ensure that the system's policy governing concurrency of 
sharing is satisfied, before issuing the requested capability. The 
criteria are that a FREE-access capability can be issued only if the 
file's capability counter—DYN[a,l,f,l]—is exactly zero, whereas a 
COPY-access capability can be issued whenever the counter is non-
negative. If rhe criterion applicable to the request is satisfied, the 
counter is adjusted accordingly—incremented for a COPY capability, 
decremented for a FREE capability—and TEMP[t,l,a,f] is incremented 
(where t is the virtual-processor number of the requesting computation). 
The capability is returned to the TM, and implanted in a user-
computation variable-descriptor as we have previously described. 
UNLINK By calling UNLINK (variable), a computation relin­
quishes the capability binding the variable to a VF's value. The TM 
looks up the address of the variable's descriptor in its TMCT table, 
and passes the file's account number (^) and VF-number (f) to the FM, 
which adjusts DYN[a,1,f,1] and TEMP[t,l,a,f] to reflect the 
surrendered capability. If the new value of DYN[a,l,f,l] is zero and 
the file's VF-name—STAT[a,l,f,1]—is null, the file has been obsoleted 
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by a call to DESTROY, and its de-allocation is now completed. 
Whenever a user-confutation holding VF-access capabilities is termi­
nated, its TM informs the FM, which uses the capability counts stored in 
TEMP[t], where ^  is the confutation's terminal number, to adjust the 
capability counters of all files to which the confutation holds access 
capabilities. (The same FM function is invoked by the Supervisor in the 
event of a TM crash.) 
AUTHORIZE (COPY/FREE) ACCESS These operations are precisely 
analogous to LEND and REVEAL, and require no separate description. 
Other Inf lementation Issues 
We do not claim to have covered, in this thesis, every important 
aspect of the implementation of our file system. In addition to the actual 
codes of the various program modules that make up the actual system, we 
have deliberately slighted certain implementation problems that seem to us 
to shed less light on SYMBOL'S basic architecture than do the aspects to 
which we have given our full attention. In this section, we give brief 
sketches of the most infortant of these neglected areas. 
"Higher authority" In discussing the issue of whether access 
capabilities ought to be arbitrarily revocable, we made reference to a 
"higher authority" which has the power to revoke access capabilities in 
certain circumstances. Other powers required to manage the system include 
those of opening and closing of accounts, of establishing and altering 
individual accounts' file-space limits, and of modifying the contents of 
the System Procedure Library. We envision all such extraordinary powers 
to be exercised only during system maintenance periods, when the 
computation through which they are exercised is the only active computation 
in the system. The possibility of interference with concurrent user-
computations is thereby eliminated. 
File backup and overflow provisions It would be highly desirable 
to provide a way of copying files into scoie form of backup storage, from 
which they could be restored in case of destruction by system malfunctions 
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or users' mistakes. It is also quite likely that if a SYMBOL file 
system were to prove genuinely useful (rather than a mere demonstration 
of feasibility), the system's 4096 pages of virtual memory would not 
long suffice for both working storage and file storage. A reasonable 
approach to both problems would be to attach one or more storage 
devices as Terminal-15 I/O equipment, to be accessed by means of 
ordinary I/O statements in the File Monitor.^ Then it would be possible 
for the FM to dump files incrementally, without unduly disturbing the 
system's operation. Shared Procedure Files could be copied soon after 
their creation, and each Value File upon surrender of a FREE-access 
capability referring to it. A Private Procedure File could perhaps be 
copied at the end of any terminal session during which it is altered. 
Decisions as to when the primary copy of a file ought to be purged 
from virtual memory would presumably be based in part upon the recency 
and frequency of accesses to it—information which can readily be 
added to DYN. In any event, the entire question of file backup and 
storage overflow is highly complex and not to be underestimated—see, 
for example, the discussion in [13] of the elaborate incremental file 
dumping, archiving, and recovery system developed for the Titan coirç)uter 
at Cambridge. 
File preservation during IPL SYMBOL's Initial Program Load 
(IPL) facility provides a means of establishing the system in a 
specified initial state; it is useful chiefly for restoring the system 
to working order after corruption of the software by a software or hard­
ware malfunction. Its first step is to clear core memory; then it 
^Should this arrangement lead to excessive interference with the 
FM's responses to file-operation requests, the file I/O equipment could 
be attached to some other terminal, to be run by a computation slaved 
to the FM through the FM Queue. This would be a more complex arrange­
ment, but would allow file dumping and ordinary file operations to 
proceed concurrently. 
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executes the IPL Program, which clears all pages of virtual memory except 
its own pages and those containing the operating-system source programs 
and procedures, and returns them to the system's available-space pool. 
Last of all, it launches the operating system onto a process of boot­
strapping itself into operation, generating new computations for the 
Supervisor and each of the Terminal Monitors. 
This process requires certain modifications to accommodate the file 
system, for the files must be preserved intact—at least insofar as they 
are intact before initiation of the IPL process- It is likely that when 
core memory is cleeired, for example, some of its page frames contain 
file-space pages that have been modified since their most recent transfer 
from the drum. Sinç>ly clearing these frames obliterates these changes, 
effectively restoring these pages to the old versions remaining on the 
drum; this risks introducing inconsistencies into the files, possibly 
invalidating values' representations and corrupting the structure of 
logical storage. Somehow, therefore, the core-resident pages must be 
restored to the drum, so that the files are preserved in a self-consistent 
state. 
To preserve the bulk of the files, of course, it is necessary that 
the IPL Program refrain from clearing those pages of virtual memory in 
which the files are stored. This is easily arranged, since all such pages 
are marked with the virtual-processor number (specifically, 15) of the 
File Monitor coiroutation; these pages can singly be skipped over in the 
clearing process. 
The File Monitor itself must take the IPL process into account, to 
the extent that after generation of a new FM confutation, it will merge 
its storage domain with that of the pre-IPL FM computation, locate the 
pre-IPL values of STAT, DYN, and TEMP, and bind these values to the 
corresponding variables in the new computation. Then, since all user-
conroutations and TM's holding file-access capabilities will have been 
obliterated by the IPL operation, the FM must use TEMP to adjust every 
file's capability counter to reflect the surrender of all volatile access 
capabilities. Finally, the storage strings occupied by the old FM 
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conçutation's instruction string and name tables must be de-allocated. 
Summary 
At the beginning of this chapter, we described the collection of 
computations that cooperate in performing the file system's operations, 
and showed how communications between them are managed and synchronized 
by the Supervisor. We pointed out a property of the hardware that 
forces us to make file operations uninterruptible—an inconvenience, 
but not a serious deficiency for a file system of the modest scale of 
this one. 
The remainder of the chapter was given over to descriptions of the 
data structures, both nams-space and external, implementing the files, 
and of the operations upon these data structures that are implied by 
each of the file operations. We described the Interpreter algorithms 
that operate upon data objects stored in files, eind with which the 
files must therefore be compatible. In most respects, as we showed, the 
files achieve conçatibility with these algorithms; we showed how 
software intervention is employed to overcome most of the remaining 
incompatibilities. The only serious limitation imposed by the Inter­
preter upon the file system's functions appears to be the restriction 
on concurrency of Value File sharing. We showed why this restriction 
is necessary, and suggested an approach to its elimination in a future 
redesign of the Interpreter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
The develojanent of the SYMBOL file system, as set forth in the pre­
ceding chapters, has e^qjosed certain of SYMB0L-2R's strengths and weak­
nesses as a foundation for a full-fledged modem timesharing system. 
Since the design of better timesharing systems, and particularly of 
their information sharing and protection mechanisms, continue to attract 
substantial research interest, the identification of those aspects of 
SYMBOL that are especially congenial or hostile to the controlled 
sharing of information will be useful to other timesharing-system 
architects. 
Certainly the greatest single contributor to the system's efficiency 
and simplicity is SYMBOL's single virtual-manory address space. 
Referring to early computer systems in which "jobs were allocated fixed 
areas of physical memory," R. S. Fabry has pointed out the benefits of 
. . a system without relocation, [in which] jobs share an address 
space and can be allowed to interact freely, sharing data structures 
and addresses as easily as if they were a single job" [11, p. 403], and 
speculates that ". . .it might turn cut that ens substantial source 
of inefficiency in the modem multiprogramming systems which rely on 
shared objects is that they have eliminated the old-fashioned idea of 
an absolute address for such objects" [11, p. 408]. In the SYMBOL 
system's memory, as we showed in chapter 2, all storage addresses are 
absolute, in the sense that the meaning of an address is totally 
independent of the context in which it is used. All computations share 
the system's single address space, and share data structures by means 
of—to invert Fabry's terminology—the address-based capabilities 
described in chapter 4. So powerful is the simplifying effect of this 
arrangement that in most cases, the introduction of sharing requires 
no modification of the system's original auccssing mechanisms. 
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Of course, a multiprogrannned system in which all confutations share 
a single absolute address space would be all sharing and no protection, 
if users' computations were free to generate addresses and use them to 
access storage arbitrarily. As we e:q)lained in chapter 2, SYMBOL allows 
nothing of the sort—a user's confutation has access to nothing but its 
own name space. Explicit access to storage is a privilege reserved to 
hardware or software conçonents of the system. Unlike user-defined 
computations, system components can be eaçected to observe self-discipline 
in performing storage accesses, thus rendering conventional explicit 
storage protection superfluous. The system retains total control over 
the mapping from each user-computation's name space to the system's 
absolute address space. The file system merely extends this mapping by 
allowing files to be bound to the name-space variables. As we have shown 
in chapter 4, the Interpreter's name-management system serves the file 
system well (with occasional software assistance) in binding procedures, 
accessing values, and passing parameters—functions which are required 
in any case for the proper implementation of SYMBOL'S high-level pro­
gramming language, even in the absence of a file system. By guaranteeing 
that access capabilities cannot be misused, the Interpreter confletely 
eliminates any need for costly validation of every attempted access, held 
to bê cââéntj-âl (âlbêxt j-ii luorê convcriuxonâl confûtcîT systcms) by Graham 
and Denning [15, p. 418] and by Saltzer and Schroeder [29, p. 1282]. 
Moreover, the SYMBOL Interpreter's parameter mechanism handles without 
assistance the dynamic variation of access capabilities implied by 
borrowed procedures* parameters, thereby overcoming at no added cost 
what has been a major obstacle in conventional systems [30]. The file 
system thus accords with the design principle, enunciated by Saltzer and 
Schroeder, of "economy of mechanism" [29, p. 1282]. 
Finally, the integrity of SYMBOL's protection system, even after its 
extension to allow controlled sharing, is a testimonial to the "principle 
of least privilege" enunciated by Turn and Ware [33, p. 200] and by 
Saltzer and Schroeder [29, p. 1282]. Whereas these authors invoke the 
principle only in the narrow context of access control, to limit the 
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number and scope of a computation's access capabilities to the minimum 
necessary to accomplish its task, we find it equally applicable in 
the wider realm of system architecture. According to Graham and 
Denning, 
It can be noted that the "average" user, who employs only 
system compilers and library routines, is unlikely to break the 
security of the system if only because conçilers and library 
routines will not cause the loopholes to be exercised. This 
does not mean attention should not be paid to structuring the 
hardware so that even the most enterprising and malicious user 
Ccinnot break security. It takes only one such user to 
compromise another's privacy which, once lost, may be irrecover­
able. On this basis, the cost of hardware and software develop­
ment required to achieve efficient implementations of protection 
is of utmost value. [15, p. 428] 
The SYMBOL analog of the "system compilers and library routines" to 
which Graham and Denning refer is its standard high-level-language user 
interface (including the command language and the file system). The 
least-privilege principle denies to all users—including "the most 
enterprising and malicious"—any other avenue of access to the machine, 
since by hypothesis its users are "average" users for whom the standard 
interface is adequate. The "average user" benefits from the absence 
of such admittedly costly security measures as access monitors that 
validate every access attempt—measures that are necessary in 
conventional systems because of the persistence of the traditional 
"machine-language" accessibility of storage. 
Several aspects of SYMBOL—2R's implementation that constitute 
weaknesses in the controlled-sharing context came to light during the 
development of the file system. The lack of a simple, reliable 
mechanism for resynchronizing Supervisor and Terminal Monitor compu­
tations necessitated the file-system policy of blocking Terminal 
Monitors whenever they submit file-operation requests, which has the 
undesirable effect of making file operations uninterruptible by users. 
The switching of virtual processors for every Value File modification, 
in order to preserve the storage domains' integrity, is responsible 
for much of the system's complexity and computational overhead. And 
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the dangers inherent in concurrent accesses to values undergoing modifi­
cation required the inçxjsition of awkward restrictions upon the issuance 
of Value File access capabilities. 
In our estimation, however, none of these shortcomings is serious 
enough to offset or obscure the fundamental strength of the SYMB0L-2R as 
a foundation for a highly capable timesharing system. The file system 
described in this thesis ançly demonstrates that SYMBOL'S innovative 
approach to system architecture is not limited to its original total-
isolation level of protection, but is readily extended to provide modes 
of controlled information sharing that compare well with the most advanced 
of contemporary systems. 
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APPENDIX A 
FILE-OPERATION ERROR CONDITIONS 
This appendix summarizes the error conditions that can prevent 
successful completion of each of the file operations. The majority 
of the errors are connected with particular parameters of the file-
operation requests, and are so identified in the table below. 
ERROR CONDITIONS 
1. no such name 
2. duplicate name 
3. invalid name 
4, file-space limit exceeded 
5. procedure definition lacks END 
6. named object does not exist, or access is unauthorized 
7. parameter is not a variable 
8. concurrency restriction 
9. variable is not bound to a file-value 
10. attempted modification not permitted 
FILE OPERATIONS 
ORIGINATE; 4 
PPF:2,3 
ACTIVATE; 
PPF:1,3 
DUPLICATE: 4 
PPFl: 1,3; PPF2: 2,3 
DISCARD: 
PPF: 1,3 
INSERT and REDEFINE: 4 
(source = null) 
(source = blank) 
(source = other scalar) 
(source = ^ user|sPF^) 
DELETE 
PPF; 1,3; proc: 1,3 
PPF: 1,3; proc; 1,2,3 
PPF: 1,3; proc; 1,2,3,5 
PPF: 1,3; proc: 1,2,3; source: 1,3 
PPF; 1,3; proc; 2,3; user: 1; SPF: 3,6 
REDEFINE - see INSERT 
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TRANSCRIBE 
PPF: 1,3; proc: 1,3 
DEPOSIT: 4 
(source = null) SPF: 2,3; proc: 1,5; env; 1,3 
(source = other) SPF; 2,3; proc: 1,3; source: 1,3; env: 1,3 
LEND and REVEAL 
SPF: 1,3; ac-list: 3 
OBSOLETE 
SPF: 1,3 
CREATE: 4 
VF: 2,3 
DESTROY 
VF: 1,3 
COPYLINK and FREELINK 
(VF-name = scalar) var: 7; VF-nasse: 1,3,8 
(VF-name = <user|vF>) var: 7; user: 1; VF: 3,6,8 
VF modification: 4,10 
UNLINK 
var: 7,9 
AUTHORIZE (COPY/FREE) ACCESS 
VF: 1,3; ac-list: 3 
167 
APPENDIX B 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SUBSYSTEM ENVIRONMENTS 
We begin by describing the hardware algorithms and hardware-defined 
data structures on which the implementation of subsystem environments 
must rest. These concepts—principally, name-tables and global-linking— 
are described in somewhat more concrete terms in [18]. 
During translation of a program, the Translator generates a separate 
Name Table (NT) for each block encountered in the source text. Each NT 
contains, for each identifier in the block, an entry consisting of the 
identifier itself and a descriptor containing information about it. 
Each NT in a multi-block computation is linked by a pair of pointers 
to one or two other NT's, as shown by the example in Figure 44. Figure 
44a is a schematic diagram of a computation's block structure (the 
letters merely label the blocks for our convenience, and have no 
significance beyond the figure). Figure 44b shows the outward pointers 
linking each NT to the NT of the block immediately enclosing it, and 
makes obvious the tree-like structure inherent in block nesting. Figure 
44c shows the forward pointers that link all of a computation's NT's 
together into a linear list beginning with the îîT cf thm cute roost 
block. (The order in which NT's appear in the forward-pointer list stems 
from the Translator's NT-generating algorithm, which inserts a new 
block's NT into the list immediately following the enclosing block's 
NT.) 
While the source string is being scanned and the instruction string 
and accompanying NT's are being generated, each NT is effectively 
isolated from all the others. Descriptors of identifiers appearing in 
GLOBAL statements are merely flagged "needs link," as are those of 
identifiers that are recognizable as procedure calls (by virtue of a 
left-parenthesis immediately following their occurrence in the source 
text) and for which no corresponding procedure declaration is found in 
the same block. 
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a 
b 
C 
c 
C' 
C" 
r 
I 
A h g f d c 
k j 
b. outward pointers -
i h—) g—>f d >c 
/ / 
k^j 
I c. forward pointers. 
a. nested blocks. 
Fig. 44. Inter-name-table links: an example. 
After the source string has been completely scanned, and the last 
instruction generated, the Translator begins the "global-linking" phase. 
Taking the Name Tables in forward-pointer order, it inspects each one 
for descriptors marked "needs link." On finding such a descriptor, the 
Translator constructs a "global" link for it as follows: 
1. Variables and labels (see exan^le in Figure 45): the Translator 
searches the NT of the immediately enclosing block for an entry with 
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if 
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X 9 
Y 9 
A 
a. before global linking. 
outward 
forward 
T 1 
X 
z 
X 8*1 
Y S» 
A 
global link 
global link 
b. after global linking. 
Fig. 45. Global linking of variables and labels. 
a matching identifier; if none is found, the Translator creates one. 
Then the "needs-link" descriptor is marked "global," and a global 
link (i.e., a pointer to the matching entry's descriptor) is stored 
in it. Exception; if the matching entry's descriptor is 
itself marked "global," its global link is copied into the "needs 
link" descriptor, thus short-cutting multi-link chains of global links. 
2. Procedure-calls; the Translator scans the Name Tables of all 
enclosing blocks, working its way outward until it finds a matching 
entry whose descriptor identifies it as a procedure declaration; on 
finding one, it global-links the "needs-link" descriptor to it in 
the same fashion as for variables and labels. If the Translator 
reaches the end of the program's outermost block without finding 
any such procedure declaration, however, it redirects its search 
to the System Public Library (see Figure 46), whose directory's address 
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BH5 
System name 
table 
* System Public Library 
proc P2; 4 
proc PI; call P2 4 
P2 
Block call PI end $ user's source text 
a. initial conditions 
user's program (i.e., instruc­
tion string generated from 
user's source text) B 
— B 
call PI 
— E 
schematic block 
structure 
b. First global-linking pass finds PI undeclared. 
B 
user • s oroeram— 
ZZBZEi' 
_ I 
PI I# 
B 
PI I ?  
E 
4^ à 
P2i?  
-B 
— B 
call PI 
— E 
B(P1) 
r, call P2 
C — X _) 
c. After translating Pi, second global-linking 
pass finds P2 undeclared. 
Fig. 46. Example showing how Translator includes library 
procedures in a user's program. 
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d. After translating P2, third global-linking pass s 
in linking the P2-call to the P2 declaration... 
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B PI EB PJ EB 
^ ! ! 
X I I % 
/""HZLc 
JP2 I i _i 
pT]^  
1 1— 
I I 
Tscl 
11 I 
y 
e. ... and finally links the Pl-call to Pi's declaration 
Fig. 45—Continued 
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is found in context-block word BH5. The directory—the System Name 
Table (SNT)—resembles computations' name tables in format; each SNT 
entry consists of an identifier and a pointer to a string of source 
text containing a procedure declaration. If the Translator finds an 
identifier in the SNT matching that of the "needs link" descriptor, 
it immediately abandons global linking and begins translating the 
procedure declaration. Since the block search ended in the program's 
outermost block, that block's Name Table provides the name context for 
the procedure declaration. The procedure's name is added to the 
outermost block's NT, a new NT is established for the procedure, and 
translation proceeds with source-text analysis and instruction 
generation. 
The end of the SNT procedure's source text eventually terminates 
translation again, and the Translator embarks once more on global 
linking, beginning again with the outermost block's Name Table. 
Eventually, it again encounters the "needs link" procedure-call 
descriptor responsible for the SNT search. This time, however, the 
procedure-call entry is matched by the new procedure-declaration entry 
in the outermost block, to which it is finally global-linked. 
The example of Figure 46, showing the global-linking involved when 
one SNT prccsdure calls another,- illustrates our problem in implementing 
subsystems, namely, that entries for all SNT procedures called (no matter 
how indirectly) fay a program must coexist in a single SNT. What we need 
is a multi-SNT structure of the sort shown in Figure 13, in which an SNT 
entry can specify not only a procedure definition, but also another SNT, 
specifying the procedure's translation environment. Unfortunately, such 
a multi-environment structure lies beyond capabilities of the Translator's 
hardware. 
We resort, therefore, to the use of software "patches" to the 
Translator's algorithms, to obtain the effect of the desired subsystem 
structure by means of intervention during translation. For each subsystem 
involved in a computation, we interrupt translation twice—first to 
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establish the subsystem's environment directory as the SNT for global-
linking the subsystem, and again to reinstate the former SNT after the 
subsystem's global-linking is complete. 
The first interruption is caused by the backspace character planted 
in the subsystem procedure's source text (see Figure 23). At this point 
in the translation process, as shown in Figure 47, the next source 
character would ordinarily be the end-of-record, to which the Translator 
would respond by compiling an end-of~block (B7) instruction, resetting its 
current-NT pointer to that of the block enclosing the procedure, and 
entering its global-linking routine. 
The net effects of the software intervention resulting from the 
backspace-induced shutdown of the Translator are to substitute the sub­
system's environment directory for the current SNT, and to isolate the 
subsystem from the enclosing block for global-linking purposes. The soft­
ware maintains a LIFO stack (the subsystem stack) internal to itself, 
in which it saves various information for use in reversing these 
alterations after the subsystem has been global-linked. 
The details of the software's effects on data structures used by 
the Translator are shown in Figure 48, in which the specific alterations 
are denoted by numbered arrowheads. First, the SNT pointer in context-
block word BH5 is placed on the software's subsystem stack (this is 
indicated by "SI" in the figure) and replaced by a pointer to the sub­
system's environment directory, which thus takes over as System Name 
Table, supplying definitions of undeclared procedures discovered during 
global linking of the subsystem. Next, the "PROCEDURE" token that is 
now the sole occupant of the Translator's stack is replaced by a "BLOCK" 
token. This causes the Translator, when it resumes, to begin global-
linking as it does at the end of a main program, i.e., at the current 
block rather than the enclosing one; the next global-linking pass there­
fore begins with the procedure-block itself, rather than the block 
enclosing it. 
The third and fourth steps disable name-table links (connecting the 
subsystem to its environment) by clearing their active flags (stacking the 
addresses of the NT control words affected so they can eventually be 
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AH5: current source pointer BH5; SNT pointer 
end of record 
P's text 
P's SNT current SNT 
M2; top-of-stack register 
NT of I 
block enclosing P ^"PROCEDURE" code 
P's NT 
orward 
links "5 
outward 
links 
last blci 
within P 
AH3; current-NT pointer 
block not con-
i tained in P 
Fig. 47. Situation at Translator shutdown for establishment of 
subsystem P's environment. 
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AH5: current source pointer BH5; SNT ptr 
P's text... ; 9 S % ( l$l 
P's SNT former SNT 
AH3; current-NT pointer 
( • 
NT of 
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< \ 
P's NT 
NOTE; back-
link flag=0 
S2 
V  
^AH2: top-of-stack register 
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^ "BLOCK" code 
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—/ last block enclosed 
within P 
block not con­
tained in P 
Fig. 48. Situation at Translator restart after establishment of 
subsystem P's environment. 
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re-enabled). Step 3 disables the outward pointer of the procedure's Name 
Table, so the subsystem is isolated from all enclosing blocks (see 
Figure 49a); this ensures that the subsystem's global procedure-calls are 
linked to procedures defined in the subsystem's own environment directory 
regardless of any procedure declarations in any enclosing block. Moreover, 
it causes GLOBAL declarations in the subsystem's outermost block to yield 
the same result as in an entire computation's outermost block, namely, an 
error message and refusal to execute. Step 4 traces the forward list 
until it finds a Name Table belonging to a block not enclosed in the sub­
system's outermost block, and disables the link to it (as illustrated in 
Figure 49). This causes the Translator to give a "normal completion" 
indication when it finishes global-linking the subsystem. 
step 3 
step 4% 
i b—>g—> f  d )c 
a. isolation of subsystem P 
from enclosing block 
(outward pointer disabled) 
b. isolation of subsystem P 
from following block 
(forward pointer disabled) 
Fig. 49. Isolating a subsystem for global linking. 
The first software intervention is now complete, and the Translator 
proceeds to global-link the subsystem. Since the subsystem's isolation 
from all outside blocks makes it look like a self-contained program to 
the Translator, the eventual result is a "normal completion" shutdown of 
the Translator, after it has global-linked the subsystem's last block. 
This event, distinguished from a true normal completion by a non-empty 
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subsystem stack, initiates the second of the pair of software inter­
ventions involved in subsystem interventions. The software responds 
by removing the three topmost items from its stack, which are the 
addresses stored in the course of the first intervention. It uses 
the addresses to restore the former SNT directory, enable the disabled 
links, and finally to set the current-NT register (in context-block 
word AH3) to point to the NT of the block enclosing the subsystem. 
Last of all, it sets the global-linking-in-progress flag (in context-
block word AH5) so that the Translator, on restarting, immediately 
resumes global-linking the blocks external to the subsystem. 
The foregoing description has shown how, through paired inter­
ventions at the initiation and completion of subsystem global-linking, 
SYMBOL software can effectively isolate a subsystem from its enclosing 
block and the translation environment thereof. Since the implementation 
depends in no way on whether the enclosing block is the user's program 
or is itself a subsystem, and since a last-in-first-out stack is 
en^loyed to save and restore the enclosing block and its environment, 
this mechanism can accommodate subsystems nested to any depth. 
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GLOSSARY 
Account: The set of all files owned by a single user. 
Capability: A pointer by which a file procedure or value is accessed. 
Confutation: An SPL program and all library procedures called by it, 
together with the values of all of their variables. 
Context block: A 24-word block of core storage permanently allocated 
to eadi virtual processor. Serves to bind a ccanputation to the 
virtual processor. 
Descriptor: A datum (occupying a single word) containing various 
attributes of some stored object, usually including the object's 
location. 
Descriptor, component: Contains a pointer to a structure-valued 
component of a structure value. 
Descriptor, library: Contains a pointer to the source-text string 
defining a library procedure, and a flag that determines whether 
the procedure is privileged. 
Descriptor, name-table: Defines an identifier as to type: variable, 
label, or procedure. 
Descriptor, variable: Contains, or poir.ts to, a variable's value. 
Environment, run-time: A translation environment, as seen by users. 
Environment, translation: A library containing procedure definitions 
to which procedure-calls in a program or procedure are linked if 
not defined within the program itself. 
Extended SPL (ESPL): The superset of SPL that includes memory-state­
ments and SYSTEM statements. Only privileged programs and 
procedures are interpreted according to the syntax of ESPL. 
Global declaration: Defines an identifier in an interior block of an 
SPL program as identical in meaning to the same identifier in the 
enclosing block. 
Instruction string: Part of the internal representation of a coir^utation 
that is generated by the Translator in preparation for the compu­
tation's execution. An instruction string differs from its parent 
source text chiefly in that instructions are aligned on half-word 
boundaries, operators are rearranged into Polish postfix order, 
and identifiers are represented by pointers to their name-table 
descriptors. 
Interpreter: The collection of processors that provides services to 
implement virtual processors. 
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Logical storage: The structured storage facility in which Virtual Storage 
is arranged into storage strings for use by the Interpreter. 
Memory statement: An ESPL construct that provides system software with 
Interpreter-like access to Logical Storage. 
Name space; The set of all of a confutation's variables. 
Name table: A list containing an entry for each identifier that occurs in 
a single block of a computation. Each entry contadns the identifier 
itself, with a descriptor giving its attributes. 
Privileged program or procedure: One whose text is interpreted according 
to the syntax of ESPL, rather than SPL. The only programs that can 
be privileged are system programs, and the only privileged procedures 
are privileged members of the System Public Library. User-supplied 
source text—programs or procedures—can never be privileged. 
Source text: The externally accessible address-free character-string 
representation of a program or procedure. Bead by the Translator in 
assembling confutations. 
Storage domain: A collection of pages in use, administered as a unit for 
storage-string allocation and de-allocation purposes, and reclaimed 
as a unit for return to the system's free-page pool. 
Storage string: A set of storage locations that behaves as a one-
dimensional sequentially accessible array under the operations 
available to the Interpreter. 
Storage Syscem: The collection of processors that provides Logical Storage 
to the Interpreter. 
Subsysvem: A Shared Procedure File that includes a specification of its 
own private run-time ^vironment. 
SYMBOL Programming Language (SPL): The high-level application-oriented 
language that motivates much of the design of SYMB0L-2R. 
System Name Table: A translation environment's directory, accessible to 
the Translator by a pointer in context-block word BK5. 
System Public Library: The system-supplied run-time environment. 
SYSTEM statement: An ESPL construct that provides synchronization between 
software and the System Sifervisor. 
Value: A collection of information bound to a variable in a confutation. 
A scalar value is a string of zero or more characters. A structure 
value is a vector, each of whose confonents is either a scalar value 
or a. vector. 
Virtual processor: The Interpreter, as seen by a single user in terms of 
the services it provides him. 
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Virtual Storage: The 2 -word linear address space upon which Logical 
Storage is based. 
Volatile capability: A capability that is held by a computation (as 
opposed to being held in a file), and hence one that is relinquished 
implicitly upon liquidation of the computation holding it. 
Workspace: A region of storage provided for each terminal session, 
into which the user loads his program for editing and execution. 
In SYMBOL's software-free configuration, each workspace is 
inçjlemented by a single storage string. When software is added, 
certain Terminal Monitors inplement workspaces by means of 
structure-valued variables. 
